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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
New trends in civil litigation financing are transforming the way in which we 
conceive the civil justice system. If, on the one hand, academic and political 
discourses directly concerning the substance of legal rights are of fundamental 
importance, equally significant are any discourses about how those rights are then to 
be enforced in practice. Litigation is an expensive process and its costs are often 
prohibitive. Hence, questions on the ways in which people and other economic 
actors can finance litigation to obtain the fulfillment of their rights are perhaps as 
important as the questions on the content of those rights themselves. 
Third-party litigation funding (also referred to as third-party litigation 
financing—hereinafter TPLF)1 is likely the most significant among the 
aforementioned new trends. TPLF consists of a practice where an independent third 
party, with no prior connection to a claimholder, covers all or some of a 
claimholder’s costs of civil litigation on a non-recourse basis, in exchange for a 
share of any damage award or settlement that is contractually determined ex-ante 
                                                      
1 Some scholars, especially in the United States, prefer using the expression Alternative Litigation 
Financing (ALF), which was introduced by a report prepared in 2010 by Steven Garber for RAND 
(Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues, Knowns and Unknowns, RAND 
Corporation: Santa Monica, 2010). However, I prefer using the expression third-party litigation 
funding (TPLF) because, even if this term may also comprise other mechanisms of litigation 
financing by third parties (e.g., litigation expenses insurance), it is much consolidated in the 
literature, and it is less vague than ‘alternative litigation financing’ (ALF). 
  8 
between the claimholder and the third-party funder. This means that, if the litigation 
is successful, the funder will obtain the contractually determined share of damage 
award or settlement. By contrast, if the litigation is unsuccessful, the claimholder 
will bear no cost for the litigation, and the third-party funder will lose his 
investment. 
Modern TPLF first emerged in Australia around twenty years ago. It has 
since then developed mostly in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
(US), but also in other common law jurisdictions, as well as—though to a lesser 
extent—in the civil law world. 
On the supply side, TPLF represents a new and attractive business 
opportunity for the financial sector, positioning itself as a new trend at the most 
advanced frontiers of finance. However, TPLF is not walking in a vacuum. By 
contrast, interrelationships between the civil justice system and the world of finance 
are increasingly acquiring importance, in a process where financial investors and 
capital markets play a more and more fundamental role in (directly or indirectly) 
supporting litigant parties interacting with the civil justice system. Those trends, 
together with TPLF, contribute to breaking away from the traditional view of the 
litigation process, which—at least in the Western legal tradition2—contemplates the 
opposition of two parties, plaintiff and defendant, represented by their respective 
lawyers, in front of an adjudicating authority, and covering the costs of the litigation 
                                                      
2 Which includes both the common law and civil law traditions. See DIEGO E. LÓPEZ MEDINA, 
TEORÍA IMPURA DEL DERECHO: LA TRANSFORMACIÓN DE LA CULTURA JURÍDICA LATINOAMERICANA 
(Legis, 3rd prtg. 2004), 12. 
  9 
out of their own pockets or—at most, in some jurisdictions—from their lawyers’ 
assets.3 
On the demand side, TPLF is an empowering tool for budget-constrained or 
risk-averse plaintiffs, which allows them to pursue enforcement of their rights even 
where they are frightened by the often-prohibitive costs of litigation. In this 
perspective, TPLF levels the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants, and it 
is capable of increasing access to justice. 
The meeting of supply and demand for TPLF has determined a boom of this 
innovative industry in recent years. More and more litigation financing companies 
are being incorporated around the world. These companies have been expanding 
their frontiers, both geographically, reaching new markets, and in terms of the areas 
of litigation in which they invest, spanning across contract disputes, personal injury 
litigation, securities litigation, bankruptcy proceedings, private enforcement of 
antitrust laws, international arbitration, intellectual property litigation, and more. 
However, this flourishing industry is constantly under attack. Opponents of 
TPLF have heavily criticized it, and brought numerous frontal attacks in the policy 
debate that has emerged around this practice, proposing arguments supporting the 
idea that TPLF should be banned or at least regulated in order to minimize its social 
costs.  
These attacks have contributed generating a heated debate on TPLF. In short, 
this debate can be roughed out in three extreme positions: (i) TPLF should be 
                                                      
3 I am referring to contingency fee schemes, on which see e.g. Neil Rickman, Contingent Fees and 
Litigation Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. &. ECON. 295 (1999). 
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permitted and left unregulated; (ii) TPLF should be completely banned; or (iii) 
TPLF should be permitted subject to regulation. Which is the way to go?  
  
   Dissertation Questions and Purpose of the Work 
The purpose of this work is to address two key questions: (i) should TPLF be 
permitted?; and, if so, (ii) should it be regulated?  
In addition, and from a broader perspective, this dissertation presents itself 
as a monographic work aiming to provide a thorough understanding of TPLF from a 
comparative perspective, in order to serve as a basis for any legal or policy 
discussion on TPLF.  
The use of the lenses of comparative in the study of TPLF law is crucial. 
TPLF is a truly transnational phenomenon; it is a practice that poses challenges 
calling for comparative law analysis, and which by no means may only be looked at 
from an isolated national or local perspective. This is at least for the following 
reasons.  
First, TPLF is a transnational business trend: not only it exists in different 
countries, but it is also following a coordinated and simultaneous evolution in those 
jurisdictions, often steered by the same driving forces. In particular, the nature of the 
TPLF industry’s business is transnational, as TPLF companies constantly invest in 
litigation overseas as well as in cross-border litigation. Countless examples could be 
mentioned: from UK or Chinese companies investing in litigation in the US,4 
Australian companies opening branches in New York for the management of their 
                                                      
4 Julie Bédard (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP), at a talk at Columbia Law School on 
27 March 2013, reported on a case in which she was involved where the plaintiff was backed by a 
Chinese litigation funding company. 
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US investments,5 to US companies investing in litigation against US defendants 
before courts of law in Latin America.6  
Second, the debate on the legality and desirability of TPLF is a truly 
transnational one. Academics, industry, and institutions are involved in a debate that 
extends to both sides of the Ocean and beyond. The positions of e.g. the US bar 
associations, or of the UK judicial institutions, inevitably influence the policy on 
TPLF beyond the borders where they originate. Similarly, transnational and global 
academic conferences have been organized with a view to learn from each other’s 
experiences, and generate transnational scholarly knowledge on TPLF.7  
Third, TPLF calls for a transnationally coherent legal and regulatory 
approach, in the absence of which strong unbalances would be produced. For 
example, lawyers are bound by different ethics and professional responsibility rules 
depending on the jurisdiction in which they are qualified, often independently of 
where they practice. TPLF raises a number of ethical issues that are likely to be 
addressed by the professional responsibility rules issued by each jurisdiction’s 
regulatory body for the legal profession. In the context of international arbitration, 
for example, if lawyers qualified in different jurisdictions are involved in the same 
arbitration, each lawyer will have to comply with the ethical rules established by the 
legal profession regulator where she is qualified. Therefore, a lack of coherence in 
                                                      
5 I am referring to Bentham IMF (http://www.imf.com.au), an Australian litigation funding company 
that recently opened a US subsidiary with offices in New York and Los Angeles. 
6 See e.g. the famous ‘Lago Agrio’ case, brought by Aguinda and other Ecuadorian citizens, backed 
by litigation funding firm Burford, against Chevron Corporation before the Court of Nueva Loja 
(Ecuador), which resulted in decision No. 2003-0002 (2011). 
7 See e.g. the two-event Global Conference on TPLF, organized by Searle Civil Justice Institute at 
George Mason University’s Law & Economics Center, which comprised an event in New York and 
one in Brussels in the fall 2011. 
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the professional responsibility rules on TPLF may create strong unbalances among 
the lawyers involved in the same funded arbitration.8  
 
Methodology 
In this work I use the analytical methods provided by the scholarly discipline of 
comparative law. In particular, not only I compare the law and policy of TPLF 
across different jurisdictions, but I use comparative law as an anti-formalistic and 
anti-positivistic methodological approach to the study of law, including economic, 
sociological, and political analysis of law and policy in order to uncover what hides 
behind the façade of the existing rhetoric on TPLF. After presenting the law of 
TPLF and the policy debate on its face, I use some of the tools provided by 
comparative law in order to unveil the politics that stand behind it. Moreover, after 
identifying the main arguments in the debate either supporting or opposing TPLF, I 
use economic analysis to test the appearances and reassess the costs and benefits of 
TPLF, and I propose sociological arguments in order to further explain certain 
political oppositions to TPLF. 
Comparative law also proves useful in order to address the issue of whether 
TPLF should be regulated. In particular, throughout the work and with respect to the 
several concerns related to TPLF that may require regulation, I discuss the 
regulatory alternatives that have been proposed or discussed in different 
jurisdictions in a comparative perspective. In this exercise, I try to the extent 
possible not to do a blind comparison between different regulatory solutions or 
                                                      
8 This issue was raised and discussed by Julie Bédard (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP), 
at a talk at Columbia Law School on 27 March 2013. 
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approaches adopted in different jurisdictions, but rather to keep an eye on the 
context in which a particular rule operates, and proceed with a comparative analysis 
that takes such different contexts into account.9 
 
Scope of this Work 
As stated, TPLF is only one among the many practices that have emerged from the 
increasing interrelation between the civil justice system and the world of finance. 
Other practices include the tendency of law firms—traditionally organized as 
partnerships and poorly capitalized—devise new solutions to raise capital, e.g., 
through private placements10 or public offerings.11 Additional practices, which are 
conceptually and structurally even more similar to TPLF, are i.a. contingency fee 
schemes, insurance based solutions, assignment of claims,12 and recourse litigation 
‘loans’.13 Although some of these practices are interesting and pose very important 
challenges, this dissertation only addresses TPLF strictly intended as the practice 
                                                      
9 On the need for such an approach see Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana Longmoore, 
Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation 
Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (2013), 95. 
10 Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP—an ex New York-based, 1200-attorney law firm—raised $125 million in 
a bond offering in April 2010. The firm filed for bankruptcy in New York on May 28, 2012. Peter 
Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 28 May 2012, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-
bankruptcy/?_php=true&_type=blogs&hp&_r=0 
11 Australia’s Slater & Gordon held the world’s first IPO for a law firm in May 2007. 
12 On the idea of a ‘market for legal claims,’ based on the mechanism of assignment, see Marc J. 
Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987); Michael 
Abramowicz, On The Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L. J. 697 (2004); Isaac M. 
Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1543 (2005); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); 
Andrea Pinna, Financing Civil Litigation: The Case for the Assignment and Securitization of 
Liability Claims (2009) NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396682. 
13 For a survey see Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-
party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 351-359. For a comparison between 
TPLF and legal expenses insurance see Michael Faure & Jef De Mot, Comparing Third-Party 
Financing of Litigation and Legal Expenses Insurance, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 743 (2012). 
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contemplating a third-party investing in a claimholder’s litigation, covering all or 
some of her litigation costs in exchange for a share of any proceeds if the suit is 
successful, or nothing if the case is lost. All other means of civil litigation financing 
shall be deemed outside the scope of this work. 
 
Contribution to Legal Scholarship 
Until a few years ago the literature on TPLF was rather scarce, at least compared to 
the long-term consequences that the establishment of this innovative practice might 
produce both on the legal and civil justice system and on the economy and society 
as a whole.14 More recently, there has been a significant increase in scholarly 
production on the topic. However, at least two shortcomings can be identified in the 
existing literature on TPLF. First, much of the scholarly work on TPLF addresses 
specific legal, policy, or economic issues, but fails to provide a broad view on the 
phenomenon as a whole. Secondly, most of the existing work hardly takes a true 
comparative perspective to the study of TPLF, and only focuses on one or more 
specific jurisdictions. Moreover, even for scholarly articles whose claim is to 
propose comparative analysis, the approach is rather formalistic, and hardly critical 
(i.e., those authors limit themselves to comparing legal rules across national 
experiences, but fail to use the anti-formalistic analytical tools provided by 
comparative law). 
                                                      
14 On the influences that different rules governing the costs of litigation exert on the development of 
substantive law see J. Robert. S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of 
Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 
(1988). 
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In contrast, this dissertation aims at a high-level reflection on TPLF within a 
monographic-type work product. It of course addresses specific issues, but it tries to 
look at the forest that spreads beyond the trees. Importantly, it also represent an 
attempt to do real comparative analysis of the problems arising from TPLF, looking 
beyond the façade of formal legal and policy narratives, and taking a detached view 
on the politics of TPLF, trying to present ideas and conclusions in an unbiased way, 
except where I expressly state my own opinion.  
Finally, by proposing a high-level comprehensive comparative work on 
TPLF, this dissertation aims at becoming a basis for a consistent transnational legal 
and regulatory policy concerning TPLF. 
 
Structure of the Work 
In order to address the two main questions of the dissertation and achieve its broader 
general objectives, the work is organized as follows. 
First, Chapter I describes what TPLF is, why it has emerged, and what the 
industry and current market look like. 
Chapter II describes the evolution of the law of TPLF in a comparative 
perspective. It addresses both the common law and civil law experiences, which are 
apparently very different, but eventually reconciling such difference using the 
comparative law theory of legal formants. The Chapter also advances some 
hypotheses, partly based on the theory of cryptotypes, on why TPLF has developed 
to a larger extent in the common law world than it has in the civil law world. 
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Chapter III reveals the real driving forces that stand behind and shape the 
law of TPLF. In other words, it is a journey into the politics of TPLF. It therefore 
discusses the arguments (at least on their face) used by proponents and critics of 
TPLF supporting or opposing the admissibility of this practice. 
The purpose of Chapter IV is to lift the veil that lays on the debate around 
TPLF. I do so by using two anti-formalistic methodological approaches to the study 
of law offered by comparative legal scholarship. First, I use economic analysis in 
order to uncover the myths and realities standing behind the arguments in favor and 
against TPLF: I do so by developing an economic model of TPLF, and looking at 
the parties’ incentives in order to test what is really likely to happen according to the 
principles of the economic analysis of law; I thus propose a reassessment of the 
costs and benefits of TPLF. Then, I bring forward some sociological considerations 
that somehow balance out the economic arguments, in order to explain why TPLF 
has been countered by some parties and why perhaps it should be limited, thus 
representing a critique to the very economic arguments that I bring forward in the 
first part of the Chapter. Chapter IV will come to the conclusion that TPLF should 
be permitted, while some concerns arise that may require regulation. 
Finally, the dissertation closes with some conclusive thoughts and 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCING THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING (TPLF) 
 
 
 
A. TPLF EXPLAINED 
Emily is a twenty-five-year-old single mother who used to work at the local ice 
cream shop. A few months ago, while driving her car on a Sunday, she was hit by a 
truck driver who ran the red light. As a result of that she became unable to work for 
at least one year, and was therefore fired by her employer. Emily now has a $1 
million claim against the truck driver, but she cannot afford to hire a lawyer to 
represent her in the litigation. In particular, Emily has some savings that she may 
invest in a lawsuit against the truck driver, but she is concerned that, if she loses the 
lawsuit, she will loose everything she has, finding herself incapable of paying for 
her own living expenses and her child’s school until she recovers. 
One year, ago, X-Conductors, Inc., a small high-tech start-up company based 
in the Silicon Valley, obtained a patent on an innovative chip that is used in new-
generation touchless credit card readers. About a month ago, X-Conductors found 
out that Giant Electronics, Inc., the largest manufacturer of electronic chips in the 
world, has been marketing credit card readers that contain a chip that violates X-
Conductors’s patent rights. Larry, X-Conductors’s General Counsel, has tried to 
convince the CEO that they have a very strong case against Giant Electronics, and 
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that X-Conductors is likely to obtain a $15 million damage award from Giant 
Electronics. However, X-Conductors has little liquidity and the CEO is concerned 
that if they lose the case, the company may go bankrupt. Therefore, the CEO intends 
not to approve Larry’s budget request for the litigation. Larry understands the 
CEO’s concerns, although he feels very frustrated by the situation.  
Today, Peter, the legal representative of YLF, Inc., a new litigation financing 
company, separately approached Emily and Larry, and proposed them to cover the 
entire cost of their respective litigation, in exchange of one third of any damage 
award or settlement. Peter explained Emily and Larry that, if their case turns out to 
be unsuccessful, YLF will ask no money from them. Emily thought about it for a 
short while and accepted Peter’s offer. Larry immediately called the CEO of X-
Conductors to discuss the proposal. The CEO realized that the budget for this 
(potentially fruitful) litigation will remain off the balance sheet, and gave Larry the 
green light to sue Giant Electronics. 
The two stories above exemplify what TPLF is and how it may work in 
practice.  
From a legal point of view, TPLF is based on a contract between a 
claimholder and a litigation funder, pursuant to which the litigation funder takes on 
the obligation to cover all or some of the claimholder’s litigation expenses 
(including filing fees, expert and witness fees, attorney fees, and so on) and, in 
exchange, the claimholder promises the funder to pay him a share of any sum he 
obtains if the outcome of the litigation is positive, or nothing if the case is lost.  
A TPLF contract may foresee a variety of clauses. For example, it may 
provide for different percentages of awards depending on whether the case is settled 
  19 
before trial, wins at trial, or goes before an appellate court. It may grant to the 
funder some oversight or control rights, e.g. over the choice of counsel or other 
litigation strategy.  
The reasons for a TPLF agreement are quite self-evident. For the funder, a 
TPLF agreement is essentially an investment: the funder expects to spend less than 
the amount he expects to obtain, discounted by the probability to lose the case (i.e., 
the funder sees an overall positive expected return from the TPLF agreement). For 
the claimholder, the reasons for signing a TPLF agreement may be at least two: (i) 
she has the resources to bring the case, but prefers not to invest them (in this case, a 
TPLF agreement is a way to manage litigation risk); or (ii) she does not even have 
the necessary resources to bring the case (in which case the claimholder’s only 
alternative is between bringing a funded case or not bringing the case at all). In both 
cases, the claimholder will turn to a litigation funder when she finds it convenient 
for her.  
 
B. EMERGENCE, DEVELOPMENTS, AND CURRENT (GLOBAL) MARKET 
Modern TPLF15 originated in Australia at the beginning of the 1990s. After having 
emerged in the specific context of insolvency,16 it successively extended to other 
                                                      
15 The fact that ancient prohibitions to TPLF exist in the common law (see Chapter II below) suggests 
that some form of third-party funding of litigation existed back in the day. For example, in the South 
African 1894 judgment Hugo & Möller N.O. v Transvaal Loan, Finance and Mortgage Co, [1894] 
(1) OR 336, the court addressed the case of an agreement to provide the necessary funds to enable an 
action to be proceeded with, in consideration for which the person lending the money was to receive 
an interest in the property sought to be recovered. The court concluded that such an agreement had 
not to be considered per se to be contra bonos mores or champertous.  
16 LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, Discussion Paper, Standing Committee of Attorneys General 
(May 2006) available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/legislation_policy/ll_lpd.nsf/pages/lp_dp, 4; VICKI WAYE, 
TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY & FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US 
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areas, though generally remaining largely confined within the boundaries of 
commercial litigation.17 Among other factors, the fairly favorable endorsement by 
Australian courts18 of non-recourse litigation lending practices allowed the industry 
to find rapid success and growth in Australia. Since then, several companies, such as 
Bentham IMF Limited (formerly known as IMF (Australia) Ltd),19 Litigation 
Lending Services Ltd20 and LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd21 are engaged in the 
business of professional litigation funding.22 Much of TPLF in Australia is still 
conducted under the statutory exception for insolvency, involving e.g. pursuing 
voidable transactions and misfeasance by company officers. Outside the insolvency 
context, litigation funding is usually limited to commercial litigation with large 
claims (over $500,000 or, for some companies, over $2 million), although an 
exception is constituted by class actions, where a large number of smaller claims can 
be processed economically. Litigation funding firms in Australia are generally not 
involved in personal injury-type matters. 
                                                      
(Presidian, 2008), 55. For an example of an insolvency matter for which TPLF was provided see 
Anstella Nominees Pty Ltd v St George Motor Finance Ltd [2003] FCA 466. 
17 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 5, 18, 133; LITIGATION FUNDING IN 
AUSTRALIA, supra note 16, 4-6. For two examples see QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd [2005] 
FCA 933; Fostif v Campbell Cash and Carry [2005] NSWCA 83. 
18 QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 1, 54; Campbell’s Cash & Carry P/L v 
Fostif P/L (2006) 299 ALR 200. 
19 Bentham IMF, which provides funding of legal claims and other related services where the claim 
size is over $2 million, is the largest litigation funder in Australia and the first to be listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (http://www.imf.com.au). 
20 Litigation Lending Services Ltd, set up in Sidney in 1999, has traditionally focused on the 
provision of litigation funding for insolvency market actions typically ranging from claims of 
between $200,000 and $10 million, though extending their services beyond insolvency to general 
commercial litigation, class actions and representative proceedings 
(http://www.litigationlending.com.au). 
21 LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd (“LCM”) has been in business since 1998 and was previously known 
as Australian Litigation Fund Pty Ltd (until April 2008). “LCM primarily provides litigation funding 
to insolvency practitioners. However, LCM also provides funding to solvent companies and 
individuals with worthwhile commercial legal claims. […] LCM prefers to undertake projects in 
which the relevant legal claim is for at least $2.5 million” (http://www.lcmlitigation.com.au). 
22 As of 2006, five companies operated in the business of commercial litigation funding. LITIGATION 
FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 16, 4. As of today, six active funders operate in the market. 
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In addition to the favorable statutory regulation and case law that has 
permitted the development of TPLF in Australia, several structural reasons explain 
why the Australian TPLF industry has turned into a flourishing one. Some of these 
reasons are the considerably high costs of litigation in relation to the value of the 
case,23 the limited availability of lawyer funding opportunities as a result of the 
prohibition on contingency fee agreements,24 the cost rule that operates in most 
areas of civil litigation, which usually requires the losing party to pay for the other 
party’s costs,25 and the decrease in the availability of legal aid in civil litigation 
cases that has taken place in recent years.26  
Some of the companies based in Australia also invest funding claims in 
foreign jurisdictions. Among them, Litigation Lending Services Ltd, based in 
Sidney, was the company involved in the funding agreement that was at issue in the 
first decision dealing with TPLF in New Zealand, given by the New Zealand High 
Court in 2000.27 Moreover, Bentham IMF Ltd, the major TPLF company in 
Australia, recently opened subsidiaries in New York and Los Angeles to manage 
their US litigation business.28 
                                                      
23 Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka, Costs and Funding of Civil 
Litigation: A Comparative Study, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 55-2009 (2009), 19. 
24 Michael Legg, Edmond Park, Nicholas Turner & Louisa Travers, The Rise and Regulation of 
Litigation Funding in Australia, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 625 (2011), 630. 
25 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 98. This rule increases 
the expected costs derived from a potential unfavorable ruling and hence encourages parties to 
disputes to resort to ways of financing litigation which minimize or even eliminate such expected 
costs. 
26 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 97; George R. Barker, 
Third-Party Litigation Funding in Australia and Europe, 8 J. L. ECON & POL’Y 451, (2012), 468. 
27 Re Nautilus Developments Ltd (in liquidation); Montgomerie v Davison (M1285/99; HC, Akld; 14 
April 2000). 
28 See http://www.benthamimf.com/about-us. 
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After its Australian debut, TPLF soon and rapidly expanded in the common 
law world, especially in the US and the UK, but also in other jurisdictions such as 
Bermuda,29 the British Virgin Islands,30 Canada,31 Hong Kong,32 Ireland,33 Jersey,34 
New Zealand,35 Singapore,36 and South Africa.37 
In the United States the industry of third-party investment in litigation 
started to develop in the mid 1990s. Differently from Australia, where TPLF has 
mainly operated in a commercial environment, in the US the industry of third-party 
investments in litigation was initially small scale and consumer oriented.38 On the 
one hand, litigation funders were active in consumer litigation such as personal 
injury cases. On the other hand, a significant market for investments in legal claims 
                                                      
29 For a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Bermuda see Stiftung Salle Modulable v Butterfield 
Trist (Bermuda) Limited ([2012] SC (Bda) 165). 
30 See e.g. Hugh Brown & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Kermas Limited [2011] (BVIHCV(COM)). 
31 For some recent cases see: E. Eddy Bayens and others v Kinross Gold Corporation and others, 
2013 ONSC 4974; Stanway v Wyeth Canada Inc. [2013] BCSC 1585; The Trustees of the Labourers’ 
Pension Fund of Central & eastern Canada v Sino-Forest Corporation [2012] ONSC 2937; Dugal v 
Manulife Financial Corporation [2011] ONSC 1785 (SCJ); MacQueen et al v Sydney Steel 
Corporation et al [2010] Halifax no 218010; Metzler Investment GMBH v Gildan Activewear Inc 
[2009] OJ no 3315 (SCJ); Hobsbawn v ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd [2009] Calgary 0101-04999 
(QB); Holmes v London Life Insurance Co [2007] CarswellOnt 268 (SCJ) (WL).  
32 For some court decision see: Re Po Yuen (To’s) Machine Factory Limited [2012] HKCU 816; 
Geoffrey L. Berman (In His Capacity as Trustee of the Lender Trust) v. SPF CDO I, Ltd and Others, 
HCMP1321/2010, 14 March 2011; Akai Holdings Ltd v Ho Wing On Christopher [2009] HKCU 172; 
Siegfried Adalbert Unruh v Hans-Joerg Seeberger [2007] HKCU 246. 
33 See e.g. Thema International Fund plc v HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Limited 
[2011] IEHC 357. 
34 See e.g. Barclays Wealth Trustees (Jersey) Limited v Equity Trust (Jersey) Limited and Equity 
Trust Services Limited [2013] JRC094; Barclays Wealth Trustees (Jersey) Limited v Equity Trust 
(Jersey) Limited and Equity Trust Services Limited [2012] JRC; The Valetta Trust [2011] JRC. 
35 For recent case law see: Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89; Saunders v 
Houghton [2012] NZCA 545; Contractors Bonding Ltd v Waterhouse [2012] NZCA 399; Houghton 
v Saunders [2011] HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-000348; Saunders v Houghton [2010] 3 NZLR 
331; Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2010] HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-3074; Houghton v 
Saunders [2008] NZCCLR 13. 
36 For some recent case law see: Law Society of Singapore v Kurubalan s/o Manickam Rengaraju 
[2013] SGHC 135; Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd. [2007] 1 SLR (R) 989; Lim 
Lie Hoa v Ong Jane Rebecca & Ors [2005] SGCA 24. 
37 See Litigation Funding in South Africa, LITIGATION FUNDING MAGAZINE (UK), August 2010. For 
some case law see: PriceWaterHouse Coopers Inc and Others v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 
[2004] (6) SA 66 (SCA); Headleigh Private Hospital (Pty) Ltd t/a Rand Clinic v Soller & Manning 
Attorneys and Others [2001] (4) SA 360 (W). 
38 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 5; George S. Swan, Economics and the 
Litigation Funding Industry: How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (2001). 
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in the US was one for ‘litigation loans,’ in which the funder would make a cash 
advance to a plaintiff in economic needs in order for her to pay for her medical and 
living expenses (and not for the litigation), using the claim as a collateral.39 
Nevertheless, a market also developed in the US that is specifically centered around 
commercial TPLF. As a consequence, the US market for TPLF is now divided in 
two broad branches: a traditional consumer litigation funding market, composed of 
many small firms that fund low-stakes litigation involving their clients,40 and a 
commercially-focused ‘upper’ market, where a small number of companies provide 
large dollar amounts to corporate actors that prefer turning to TPLF than risking 
their own assets to cover litigation costs. As the moment, six corporations invest in 
commercial lawsuits in the US. Of these six corporations, two are publicly traded 
corporations (Juridica Investment and Burford Capital). Since then, a few more 
companies have been incorporated as well as divisions of large institutions have 
been created to invest in commercial litigation in the US.41 
Juridica Investments Limited, one among the largest companies operating in 
the commercial sector in the US, is a Guernsey-based investment company that only 
invests in commercial claims (including IP, antitrust, commercial contracts, 
bankruptcy and insolvency, securities and finance). The typically investment size for 
Juridica amounts between $3 and 10+ million into claims of the size of at least $25-
                                                      
39 See e.g. Terry Carter, Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains on Plaintiffs 
Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 34 (2004); James T. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The 
“Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
223 (2003). 
40 A group of US companies providing non-recourse litigation funding to personal injury victims 
formed the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA) in 2004. ALFA is now comprised of 31 
companies nationwide. One of ALFA’s first goals was to establish industry standards in the TPLF 
industry, especially regarding transparency in transactions and clear disclosure to consumers 
(http://www.americanlegalfin.com). 
41 Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J. L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 593 (2012), 3. 
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100+ million.42 Another one of the largest litigation-finance firms, Burford Capital 
Limited, also based in Guernsey, also invests in commercial litigation, providing 
financing in support of high-stakes and sophisticated corporate litigation, arbitration, 
and other disputes, working with clients in both the United States and 
internationally.43 Law Finance Group Inc, created in 1994, advances sums between 
$25,000 and $15 million, and up to $50 million for appeal cases. Law Funds LLC, 
advances between $500 and $20 million in exchange for an assignment of the 
proceeds of a judgment or settlement.44 These are just some examples of companies 
operating in the TPLF market in the US, but others include Parabellum Capital LLC 
(a spinoff of Credit Suisse45), and more specifically oriented companies like General 
Patent Corporation.46  
The other crucial market for litigation funding in the common law world is 
the UK. The UK experience—similarly to the US one—is marked by a twofold 
litigation funding market, demonstrating that there is no reason to believe that TPLF 
should be limited to commercial matters. Indeed, litigation funding in the UK has 
                                                      
42 http://www.juridicacapital.com/investments.php 
43 http://www.burfordgroupltd.com/purpose.html. 
44 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 45. 
45 http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/09/credit-suisse-parts-with-litigation-finance-group 
46 “General Patent Corporation (GPC), for example, works on a 100% contingency basis. That means 
that if GPC accepts you as a client, the company covers ALL [emphasis in the original] fees and costs 
involved in the litigation. General Patent Corporation is not a law firm, so it will retain a law firm to 
actually try the case. It will, however, underwrite all legal fees and out-of-pocket expenses related to 
the lawsuit(s). […] Patent enforcement firms recoup their expenses and earn their fees from the 
proceeds of the settlements or judgments that result from the lawsuit and share in license fees and 
royalty payments obtained by them through licensing the patent. General Patent’s arrangement is a 
50/50 split of all net recoveries. Should the patent enforcement firm fail to secure a settlement for the 
patent owner, however, they are out the money they invested in the case and the patent owner owes 
the patent enforcement firm nothing!” Financing Patent Infringement Litigation, General Patent 
Corporation, February 2009, http://www.generalpatent.com/financing-patent-infringement-litigation-
0. 
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come to cover such areas as personal injury and family matters.47 However, the 
commercial litigation sector is the one expanding more rapidly and significantly. 
Private litigation funding in the UK is mainly the product of a combination 
of two factors that contributed to its development: on the one hand, a public policy 
trend during the 1980s and 1990s that focused on the reduction of publicly funded 
instruments for easing access to justice (legal aid); on the other, a judicial 
endorsement of private funding practices justified under the rationale of access to 
justice. Since the 1980s, the English government started reducing legal aid on the 
grounds that is was too expensive. Meanwhile, government policy encouraged 
privately funded access to justice by way of conditional fee agreements and after the 
event (ATE) insurance agreements, though not mentioning in principle TPLF.48 The 
new policy setting was thought precisely to shift the funding of non-commercial 
injury claims, i.e. damages claims involving physical or mental injuries, away from 
the public purse (legal aid) to the private sector.49 Later on, however, litigation 
funding has expanded to the commercial realm, in particular—like in Australia—in 
the field of insolvency,50 thus transforming the UK in an attractive market, where 
companies are willing to invest in a variety of fields that include even family matters 
(divorces),51 favoring access to justice in a highly expensive legal system like the 
                                                      
47 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 81. 
48 UNITED KINGDOM, LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITH CONDITIONAL 
FEES (March 1998), 3.3. However, third party funding was introduced as a result of an amendment 
sought in the House of Lords. 
49 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 82. 
50 Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 729; In re Park Gate Waggon Works Co. (1881) 17 Ch D 234; 
Guy v. Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481; Ramsey v Hartley [1977] 1 WLR 686; Norglen Ltd (in liq) v 
Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1. 
51 A famous case is that of “Harbour Litigation Funding […] financing the legal battle of Michelle 
Young, wife of the property tycoon Scot Young, [claiming] to have lost most of what was once a 
£400m fortune.” Elena Moya, Hedge Funds, Investors and Divorce Lawyers – It’s a Match Made in 
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UK one.52 Companies operating in the UK litigation funding market include IM 
Litigation Funding, Harbour Litigation Funding LTD,53 Juridica Investment 
Limited,54 among others. While initially the market was only composed of 
‘alternative investment firms,’55 in 2007 Allianz Litigation Funding56 had become 
“the first mainstream institution to enter the UK’s fledgling market for third-party 
litigation funding.”57 However, at the beginning of 2012 Allianz decided to 
discontinue its TPLF business in the UK and continental Europe.58 Furthermore, the 
rapid expansion of TPLF in the UK arguably also benefited from the recent global 
financial crisis, as the flood of litigation triggered by the credit crunch prompted the 
formation of new companies that finance lawsuits.59 
TPLF in Europe is not at all limited to the UK. Claims Funding 
International, for instance, “is a litigation funding company incorporated in Ireland 
and managed from its office in Dublin. [Its] mandate is to identify, fund, manage, 
                                                      
Heaven, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, 16 October 2009 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/oct/16/hedge-funds-divorce-litigation-funding). 
52 For the most recent and exhaustive report on the costs of the UK civil justice system see RT. HON. 
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT (The Stationary Office, 
2010). 
53 “Harbour Litigation funds claims with a claim value in excess of £3,000,000,” 
http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com. 
54 Juridica predominantly invests in the US, the UK, and in international arbitrations cases, 
http://www.juridicainvestments.com. 
55 Juridica Investment Limited, for example, with over US$200 million of assets under management, 
is listed on the London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM: JIL). 
56 Allianz Litigation Funding was the UK branch of Munich-based Allianz ProzessFinanz GmbH. 
57 Michael Herman, Allianz to Fund UK Court Cases, TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2007, available at 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article2688587.ece. 
58 See Christian Stuerwald, An Analysis of Allianz’ [sic] Decision to Discontinue its Litigation 
Funding Business, Calunius Capital, January 2012, available at 
http://www.calunius.com/media/2747/cs%20-
%20calunius%20article%20on%20allianz%204%20january%202012.pdf (last visited on January 31, 
2014). 
59 Jane Croft, Litigation Finance Follows Credit Crunch, FINANCIAL TIMES (Online version), 27 
January 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7c98c38a-0ab1-11df-b35f-00144feabdc0.html. 
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and resolve multi party (class action) and other significant legal claims in Europe 
and elsewhere.”60  
However, there is more than that. Third-party litigation funding is also 
growing in some continental Europe’s civil law countries. Apart from (and before)61 
the UK, Allianz Prozessfinanzierung62 used to fund litigation costs to plaintiffs in 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland, when these held claims of at least €100,000, 
with high probability of success and with a potentially divisible award which the 
company can share in, in exchange of a 20-30% of the proceeds (if any).63 Although 
Allianz has terminated its TPLF business, other companies still exist and have since 
then been created that are actively funding litigation in Europe.  
Germany is likely the most consolidated market in continental Europe for 
TPLF. FORIS Finanziert Prozesse64 was the first company operating in the TPLF 
business in Germany, and still today it offers both to advance the court costs and 
fees necessary to initiate an action as well as to assume the risk of a cost award if the 
plaintiff loses.65 There are also other companies in Germany that offer similar 
services, including DAS Prozessfinanzierung AG,66 Roland Prozessfinanz,67 
Juragent,68 and Exactor AG.69 It is interesting to notice that, while initially FORIS 
                                                      
60 http://www.claimsfunding.eu 
61 Allianz had entered the UK market in 2007. 
62 http://www.allianz-profi.com 
63 http://www.allianz-profi.de 
64 www.foris.de 
65 Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, FORIS Contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees 
in Germany, Centre for the Study of Law and Economics, Discussion paper 2001-04 available at 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwcsledp/200104.htm(2001); Michael Coester & Dagobert 
Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, 24 CIV. JUST. Q. 83, 84 (2005). 
66 www.das-profi.de 
67 http://www.roland-prozessfinanz.de/de/roland_prozessfinanz 
68 http://www.juragent.de 
69 www.exactor.de 
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demanded 50 percent of the client’s return from settlement or trial, nowadays—with 
more competition in the market—it only claims 30 percent.70  
In the civil law world, as will be discussed in the next chapter, TPLF is not 
as developed as in the common law world. However, there are sings pointing to an 
increasing market in those jurisdictions as well. For example, companies have been 
funding litigation in Austria,71 France,72 the Netherlands,73 and Switzerland.74  
In addition to the geographic expansion of the TPLF industry, it is worth 
noting that TPLF companies have been expanding the scope of the types of claims 
they support. Leaving aside the world of consumer litigation finance (typical of the 
US market, and of the UK to some extent), in the commercial realm companies have 
financed litigation and (international) arbitration in cases involving contract breach 
claims, bankruptcy cases,75 securities litigation, class actions (but only in some 
jurisdictions), damage claims for antitrust laws violations,76 and went even farther, 
                                                      
70 R. Kirstein & N. Rickman, FORIS Contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in 
Germany, supra note 65, 3-4. 
71 See e.g. AdvoFin Prozessfinanzierung AG, http://www.advofin.at, or Lexdroit, 
http://www.lexdroit.at. 
72 For example, Alter Litigation (http://www.alterlitigation.com) is the first litigation funding 
company in France: http://www.alterlitigation.com. 
73 See e.g. Liesker Legal (http://www.lieskerlegal.nl/index.php?lang=en). The company claims to be 
the market leader in litigation funding in the Netherlands. 
74 The first Swiss litigation financing company was Prozessfinanz—www.prozessfinanz.ch: see 
Christian Toggenburger, Financing Private Litigation – A European Alternative to Contingency 
Fees, 4 EUR. J. LAW REFORM 603 (2002). Reportedly, a draft law proposed by resolution of the 
Cantonal Council of Zurich in 2003 and i.a. prohibiting TPLF was challenged before the Swiss 
courts. In a decision of 10 December 2004, the Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne ruled that the 
relevant provision of the draft law prohibiting TPLF should be set aside, on the basis that it would 
restrict freedom of commerce in a way that was disproportionate to its intended purpose. 
75 See Patrick M. Jones, Third-Party Litigation Funding In Bankruptcy Cases, LAW JOURNAL 
NEWSLETTERS, ALM Media Properties, LLC (2013). 
76 On TPLF in antitrust private enforcement actions in Europe see e.g. E.V.O. (Dutch Shippers’ 
Council) Endorses Claims Funding International to Companies Claiming Against Air Freight 
Cartels, Claims Funding International (September 2009), available at 
http://www.claimsfunding.eu/10.html?&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=18&tx_ttnews[backPid]=4&cHash=ff63
1a4986. 
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e.g. financing cases for the recovery of funds stolen through corruption in emerging 
markets, as recently reported.77 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that TPLF not only has given rise to an 
investment industry directly interested in funding litigation for profit, but also to an 
array of related services. These include e.g. due diligence services by law firms or 
other service providers who assess legal claims on behalf of litigation funders. 
Moreover, they also include other consulting businesses: for example, Tim 
Scrantom, former founder and managing director of Juridica and later of BlackRobe 
Capital Partners LLC (a no longer existing litigation funding company) recently co-
launched a consultancy firm with specific expertise on TPLF in order to assist 
clients better navigate the market and its players.78 
                                                      
77 See Joe Leahy, Fund Sees Brazilian Fraud as Next Big Thing in Emerging Markets, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, 8 December 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cd441484-5e8a-11e3-8621-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2sTK3VoCM (last visited on February 5, 2014). 
78 Scrantom Dulles International PLLC (http://www.sdils.com). 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LAW OF TPLF: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
A. COMMON LAW 
1. Traditional Prohibitions: Maintenance and Champerty  
The common law has witnessed a significant expansion of TPLF during the past 
twenty years.79 However, this development has not taken place at a pace determined 
by free market forces, but the industry has encountered resistance from courts of law 
that have long been debating the legal status of TPLF. In particular, TPLF has 
encountered its harshest obstacle in the common law doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty.80  
In the words of the US Supreme Court, “[p]ut simply, maintenance is 
helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a 
                                                      
79 See i.a. Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia: How The 
Industry Has Evolved In Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687 (2011). 
80 See Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297 
(2002); Susan L. Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be 
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004), 55; Douglas R. Richmond, Other 
People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005), 650; Mariel 
Rodak, It’s About Time: A System Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its 
Effects on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2006); Julia H. McLaughilin, Litigation Funding: 
Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007), 646-647; Courtney R. Barksdale, 
All that Glitter Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 
707 (2007) 735; Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011) 63-67. 
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financial interest in the outcome”.81 By definition, therefore, maintenance and 
champerty prohibit TPLF.82  
Many common law jurisdictions have abolished maintenance and champerty 
as both torts and criminal offences.83 However, some continue to recognize and 
enforce these doctrines and thus limit the expansion of TPLF.84 In addition, even 
where maintenance and champerty have been abolished, these doctrines continue to 
survive as rules of public policy that can be raised to render TPLF agreements void 
and unenforceable.85 In some cases, courts have also been able to make use of this 
leverage to exercise control on the terms of TPLF agreements. As a result, the legal 
status of TPLF is disputed in many common law jurisdictions.  
In general terms, what characterizes the experience of TPLF in the common 
law world is a tendency which traces back from an original broad prohibition of 
                                                      
81 In re Primus, 436 US 412 n. 15 (1978). 
82 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL 
LITIGATION SECTION, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION 
FUNDING, 16 April 2013, 11. 
83 England: Criminal Law Act 1967 (UK) s 13. Identical provision was made for Northern Ireland by 
s. 16 of the Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1968. Australian 
states: Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Act 1993 (North South Wales); Civil Law (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (Australian Capital Territory) s 229; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (South 
Australia) Sch 11, 1 (3); V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 14. In the United 
States only a few cases seem to have applied champerty as a tort in the last hundred years (ibid.). 
84 Hong Kong is one example. See e.g. Siegfried Adalbert Unruh v Hans-Joerg Seeberger [2007] 
HKCU 246, in which the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong noted that the “the common law rules 
making maintenance and champerty criminal offences, torts and a ground for public policy for 
invalidating tainted contracts were part of Hong Kong law prior to 1997 and remain applicable by 
virtue of Article 8 of the Basic Law.” See also the more recent decision Winnie Lo v HKSAR [2011] 
FACC 2/2011, where the Court of Final Appeal made clear that the prohibition on champerty and 
maintenance is not unconstitutional and remains part of the law in Hong Kong. However, the Court 
also indicated that reform should be considered with regards to this area of law. As Ribeiro PJ stated: 
“I wish to raise for consideration the question whether and to what extent criminal liability for 
maintenance should be retained in Hong Kong […]. The issues are, however, of some complexity 
and may involve taking a different view in respect of maintenance as opposed to champerty; and of 
criminal as opposed to tortious liability. It is in my view a fit topic to be referred to the Law Reform 
Commission.” 
85 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) (1975) QB 373; Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse (1982) AC 
679, 702; Roux v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1992) 2 VR 577, 605; Quach v Huntof P/L 
(2000) 32 MVR 263; Smith v Roach (2002) 42 ACSR 148. 
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champertous agreements towards a gradually increasing relaxation of that doctrine 
and contextual liberalization of the practice of TPLF. Before entering the 
exploration of how such relaxations have taken place in the three main common law 
jurisdictions where TPLF has developed (Australia, the US, and the UK), and 
how—by contrast—courts still use them to strike down TPLF agreements (or at 
least impose that those agreements be structured according to certain standards) in 
certain other jurisdictions, it is useful to briefly explain what maintenance and 
champerty are as well as their rationale and historical origins.  
Champerty is considered a species within the wider category of maintenance, 
where to ‘maintain’ indicates the action of who “assist[s] a litigant in prosecuting or 
defending a claim.”86 In particular, champerty (“an agreement between an officious 
intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the 
litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”87) is 
considered to be an illegal form of maintenance.88 In the words of NY Court of 
Appeals Judge Cardozo, “maintenance inspired by charity or benevolence has been 
sharply set apart from maintenance for spite or envy or the promise or hope of 
gain”,89 being the former considered legal while the latter, today simply identified as 
‘champerty,’ illegal.90 An agreement in which a third party supports another’s 
litigation in exchange for a share of the proceeds in case of success and nothing in 
case of loss, where therefore the funder has no other interest than financial, is 
                                                      
86 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009). 
87 Ibid. 262. 
88 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. 
89 In the Matter of the Estate of Gilman 251 N.Y. 265, 271 (1929). 
90 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80.  
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understood to fall under the category of champertous agreements and is thus, at least 
in principle, considered void. 
The doctrine of champerty is an ancient one. According to a majority 
opinion, it developed in medieval England as the merchant class was growing in 
importance and the economic power of the feudal nobles was beginning to decline.91 
In particular, the doctrine of champerty developed as a judicial and statutory92 
reaction to a practice that was taking place among feudal lords, whereby these 
would underwrite the costs of suits carried out by others for the recovery of land in 
exchange for a share of the result. By this means the lords could become joint 
owners of estates at investment prices well below the market value of the land, 
increasing the size of their retinues and thus aggrandizing their political power.93 
In light of this background, the doctrine of champerty seems to owe much of 
its rationale to a particular historical, economic and social context that no longer 
subsists in the modern world. Legal rules are not insensible to social and economic 
changes, but they follow those and adapt throughout time depending on new social 
contexts.94 Due to the changes that differentiate current times from the Middle age, 
the doctrine of champerty seems to have lost its importance, which justifies 
loosening its severity and allowing TPLF to develop.  
                                                      
91 Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 51-52 (1935). 
92 The English legislature passed a series of statutory instruments prohibiting champerty between 
1275 and 1541, which are well described in PERCY H. WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND 
ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS 151 (1921), and in SIR W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
395-400 (5th ed., Vol. 3, 1942). 
93 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 12-13. 
94 See for all Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
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Many commentators and judges have supported the idea that champerty is an 
obsolete doctrine that should be abandoned from the common law.95 Jeremy 
Bentham, writing in 1787, argued that these prohibitions were no longer necessary.96 
However, according to a different view, valid reasons for prohibiting champerty still 
subsist and include a desire to discourage frivolous litigation, quarrels, resistance to 
settlement and interference with the attorney-client relationship,97 which explains 
why courts from time to time continue to apply the prohibition of champerty to void 
TPLF agreements. 
In addition to maintenance and champerty, some argue that the other chief 
potential legal impediment to TPLF are usury statutes.98 Usury, the act of lending 
money at an unlawfully high rate of interest, is another ancient legal doctrine.99 In 
its common conception, a fundamental element of usury that distinguishes it from 
TPLF is the borrower’s absolute obligation to repay the lender, with repayment not 
contingent on any other event or circumstance: in TPLF, the repayment is 
                                                      
95 See e.g. in Australia, Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41; in the UK, 
Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187; in the US, Saladini v Righellis 687 NE 2d 
1224 (1997); Osprey, Inc v Cabana Ltd Partnership 340 SC 367, 523 SE 2d 269 (2000); Hardick v 
Homol 795 So 2d 1107 (2001). 
96 Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-party Financed Litigation, Boston University Working 
Paper No. 11-57 (2011), 5. 
97 A.L.G., The Effect of Champerty in Contractual Liability 79 L. Q. REV. 493, 494 (1963). 
98 See Susan L. Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL BUS. 
& COM. L.J. 85, 89-90 (2002). Other opinions that consider the relevance of usury for TPLF include 
J.H. McLaughilin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, supra note 80; M. 
Rodak, It’s About Time: A System Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its 
Effects on Settlement, supra note 80; C.R. Barksdale, All that Glitter Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs 
and Benefits of Litigation Finance, supra note 80; D.R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The 
Ethics of Litigation Funding, supra note 80; S.L. Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The 
Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, supra note 80; V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL 
CLAIMS, supra note 16, 126-130. See also Sheri P. Adler, Alternative Litigation Finance and the 
Usury Challenge: A Multi-Factor Approach, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 329 (2012); and Jenna W. 
Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal to Bring Litigation 
Advances within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750 (2012). 
99 The world’s first recorded usury law was part of the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi written in 
1790 B.C. 
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contingent to the plaintiff’s recovery of any proceeds. In other words, usury laws 
apply to loans but not to TPLF agreements, which cannot be qualified as loans.100 
 
2. Opening Up to TPLF 
In the following sections I briefly survey how and to what extent the law in 
Australia, the US, and the UK respectively has been moving away from a strict 
application of the prohibition of champerty, thus embracing an increasing 
liberalization of the practice of TPLF. Thereafter, I briefly discuss a number of other 
minor experiences of common law jurisdictions that have liberalized TPLF, as well 
as some examples of countries that have retained maintenance and champerty to 
varying extents, allowing courts to restrict TPLF to certain types of transactions 
considered in line with public policy interests. 
 
a)  Australia 
Maintenance and champerty were once torts and crimes in all Australian 
jurisdictions.101 However, courts allowed TPLF pursuant to settled common law 
exceptions: if there was a bona fide community of interest between the plaintiff and 
                                                      
100 See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Mar. 2, 2005), where Judge Warshawsky wrongfully considered a litigation funding agreement a 
‘loan’ based on the fact that a positive outcome of the suit was a ‘sure thing,’ given that the plaintiff 
was suing under a statute that imposed strict liability. That judgment has to be considered wrong, 
because it cannot be said that all civil cases based on strict liability can be said to be ‘sure things.’ 
See A. Sebok, A New York Decision That May Imperil Plaintiffs’ Ability to Finance Their Lawsuits: 
Why It Should Be Repudiated, or Limited to Its Facts, FINDLAW, 18 April 2005, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050418.html. 
101 In Australia, the common law prohibition of litigation funding was justified in part by the concern 
that the judicial system should not be the site of speculative business ventures. However, the primary 
aim was to prevent abuses of court process (vexatious or oppressive litigation, elevated damages, 
suppressed evidence, suborned witnesses) for personal gain. LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, 
supra note 16, 4. 
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the funder, or if the plaintiff was impecunious and the funder was not acting with 
any collateral motive.102 Today, legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria has expressly abolished maintenance 
and champerty both as a crime and as a tort.103 In these jurisdictions, however, 
courts could set aside a TPLF agreement if it is found to be inconsistent with public 
policy considerations upon which the prohibition was based at common law.104 
Since 1995, a new statutory exception to the rule against champerty has 
developed. Under their statutory powers of sale,105 insolvency practitioners may 
now contract for the funding of lawsuits if these are characterized as company 
property. Many such actions are for voidable transactions or misfeasance by 
company officers.106 Litigation funding companies emerged to serve this market, 
and much of litigation funding in Australia continues to be under the statutory 
exception for insolvency. However, a number of companies have begun to fund non-
insolvency plaintiff lawsuits.107  
The legitimacy of TPLF agreements outside insolvency was challenged 
before the Australian courts, producing a series of conflicting judicial decisions.108 
Central to the question on the legitimacy of TPLF is a series of conflicting public 
                                                      
102 LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 16, 4. 
103 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 221; Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 
1993 (NSW) 3, 4, 6; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) Sch 11 ss 1(3), 3; Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) s32 and Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s322A. 
104 See e.g. Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act 1993 (NSW) s 6; Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) s32 (2). 
105 For example, the powers of disposal given to a receiver to dispose of a company’s property under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): s 420(2)(b) and (g). See also the powers of disposal accorded to a 
liquidator by Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477(2)(c). Statutory powers of sale also arise from 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and for trustees in all jurisdictions. 
106 LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 16, 5. 
107 For two examples see QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 933; Fostif v Campbell 
Cash and Carry [2005] NSWCA 83. 
108 The key cases are discussed in Fostif v. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 83. 
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policy arguments. On the one hand, access to justice has become a powerful 
consideration for courts in approving funding arrangements. On the other hand, 
courts have been challenged by defendants on the grounds of the arguments 
underpinning the traditional prohibitions of maintenance and champerty, based on 
the doctrine of abuse of process.109 Access to justice has played a fundamental role 
in leading courts in Australia (as well as in the UK) to approve funded 
proceedings110 to such an extent that, despite numerous challenges in the last 
decade, no funding agreements have been struck down in Australian courts. Until 
recently, however, TPLF in cases other than insolvency cases was still uncertain.  
In 2006, the Australian High Court in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v 
Fostif Pty Ltd111 resolved the conflict and gave its imprimatur to litigation 
funding.112 Since then, TPLF has been growing and other judges have endorsed 
commercial litigation funding for its potential to “inject a welcome element of 
commercial objectivity into the way in which [litigation] budgets are framed,”113 to 
increase the efficiency with which litigation is conducted and to foster the aims of 
Australian class action legislation.114 Support for commercial litigation funding has 
                                                      
109 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 107. 
110 See also V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 63-67. 
111 Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41. 
112 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 55. 
113 QPSX Limited v. Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 933, [54]. 
114 Kirby v. Centro [2008] FCA 1505. 
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also come from outside the courts, namely from the Law Council of Australia115 and 
the Law Institute of Victoria,116 among others.117 
While Campbells v. Fostif made clear that TPLF is admissible in Australia, 
TPLF has continued to be a controversial issue, although controversy has turned to 
matters of regulation. In this regard, a 2011 majority decision of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in Chameleon118 stated that TPLF agreements constitute 
prima facie a financial product. The basis for such conclusion was that TPLF 
agreements are a facility through which financial risk is managed. Consequently, 
TPLF funders should hold an Australian Financial Services License in order to 
operate.119 However, the High Court overturned this decision by holding that TPLF 
agreements can be best described as a credit facility and thus are excluded from the 
definition of financial product.120  
The last decade has witnessed an expansion of TPLF agreements in the area 
of class actions.121 The development in this area has been so remarkable that TPLF 
has actually become the main way of financing class action litigation in Australia.122 
                                                      
115 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, SUBMISSION TO STANDING COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL 
(14 September 2006) available at 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=8C744AB2-1C23-
CACD-2297-5D181CEBB545&siteName=lca 
116 See Bernard Murphy and Camille Cameron, Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Actions 
in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 399 (2006); John North, Litigation Funding: Much to be Achieved 
with the Right Approach, 43 LAW SOCIETY JOURNAL 66, 69 (2005). 
117 See e.g. NSW YOUNG LAWYERS CIVIL LITIGATION COMMITTEE & NSW YOUNG LAWYERS PRO 
BONO TASKFORCE, JOINT SUBMISSION TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEY GENERALS’ 
REVIEW INTO LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA (2006) available at 
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/idc/groups/public/documents/internetyounglawyers/025814.pdf 
118 International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v. Chameleon Mining NL [2011] NSWCA 50. 
119 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, at 107-108.  
120 International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v. Chameleon Mining NL & Others [2012] HCA 45. 
121 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 96. 
122 Ibid., 100. 
  39 
Importantly, in Brookfield Multiplex v. International Litigation Funding Partners,123 
the Federal Court of Australia ruled that TPLF agreements amount to managed 
investment schemes. The qualification of TPLF agreements as managed investment 
schemes made funders and TPLF agreements subject to a wide range of burdensome 
requirements. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission initially 
provided a provisional exemption from compliance with such requirements.124 
Subsequently, the Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 6) excluded 
litigation funding schemes and similar arrangements from the definition of managed 
investment schemes.125 
 
b)  United States 
The doctrines of maintenance and champerty traditionally also belong to the US 
states’ common law, where they are typically related back to the English common 
law doctrines that were received by US states and maintained after the American 
revolution.126  
Restrictions to maintenance exist to varying degrees across US states. All 
states now permit at least one form of maintenance, lawyer’s contingency fees,127 
while—conversely—all states prohibit at least what is referred to as ‘malice 
maintenance,’ i.e. when a third party supports a stranger litigant for pure spite of 
                                                      
123 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v. International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147. 
124 J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 110. 
125 Corporations Amendment Regulation No. 6 (2012), §1(1).  
126 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80.  
127 Lawyer’s contingency fees have also been defined as an exception to the prohibition of 
champerty, but that does not seem the right interpretation. On contingency fees as an exception to the 
prohibition of champerty see S.L. Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of 
Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, supra note 80, 57; contra see A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic 
Claim, supra note 80. 
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malevolence toward the target of the person aided by the maintainer.128 As it appears 
from these two examples, many conceptions of maintenance exist that are prohibited 
to varying degrees across US states.129 What is of our interest here is what is 
referred to as ‘profit maintenance,’ or champerty.  
The legal status of champerty in the US is not uniform and its picture is quite 
complex.130 For the purpose of this section of the dissertation—that of providing an 
overview of the status of TPLF in the common law world—I will use the following 
paragraphs to summarize the evolution of the legal status of TPLF in the US helping 
myself with some approximations, referring to the existing literature for more 
detailed observations.131 
Like in Australia, champerty is neither a tort nor a crime in most US states, 
but its most visible impact is as a contract defense.132 Until the emergence of TPLF, 
US courts rarely enforced the doctrine of champerty. When TPLF emerged, 
American courts initially rarely used this doctrine to void TPLF agreements. 
Furthermore, some courts expressly took the position in favor of the abolition of 
maintenance and champerty on the grounds that those doctrines no longer responded 
to the need of protecting against speculations in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous 
                                                      
128 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. 
129 For a detailed discussion see A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. 
130 For an in-depth analysis see A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. According to 
Sebok, restriction on champerty can be categorized under three categories: restrictions on what 
lawsuits may be maintained for profit; restrictions on how lawsuits may be maintained for profit; 
restrictions on the cause of the maintenance for profit. 
131 See in particular A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80; and P. Bond, Making 
Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, supra note 80, 1333-1341 (who offers in the 
Appendix an overview of champerty law in all fifty-one states). 
132 As such, its visibility in case law is somehow proportional to the amount of champertous 
agreements. P. Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, supra note 80, 1304. 
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claims and other public policy concerns that could be addressed more efficiently by 
other means.133  
At the turn of the new millennium there has been a judicial backlash against 
commercial investment in litigation in the United States.134 A number of US courts 
have taken a negative view and have used champerty135 and other doctrines—in 
particular usury136—as significant obstructions to commercial investments in 
litigation.  
The recent situation in the US is not uniform and can be roughly portrayed as 
follows: in some states champerty is subject to statutory prohibition,137 in some 
others its prohibition is embodied in the common law,138 in some other states it 
remains relevant only as principle of public policy, and in others it is permitted,139 
among which in a number of cases it is explicitly permitted.140 
                                                      
133 Saladini v Righellis 687 NE 2d 1224 (1997); Osprey, Inc v Cabana Ltd Partnership 340 SC 367, 
523 SE 2d 269 (2000); Hardick v Homol 795 So 2d 1107 (2001). 
134 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 111. 
135 Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721. 
136 See e.g. the position of the lower courts then reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Rancman v. 
Interim Settlement Funding Corp., supra note 135. 
137 See e.g. Louisiana: Law Civ Code Ann Art 2447 (but only applies to purchases by attorneys and 
officers of the court); Mississippi: Miss Code Ann § 97-9-11; Kentucky: KRS 372.060; Georgia: 
OCGA § 13-8-2. 
138 For example, IL: Midtown Chiropractic v Illinois Farmers Ins Co 812 NE 2d 851 (2004); PA, 
Fleetwood Area School District v Berks County Bd of Assessment Appeals 821 A 2d 1268 (2003); 
MN, Johnson v Wright 682 NW 2d 671 (2004); RI, Toste Farm Corp v Hadbury Inc 798 A 2d 901 
(2002). The examples are among those reported by V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 
16, 112. 
139 Based upon the survey offered by P. Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State 
Action, supra note 80 (Appendix), reported and updated by A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra 
note 80, twenty-eight U.S. states permitted champerty as of 2002: AZ, Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d 458 
(Ariz. App. 1992); CA, Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124 (Cal. 1987); CO, Fastenau 
v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173 (Col. 1952); CT, Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460 (Conn. 
2000); FL, Kraft v. Mason, 668 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1996); HI, TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 
153 P.3d 444 (Haw. 2007); IA, Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene 472 (Iowa 1852); KS, Boettcher v. 
Criscione, 299 P.2d 806 (Kan. 1956); LA, Martin v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 665 F.2d 598 (6th 
Cir. 1982); ME, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9A §12-101 (2009) (partially amending ME. REV. STAT. 
17A §516(1) (2009)); MD, Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112 (Md. 
1998); MA, Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997); MI, Smith v. Childs, 497 N.W.2d 
538 (Mich. App. 1993); MO, Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. App. 1975); MT, 
Green v. Gremaux, 945 P.2d 903 (Mont. 1997); NH, Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. 
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Even in states that have retained champerty, it has been argued that the 
doctrine is on the wane, in the light of developments that have considerably 
broadened the exceptions to the champerty prohibition.141 First, champerty generally 
only applies to TPLF where the party sharing in the proceeds has no legitimate 
interest in the outcome of the action.142 Second, champerty (and maintenance) 
cannot be established unless there is officious intermeddling. Thus, the doctrines 
may not apply where the maintained party has initiated suit prior to entering a TPLF 
agreement, where the funder plays no role in the conduct of the litigation and where 
the terms of the financing agreements are fair.143  
From the observation of these exceptions derives that the doctrine of 
champerty may cover situations that go beyond TPLF agreement where the funder 
acquires no control of the litigation. The issue of who retains control of the litigation 
                                                      
Harwell, 606 A.2d 802 (N.H. 1992); NJ, Polo v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1987); NY, Leon v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511 (N.Y. 1994), NC, Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 
S.E.2d 767 (N.C. App. 2008); ND, Interstate Collection Agency v. Kuntz, 181 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 
1970); OH, ORC ANN. 1349.55 (2009) (reversing Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp. (99 
Ohio St.3d 121(2003)), OK, Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okl. 1981); OR, Brown 
v. Bigne, 28 P. 11 (Or. 1891); SC, Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd., 532 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 2000); TN, 
Record v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 438 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. 1969); TX, Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. 
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2006); WA, Giambattista v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 
586 P.2d 1180 (Wash. App. 1978); and WV, Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 151 S.E. 700 (W. Va. 1929). 
140 As reported by A. Sebok, sixteen U.S. states now explicitly permit champerty as a form of 
maintenance for profit: CO, Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173 (Col. 1952); CT, Robertson v. Town of 
Stonington, 750 A.2d 460 (Conn. 2000); FL, Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1996); IA, Wright 
v. Meek, 3 Greene 472 (Iowa 1852); KS, Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806 (Kan. 1956); ME, ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 9A §12- 101 (2009) (partially amending ME. REV. STAT. 17A §516(1) (2009)); 
MD, Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112 (Md. 1998); MA, Saladini v. 
Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997); MO, Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 
App. 1975); NH, Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Harwell, 606 A.2d 802 (N.H. 1992); NC, 
Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. App. 2008); OH, ORC ANN. 1349.55 (2009) 
(reversing Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp. (99 Ohio St.3d 121(2003))); OK, Mitchell 
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okl. 1981); OR, Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11 (Or. 1891); WA, 
Giambattista v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 586 P.2d 1180 (Wash. App. 1978); and WV, 
Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 151 S.E. 700 (W. Va. 1929). A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra 
note 80. 
141 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16,113. 
142 For examples and cases see ibid., 113. 
143 Ibid., 114. 
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is of fundamental relevance for the law on TPLF. Assume to represent with a line 
the leitmotif of a series of situations. On one end is TPLF narrowly considered, 
where no control is transferred from the claimholder to the funder. On the opposite 
end is a funding agreement in which the claimholder transfers to the funder 
complete control over the lawsuit: this extreme situation coincides with what is 
referred to as ‘assignment’ of claims. The assignment of a claim falls under a 
different doctrine, the common law rule of non-assignability.144 Between these two 
extreme solutions is an indefinite quantity of intermediate situations that can fall 
under the realm of either common law doctrine. The distinction between, on the one 
hand, maintenance and champerty and, on the other, assignment is extremely faded, 
and as such it is of critical importance for who attempts to study future perspectives 
of development of TPLF.  
 
c)  United Kingdom 
The experience of the UK is similar to the Australian one to the extent that TPLF 
first developed in the context of insolvency, then expanding to the whole realm of 
commercial litigation.145 However, differently from Australia, the UK experience 
has demonstrated that TPLF needs not to be so confined, but it can expand beyond 
the commercial context into what is commonly referred to as the personal or 
consumer sphere.146 
                                                      
144 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80.  
145 Cento Veljanovski, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 405 (2012), 
418. 
146 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 105. 
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Apart from the development of case law on litigation funding, the English 
government’s substantial shift in public policy from public mechanisms of financing 
poor people’s litigation (legal aid) towards market-based alternatives during the 
1990s was an important factor that contributed to the expansion of TPLF in the UK, 
especially for non-commercial matters. The reforms that were enacted at the end of 
the 1990s were stimulated by the raises in legal aid expenditure and were 
specifically adopted in order to shift the funding of non-commercial litigation away 
from the public purse. The Access to Justice Act of 1999 removed legal aid for all 
civil cases involving money claims and introduced conditional fees and after-the-
event insurance as new, private and market-based alternatives to finance 
litigation.147 The Act in principle did not mention litigation funding, which was 
introduced as a result of an amendment sought in the House of Lords,148 which 
however has never been brought into effect.149 The Access to Justice Act of 1999 can 
be considered the outcome of a general shift in public policy that matured during the 
1990s concerning access to justice, which has been of important background 
relevance for the development of TPLF. 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the law on champerty and maintenance in 
the UK looked as follows: the common law principle was that contracts involving 
maintenance or champerty were void for public policy unless they fell within 
                                                      
147 See UNITED KINGDOM, LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITH 
CONDITIONAL FEES, supra note 48. 
148 See United Kingdom Parliament Standing Committee E, Access to Justice Bill [Lords], 13 May 
1999, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmstand/e/st990513/am/90513s01.htm. 
149 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 87. 
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recognized exceptions, such as the common interest exception150 or the statutory 
insolvency exceptions.151 
In 1994, Giles v Thompson152 represented a fundamental change in British 
judicial thinking with respect to maintenance and champerty. Following Giles, 
English courts tend to consider that there are no longer public policy reasons 
supporting the general prohibition of third-party funding agreements limited by 
some exceptions. Conversely the new position of UK courts is that no prohibition on 
maintenance and champerty applies, with the exception of the case of wanton and 
officious intermeddling153 and the case of trafficking in legal claims,154 which are 
often intertwined.155  
Once again, central to the evaluation of the validity of a litigation funding 
agreement is the issue of who controls the litigation. English courts maintain strong 
resistance against the cession of control from the claimholder to the funder. A TPLF 
agreement that contemplates full transfer of control to the funder is void for 
champerty.156 By contrast, absent the cession of control, TPLF agreements are fully 
                                                      
150 Traditionally the common interest had to derive from the subject matter of the claim, rather than 
being a commercial interest coincidental to the claim (Alabaster v. Harness [1895] 1 QB 339). 
However, in the 1990s that requirement was relaxed allowing for any genuine commercial interest to 
be the basis for an exception to the common law position (see comments in Giles v Thompson [1993] 
3 All ER 321, 333). 
151 As noted by V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 106-107, in England, the 
general position in relation to insolvency office holders such as liquidators or trustees in bankruptcy 
is that those office holders are exempt from prohibitions arising in champerty and maintenance 
preventing the assignment of legal claims. Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 729; In re Park Gate 
Waggon Works Co. (1881) 17 Ch D 234; Guy v. Churchill (1888) 40 Ch D 481; Ramsey v Hartley 
[1977] 1 WLR 686; Norglen Ltd (in liq) v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd [1999] 2 AC 1. 
152 Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142. 
153 Ahmed v Powell [2003] PNLR 22; Factortame & Ors v Secretary of State for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (No. 8) [2003] QB 381. 
154 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679. 
155 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 104. 
156 Ahmed v Powell [2003] PNLR 22. 
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valid under current UK law,157 provided that they do not involve litigators subject to 
the conditional fee regime.158 
The TPLF industry is rapidly growing in the UK in a climate that is moving 
towards increasing liberalization. This trend is supported both by the government 
through public policy and by courts through case law. Five years ago, Arkin v 
Borchard Lines Ltd159 was the first case where court indicated that third-party 
funding should not only be tolerated but also encouraged as a useful tool for 
facilitating access to justice.160 Furthermore, the climate of support that reigns in the 
UK has found expression in the report by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Jackson on the 
costs of civil litigation that was published in January 2010. Justice Jackson stated 
that “[i]n some areas of civil litigation costs are disproportionate and impede access 
to justice.”161 With the scope in mind of “propos[ing] a coherent package of 
interlocking reforms, designed to control costs and promote access to justice,”162 he 
                                                      
157 This approach has been confirmed by the Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders adopted the 
Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales (ALF) in November 2011. See THE 
ASSOCIATION OF LITIGATION FUNDERS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
LITIGATION FUNDERS (November 2011) and further discussions below. An updated version of the 
Code (January 2014) is available at http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Code-of-conduct-Jan-2014-Final-PDFv2-2.pdf. For a discussion on the 
contents of an initial draft of the Code that was proposed for consultation by the Civil Justice Council 
to stakeholders in the Summer of 2010, see CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, CONSULTATION PAPER. A SELF-
REGULATORY CODE FOR THIRD PARTY FUNDING (2010). 
158 If a conditional fee regime applies, funding agreements must conform to its requirements (Awwad 
v Geraghy & Co [2001] QB 570 (CA); Factortame & Ors v Secretary of State for Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions (No. 8) [2003] QB 381). 
159 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187. 
160 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 105. 
161 RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 52, i. 
162 Ibid., i. 
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stated that third-party funding is beneficial and should be supported in that it 
promotes access to justice.163 
While it could safely be said that TPLF has been ‘accepted’ in the UK and it 
is there to stay, there continues to be some controversy with respect to this practice 
in the UK. However, such a controversy has shifted from whether or not TPLF 
should be permitted to whether or not TPLF should be regulated, and how.  
Lord Justice Jackson specifically dealt with this issue in his Report. Perhaps 
as a result of the lobbying efforts by the TPLF industry,164 Justice Jackson 
acknowledged that, at the present stage of the development of the TPLF market, 
parties who use such services are generally sophisticated enterprises with access to 
full legal advice. Hence, he argued that regulation is not yet required. However, he 
conceded that full statutory regulation may be required in case the use of TPLF 
expands on a larger scale.165 Furthermore, Justice Jackson indicated that a 
satisfactory voluntary code should be drawn up and that such code should contain 
such provisions as effective capital adequacy requirements and restrictions to TPLF 
funders’ ability to withdraw support from ongoing litigation.166  
As a result of this ‘concession’ by Justice Jackson, the TPLF industry active 
on the UK market created the Association of Litigation Funders of England and 
Wales (ALF), and adopted a Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders in November 
                                                      
163 Ibid., 117. The Civil Justice Council (the “CJC”) has expressed a similar view. See the CJC report 
IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE – FUNDING OPTIONS AND PROPORTIONATE COSTS (June 2007) 
Recommendation 3 and Chapter C. 
164 Christopher Hodges, Self-regulation (Jackson Report, Code of Conduct), in LE FINANCEMENT DE 
CONTENTIEUX PAR UN TIERS – THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 151 (CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN ed., 
Éditions Panthéon-Assas, 2012), 155. 
165 RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 52, 119. 
166 Ibid., 124. 
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2011.167 The contents of the Code are very much adapted to the recommendations 
advanced by Lord Justice Jackson. Particularly relevant is paragraph 8, which holds 
that TPLF providers may be liable for the full amount of adverse costs. This 
provision contravenes the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Arkin v. Borchard, where 
the court stated that the funder should be potentially liable for the costs of the 
opposing party only to the extent of the funding provided.168 
How the adoption of the Code of Conduct will impact the development of 
the TPLF industry in the UK remains to be seen. For example, the incorporation in 
the Code of the provision that holds TPLF potentially liable for the full amount of 
adverse costs may be an issue affecting the industry. It might be expected, however, 
that this change will not be detrimental to TPLF, as there seems not to be evidence 
proving that full liability for adverse costs may hamper TPLF.169 In fact, the 
prospect of indemnifying defendants for the full adverse costs is not a major 
preoccupation for TPLF providers.170  
Another event that may influence the future development of TPLF in the UK 
is the reform on civil litigation costs that came into effect on 1 April 2013.171 In 
particular, the introduction of damages-based agreements (i.e., contingency fees) in 
civil litigation172 provides plaintiffs with a new way of financing litigation, which 
may pose a challenge to the TPLF industry. 
 
                                                      
167 ALF, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION FUNDERS, supra note 157. 
168 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187. 
169 RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 52, 123. 
170 Cento Veljanovski, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe, supra note 145, 444. 
171 LEGAL AID, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS ACT (2012). 
172 Ibid., Section 45. 
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d)  Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
In addition to Australia, the US, and he UK, TPLF has witnessed a trend of 
increasing liberalization also in other common law jurisdictions. All these 
jurisdictions share the traditional presence of the doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty, which are increasingly being abandoned. Among these, it is worth 
mentioning Bermuda,173 Canada (though limited to the funding of class actions),174 
Jersey,175 New Zealand,176 and South Africa.177 
By contrast, other common law jurisdictions have received TPLF with less 
enthusiasm, and continue to enforce the champerty and maintenance prohibitions in 
order to limit the establishment of the practice in their territories.  
A first major example is Ireland, where TPLF is not acceptable unless the 
TPLF agreement falls within one of the exceptions to the rules of champerty and 
maintenance. In particular, for a TPLF agreement to be permitted, the funder must 
                                                      
173 According to Harbour Litigation Funding, TPLF “is provided to litigants in Bermuda on a fairly 
regular basis” (http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/funding-map). For a recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Bermuda see Stiftung Salle Modulable v Butterfield Trist (Bermuda) Limited 
[2012] SC (Bda) 165. 
174 For some recent cases see: E. Eddy Bayens and others v Kinross Gold Corporation and others, 
2013 ONSC 4974; Stanway v Wyeth Canada Inc. [2013] BCSC 1585; The Trustees of the Labourers' 
Pension Fund of Central & eastern Canada v Sino-Forest Corporation [2012] ONSC 2937; Dugal v 
Manulife Financial Corporation [2011] ONSC 1785 (SCJ); MacQueen et al v Sydney Steel 
Corporation et al [2010] Halifax no 218010; Metzler Investment GMBH v Gildan Activewear Inc 
[2009] OJ no 3315 (SCJ); Hobsbawn v ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd [2009] Calgary 0101-04999 
(QB); Holmes v London Life Insurance Co [2007] CarswellOnt 268 (SCJ) (WL).  
175 See e.g. Barclays Wealth Trustees (Jersey) Limited v Equity Trust (Jersey) Limited and Equity 
Trust Services Limited [2013] JRC094; Barclays Wealth Trustees (Jersey) Limited v Equity Trust 
(Jersey) Limited and Equity Trust Services Limited [2012] JRC; The Valetta Trust [2011] JRC. 
176 For recent case law see: Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89; Saunders v 
Houghton [2012] NZCA 545; Contractors Bonding Ltd v Waterhouse [2012] NZCA 399; Houghton 
v Saunders [2011] HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-000348; Saunders v Houghton [2010] 3 NZLR 
331; Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2010] HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-3074; Houghton v 
Saunders [2008] NZCCLR 13. 
177 See Litigation Funding in South Africa, supra note 37. For some case law see: PriceWaterHouse 
Coopers Inc and Others v National Potato Co-operative Ltd [2004] (6) SA 66 (SCA); Headleigh 
Private Hospital (Pty) Ltd t/a Rand Clinic v Soller & Manning Attorneys and Others [2001] (4) SA 
360 (W). 
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have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation. For example, in the 
context of insolvency, if an insolvent company has a good cause of action, then its 
shareholders are likely to be permitted to fund the litigation, because they are 
creditors who have a legitimate interest in any recovery from the lawsuit. By 
contrast, if a professional litigation funder simply ‘buys into’ someone else’s 
litigation without having any legitimate interest other than financial, in this case the 
TPLF agreement is likely to be void.178 
Singapore has taken a very similar approach to Ireland. In particular, the 
Court of Appeal of Singapore recognized that a TPLF agreement is valid when the 
funder has a commercial interest in the proceedings.179 By contrast, courts have 
invalidated TPLF agreements that were a mere sale of a bare cause of action to a 
third party who had no genuine commercial interest in the claim, in return for a 
division of the award.180 
 
B. CIVIL LAW WORLD 
1. General Absence of Prohibitions 
In the civil law world no specific legislative or judicial prohibitions seem to apply to 
TPLF. However, the industry is by no means as developed as it is in the common 
law world.  
                                                      
178 See Harbour Litigation Funding’s report on Ireland, available at 
http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/funding-map/IE. 
179 Lim Lie Hoa v Ong Jane Rebecca & Ors [2005] SGCA 24. 
180 See Harbour Litigation Funding’s report on Singapore, available at 
http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/funding-map/SG. 
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According to a 2010 report, in the civil law world:181 in Argentina “there is 
no regulation on this issue;” in Brazil “third party funding is not prohibited;” in 
Bulgaria “neither special regulation nor restrictions on third party funding are 
provided;” in Estonia “third party funding of claims is permitted based on the 
general rules governing the performance of obligation by third party;” in Finland 
“generally speaking, third party funding of claims is not restricted but not very 
common;” in France “third-party funding is not forbidden per se. As French lawyers 
can only be paid by their clients or the clients’ agent (article 11.3 of the National 
Bar Association Rules), third-party funding appears possible under French law 
provided that the private party concludes a contract with the plaintiff governing the 
funding and apportioning of the damages obtained, and does not directly pay the 
lawyers’ fees;” in Italy “third party funding is possible but not frequent;” in Latvia 
“there are no restrictions on third party funding of claims; however it is not common 
practice in Latvia;” in Mexico “there is no express prohibition about third party 
funding neither on the Federal Bill nor in the Mexico City Bill;” in Slovakia 
“although third party funding is not prohibited (however not regulated) under 
Slovak law, if at all, it is rarely used;” in Spain182 “although nothing under Spanish 
law prohibits it, there is no experience of third party funding in the Spanish day-to-
day practice.”183  
                                                      
181 Here I am following the classification of legal systems offered by the research group JuriGlobe at 
the University of Ottawa, available at http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/index.php. 
182 For an opinion on a potential interest by international litigation funders in the Spanish market see 
Mercedes Serraller, Los Fondos de Inversión Quieren Financiar Pleitos en España, EXPANSIÓN, 26 
October 2012, available at www.expansion.com/2012/10/26/juridico/1351270637.html. 
183 CLASS & GROUP ACTION 2010, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE SERIES, Global 
Legal Group Ltd, London 2010, available at 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&kh_publications_id=119. 
  52 
The rare exceptions to the absence of TPLF in continental European civil law 
countries—at least in the everyday practice—seem to be Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.184 Furthermore, while in most Asian 
countries TPLF is not officially available, some countries belonging to the civil law 
tradition, such as China and Japan,185 have introduced it186 or are considering 
introducing it.187 
Because no prohibitions seem to apply, the reasons why TPLF has not 
developed in the civil law world are not clear. I argue that possible explanations 
should be looked for in some general structural and cultural characteristics of civil 
law jurisdictions, rather than in any rules of positive law. A number of factors are 
worth underlying that might have significance in the explanation of why TPLF has 
not developed in the civil law world. Before entering that inquiry, however, it is 
worth briefly analyzing the law of TPLF in the civil law world. In order to do so, I 
will discuss the law of TPLF in Germany, the most consolidated market for TPLF in 
the civil law world.188  
 
 
                                                      
184 According to CLASS & GROUP ACTION 2010, supra note 183, “In Switzerland, a third party can 
agree to cover the costs of a litigation. In return, the third party may agree to accept a share of the 
outcome of the litigation.” 
185 China and Japan are considered belonging to the civil law world, though as “mixed systems of 
civil law and customary law”, see the classification made available by JuriGlobe, supra note 247. 
186 Julie Bédard (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP), at a talk at Columbia Law School on 
27 March 2013, stated that she had been involved in a litigation in the US where plaintiff was funded 
by a Chinese litigation funding company. 
187 Yue Qiao, Legal-Expenses Insurance and Settlement, ASIAN J. L. & ECON. Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Art. 4 
(2010). 
188 It is likely that, from a private law perspective, TPLF agreements are structured in different ways 
depending on the jurisdiction. For example, Christopher Hodges suggests that in Belgium and the 
Netherlands (and Germany) the claims are assigned to the funders, even though payment is delayed 
until the success of the litigation. See Discussion Partie III, in LE FINANCEMENT DE CONTENTIEUX 
PAR UN TIERS – THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING, supra note 164, 175. 
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2. A Case Study: Germany 
TPLF in Germany operates in the framework of the following context: as a rule, 
legal costs are borne by the losing party189 (or apportioned between the parties); 
costs are often high, are fixed by law190 and include court fees191 and attorney 
fees;192 additional costs particular to a case, including e.g. witnesses and expert 
reports, may arise for the means of proof. In the light of this context, high litigation 
costs determine a financial risk that can be prohibitive for the plaintiff. Contingency 
fees, which might be a solution for the elimination of the plaintiff’s risk, have 
traditionally been prohibited in Germany, although the German legislator recently 
introduced a narrowly interpreted exception to this prohibition, which allows for 
contingency fees in limited circumstances where the plaintiff is actually financially 
unable to bear the costs of litigation.193  
                                                      
189 §§ 91 ff. ZPO. For an economic model, see Chapter IV, Section B. 2 (b). 
190 Court Fees Act (Gerichtskostengesetz) and Attorney Remuneration Act 
(Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz). 
191 Court fees are directly proportional to the value of the claim, increasing at a diminishing marginal 
rate. 
192 MATHIAS REIMANN & JOACHIM ZEKOLL (eds.), INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 377 (2nd ed., 
2005). 
193 German law traditionally prohibited fee agreements that linked the compensation of an attorney to 
the outcome of a lawsuit, as well as agreements that provided a participation of an attorney in the 
rewards of a lawsuit (see § 49b Federal Attorney Act [BRAO] in the version valid until December 
17, 2007). A ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) on December 12, 2006 
marked the beginning of a new era, by ruling that an unconditional prohibition of contingency fee 
arrangements is disproportional as it hinders the access to justice in some situations (see BVerfG, 
December 12, 2006 – 1 BvR 2576/04 = NJW 2007, 979). The court therefore demanded that the 
legislator provide an exception and allow contingency fees in situations where “special circumstances 
in the person of the litigant […] otherwise would prevent him from pursuing his rights.” The German 
legislator revised the legal framework for attorney fees and, following the court decision, reluctantly 
decided to lift the principle ban on contingency fees but only as far as necessary to comply with the 
court’s demands. On July 1, 2008 the revised § 49b para. 2, sentence 1 of the BRAO became 
effective. Fee arrangements that link the fee or its amount to the outcome of the legal proceedings as 
well as arrangements that reward the attorney with a percentage of the recovery are still inadmissible 
unless such arrangements are authorized by a provision in the Attorneys Compensation Act (RVG). 
The newly implanted § 4a RVG who picked up the wording of the court decision provides such an 
exception. In order to fulfill the constitutional minimal requirements, it allows contingency fee 
arrangement when they are concluded “on a case by case basis provided that the party’s financial 
conditions would otherwise prevent her from pursuing her rights.” This exception is interpreted 
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This background scenario seems to have favored the emergence of TPLF, 
which was introduced in Germany by FORIS in 1998 and is now offered by a 
number of companies.194 
TPLF agreements, unknown before in Germany, seem now to have taken a 
quite harmonious default structure within the industry.195 What is of our interest 
here, however, are not the contractual rules that govern the relationship between the 
parties, but rather the nature of TPLF agreements and their enforceability under 
German law. 
As far as the legal nature of TPLF contracts is concerned, the prevailing 
opinion in German literature196 is that a TPLF contract creates a silent partnership 
under the German Civil Code (Stille Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts) between the 
funder and the plaintiff.197 This partnership is not registered in the commercial 
                                                      
narrowly, and its application depends on the objective financial circumstances of the individual 
client. A mere declaration of the client that he will not pursue his rights unless he is offered a 
contingency fee arrangement is insufficient (see, e.g. Joachim Teubel, in RVG: HANDKOMMENTAR 
(LUDWIG KROIß & HANS-JOCHEM MAYER eds., 5th ed., Nomos, 2102), § 4a RVG point 29). Attorneys 
are only allowed to conclude contingency fee arrangements if their client is either actually financially 
unable to bear the costs of litigation or if the potential costs are outweigh the gains due to the small 
likelihood of success (see ibid, points 27 ff.). Michael Herwig, Third Party Litigation Funding Under 
German Law – Mechanisms to Shift the Financial Risks and the Costs of Litigation, Columbia Law 
School LL.M. paper 2013 (on file with author). 
194 See Chapter I, Section B. 
195 For an in-depth analysis of the contractual agreements regulating the relationship between a 
plaintiff and a funder see M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in 
Germany, supra note 65, 87-94. 
196 See for all M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra 
note 65, 95 and N. Dethloff, Verträge zur Prozessfinanzierung gegen Erfolgsbeteiligung, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2225, 2227 (2000). See also DIRK BÖTTGER, GEWERBLICHE 
PROZESSFINANZIERUNG UND STAATLICHE PROZESSKOSTENHILFE: AM BEISPIEL DER 
PROZESSFÜHRUNG DURCH INSOLVENZVERWALTER (2008). 
197 It is interesting to notice here the typical civil lawyers’ attitude toward trying to bring back 
innovative contractual agreements within the pre-determined contractual ‘types’ designed in the civil 
code. See MAURO BUSSANI, LIBERTÀ CONTRATTUALE E DIRITTO EUROPEO (2005), 28-35. 
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register and the personal liability of the parties is unlimited.198 The financing 
contract is neither considered a loan agreement199 nor an insurance contract.200 
It is argued that a silent partnership under the German Civil Code arises in 
TPLF because the funder and the claimholder are pursuing a joint aim, that being 
the common goal of both parties to assert the plaintiff’s claim before a court and to 
achieve the highest possible award. A comment deserves attention here. The 
existing literature on TPLF, both in the common law and civil law world, has 
highlighted the existence of possible conflicts of interests between the funder and 
the plaintiff. Consequently, if on the one hand it is true that the funder and the 
plaintiff are moved by a common scope, on the other hand at some point their 
interests and goals may diverge.201  
The possible solution to this apparent contradiction concerns, once again, the 
issue of control, and—in my opinion—it moves from a descriptive toward a 
normative dimension. It has been argued that the partnership created by a TPLF 
contract is an undisclosed partnership, i.e. one in which only one partner—the 
plaintiff—is entitled to represent the partnership vis-à-vis third parties. Moreover, 
the plaintiff asserts the claim in his own name and decides on all steps to be taken 
                                                      
198 M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 94. 
199 A loan exists only where the borrower is obliged to pay back the received amounts under no 
contingency. In TPLF contracts, the plaintiff is only obliged to repay if he is successful and receives 
from the defendant the amount advanced by the funder. The same argument has been made in the 
context of U.S. law: see Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) and the comments supra at note 100. 
200 An insurance contract requires that the insurance coverage is provided in return for a premium. 
See M. HENSSLER, RISIKO ALS VERTRAGSGEGENSTAND 373 (1994); M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, 
Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 95. 
201 Common law: see for all Vicki Waye, Conflicts of Interests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and 
Litigation Entrepreneurs, 19 BOND L. REV. 225 (2007). Civil law: see C. Toggenburger, Financing 
Private Litigation – A European Alternative to Contingency Fees, supra note 74, 627. 
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independently.202 This might certainly be a descriptive assertion (in that it describes 
what in fact happens), but in my view it is relevant from a normative point of view: 
that is to say that a TPLF agreement should be considered a silent partnership, 
and—thus—valid, as long as the funder does not acquire any control over the 
lawsuit. Once again—like in most of the common law world—central to the validity 
of TPLF is the issue of control: if no control is transferred to the funder, TPLF does 
not seem to present any particular problem. 
Another reason to interpret TPLF contracts as creating silent partnerships—
as opposed to normal partnerships—is that no partnership asset exists. 
Notwithstanding the conclusion of a TPLF contract, the plaintiff’s and the funder’s 
assets remain strictly separate. The financing company, which is the silent partner, 
contributes to the partnership through the assumption of financial risk (through the 
advancement of payments) relating to the claimholder’s lawsuit, facilitating the 
latter. After the final court decision, the partnership is liquidated according to the 
rules established in the contract.203 
As far as the validity of TPLF is concerned, the prevailing opinion is that 
TPLF is permissible. The main problem204 TPLF encounters lies in its relationship 
with the prohibition of lawyers’ contingency fees. Contingency fees, according to 
which a lawyer advances all litigation costs of his client in exchange for a share of 
the proceeds in case of success and nothing in the case of loss, are generally 
prohibited in Germany (subject to the limited exceptions discussed above).205 Critics 
of TPLF have argued that TPLF essentially serves the same function of contingency 
                                                      
202 M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 95. 
203 Ibid., 95. 
204 For a description of other minor problems, see ibid., 98-101. 
205 See note 193. 
  57 
fees. In fact, from the perspective of the plaintiff, having the lawsuit financed by the 
lawyer or by a third party funder is essentially the same, the result being the 
elimination of his litigation cost risk.  
The first issue is whether the prohibition of contingency fees should apply to 
TPLF. The answer is no, because the Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung206 contains 
ethical regulations for the Bar, and thus only applies to contractual relationships 
between lawyers and clients.207 The financing contract is between the plaintiff and 
the funder only and the lawyer is neither a party to the contract nor does he have any 
obligation under such contract. 
The second issue is whether TPLF contracts should be considered void 
because TPLF contracts circumvent the prohibition against contingency fees. In fact, 
under German law, legal acts circumventing a prohibition are null and void if the 
regulation is designed to avoid the result reached by the circumventing legal act. 
This argument is based on the assumption that the prohibition against contingency 
fees is designed to prevent the plaintiff from eliminating his litigation cost risk 
through recourse to external capital. This assumption is wrong. The sole aim of the 
prohibition of contingency fees is to preserve the independence of the lawyer from 
his client, i.e. no acts taken by the lawyer when representing his client should relate 
to his own profit and economic interest. It is not the interest of the client that is 
protected by the prohibition of contingency fees, but only the independence of 
lawyers.208 Because, under German law, legal acts circumventing a prohibition are 
                                                      
206 German Act on the Ethics of the Profession of Lawyers (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung). 
207 See N. Dethloff, Verträge zur Prozessfinanzierung gegen Erfolgsbeteiligung, supra note 196, 
2228; M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 
96. 
208 See Deutscher Bundestag (German Parliament), BT-Dr. 12/4993, S.31. 
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null and void only if the act reaches the aim that the regulation is designed to avoid, 
TPLF shall not be considered void, because TPLF does not per se interfere with the 
independence of the legal profession.209 
The problem of the independence of lawyers, from a broader perspective 
than the one considered with respect to contingency fees, is the third major validity 
issue faced by TPLF. Apart from the specific prohibition of contingency fees, 
judicial decisions mandate that each lawyer must be personally and professionally 
independent from any third parties.210 Accordingly, the validity of TPLF is 
challenged by the possibility that TPLF creates conflicts of interests between 
lawyers and clients. A client’s financing contract, however, does not create a 
conflict of interests. The lawyer is not bound in any respect to instructions from the 
financing firm and may completely disregard them.211 
From the observation of the three main issues that jeopardize the validity of 
TPLF contracts, a common leitmotif exists: TPLF is deemed valid because of the 
fact that the lawyer’s incentives in carrying out his work are not altered by the 
existence of the TPLF contract. This is only apparently a descriptive argument. In 
my view, once again, it is a normative argument, which is essentially based on the 
problematic issue of the control of the litigation.  
 
 
 
                                                      
209 M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 97. 
210 See Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 76, 184 ff; see also BUuse, Freie Advokatur, AnwBl. 
2001, 135, Federal Court of Justice, BGH, BGHSt 22, 157. 
211 M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 
1000. 
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C. COMMON LAW VS. CIVIL LAW 
The review of the law of TPLF in the main common law and civil law experiences 
has revealed a number of differences in the legal framework regulating such 
practice. In particular, while in the common law TPLF has found its way dribbling 
among the traditional prohibitions of maintenance and champerty, in the civil law 
there is generally no legal obstacle to the external financing of civil litigation. This 
scenario has, however, determined counterintuitive consequences in terms of the 
development of the TPLF market. While legal prohibitions to TPLF exist in the 
common law, the industry is rapidly developing. By contrast, while in the civil law 
world TPLF is unregulated, a TPLF market is almost inexistent. 
This section addresses both the legal and regulatory divergence between the 
common law and the civil law regarding TPLF, and the counterintuitive 
consequences of such divergence with respect to the development of the TPLF 
market in the two legal traditions. It does so by using two core analytical tools 
provided by comparative law: the theory of legal formants for the former issue, and 
the theory of cryptotypes (and more generally of structural, contextual, and cultural 
factors as impacting the law) for the latter. 
 
1. Narrowing the Distance 
Comparative law scholars have long become aware of the fact that a legal provision 
not necessarily (and in fact, hardly) corresponds to how the law on the matter 
covered works in practice. In particular, there is almost necessarily a divergence 
between any legal provision and the corresponding operating rule. Comparative law 
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scholars achieve this conclusion by using the theory of legal formants.212 In any 
legal system, a legal rule subject to observation is the result of the interplay of a 
number of legal formants, which together shape an operative rule. Legal formants 
mainly include statutory law, court decisions, and scholarly interpretations, among 
others. It is the interplay of all formants that shape an actual operative rule. 
Therefore, an identical statutory provision in force in two separate legal systems 
may give rise to different operative rules, depending on the legal formants with 
which it combines in the respective system (e.g., court decisions, scholarly 
interpretations). Similarly, an identical operative rule may be in force in two legal 
systems that have different declamatory provisions in their statutory laws on the 
matter.  
When it comes to TPLF, we have seen up to this point that completely 
different legal and regulatory environments deal with TPLF in the common law and 
civil law world, respectively. The common law knows doctrines such as 
maintenance and champerty; the civil law has no provisions directly on point. 
In the common law, champerty normally makes a TPLF agreement void. 
However, virtually in all common law jurisdictions, courts (or legislators) have 
intervened and relaxed the application of this doctrine. This has happened in 
                                                      
212 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment I of 
II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991), 21-23; Id., Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343 (1991); P. G. Monateri and R. Sacco, Legal 
Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, vol. 1 (P. NEWMAN 
ed., Groves Dictionaries Inc, 1998). Sacco identifies as ‘legal formants’ the different formative 
elements of a legal system. These include at least statutory declamations, their interpretation and 
application by courts, and their interpretation by legal scholarship. Contrasting the traditional ‘static’ 
approach to the study of legal rules, which is based on the false assumption that all legal formants are 
coherent with each other, Sacco argues that different legal formants may determine different 
operative rules for the same question of law, and that only through a dynamic and anti-formalistic 
approach, whereby legal formants are in a competitive relationship with each other, it is possible to 
unveil the real and operative essence of a legal rule. 
  61 
different ways and to varying extents in each common law jurisdiction. Making a 
gross generalization, however, we notice that in many common law jurisdictions 
champerty no longer prevents parties from concluding a TPLF agreement, except in 
the case of a complete takeover of the control of the lawsuit by the third-party 
funder. Therefore, in most common law jurisdictions purely ‘passive’ TPLF is likely 
to be acceptable. 
Let us now reconsider the conditions under which TPLF is deemed valid in 
the civil law jurisdiction we analyzed, namely Germany, under the perspective of 
the three issues raised above: (i) the financing contract is between the plaintiff and 
the funder only and the lawyer is neither a party to the contract nor does he have any 
obligation under the contract; (ii) TPLF does not interfere with the independence of 
the legal profession, which safeguard is the aim of the prohibition against 
contingency fees; and (iii) a client’s financing contract does not create a conflict of 
interests between the lawyer and the client. 
The three conditions above clearly do not matter in their descriptive 
dimension, but they do so in their normative dimension. In other words, the point is 
not that TPLF is permissible because that is what happens in fact, but rather that 
TPLF contracts, in order to be valid, must respect the above conditions. Just like in 
the common law, also under German law the transfer of control of the litigation is 
what creates problems for the validity of TPLF. If control is transferred from the 
claimholder to the funder, then it is not true that the financing contract does not have 
an impact on the lawyer. The lawyer will follow instructions from the funder, will 
make the funder’s interest and not the plaintiff’s (when diverging), he will have 
obligations towards the funder (e.g. duties to inform and provide documents), and 
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conflicts of interest will exist when the plaintiff and the funder have divergent 
interests.213 This is to say that, also under German law, the legal system is concerned 
with the issue of control. Importantly, however, purely ‘passive’ TPLF is likely to 
be permitted. 
The operative rules as described above are significantly different from the 
declamatory provisions that we find in the common law and under German law. The 
theory of legal formants allows us to reach an understanding of the real essence of 
the law of TPLF, well beyond the appearances of formal legal provisions. This 
approach allows us to look comparatively at apparently very different legal 
experiences, and to ‘narrow the distance’ between them, realizing that both the 
common law and civil law share common issues and operative solutions to them. 
 
2. Different Extents of Market Development 
I mentioned earlier that TPLF is virtually inexistent in the civil law world with few 
exceptions. Because no specific prohibition seems to apply,214 it is unclear why 
TPLF has not taken off. I argue that a number of structural and cultural factors, 
characteristic of the civil law tradition, should be taken into consideration in order to 
explain the fact that TPLF has not (yet) developed much in the civil law world.  
                                                      
213 It is true—in principle—that both the plaintiff’s and the funder’s interest is to achieve the 
maximum possible awards. However, their interests might diverge with respect to timing and—
eventually—also to the amount of the awards. While a plaintiff is usually a one-shot player, who will 
then try to maximize the awards, a financing company is a repeated player. The amount of awards it 
is interested in is a function of the investment, not at all related to the merit of the claim. Possibly, if 
things get ‘complicated’ during the course of the litigation, the funder will be willing to accept any 
amount that is superior to the costs he incurred in, and will prefer to bring that case to conclusion 
soon instead of investing further resources. 
214 See Section B. 1 in this Chapter. 
  63 
On the one hand, structural differences include the costs of the legal system 
and of the civil justice system, which in some cases mirror different litigation 
models and procedural rules.215 On the other hand, cultural differences include deep 
cultural models that are rooted in a legal system, sometimes even in a way that is 
‘unconscious’—not realized by the people within that legal system—, but that play a 
significant role in the evolution of the law and legal culture (cryptotypes).216 
In the first place, litigation in common law jurisdictions is normally more 
expensive than in civil law countries. For example, the very structure of the 
American judicial process decentralizes power and activity: a large variety of 
activities within litigation which are labeled ‘official’ in European legal systems, 
such as service of process, discovery,217 and questioning of witnesses, are private 
matters in American law and are therefore paid by the parties.218 Furthermore, 
punitive damages are not contemplated in civil law countries, which reduces the 
margin of profit from funding litigation.219  
In the second place, some have argued that common law systems are more 
favorable environments for litigation funding investments, because common law 
                                                      
215 Some skepticism has been expressed with respect to the economical viability of the TPLF industry 
in Europe by C. Toggenburger, Financing Private Litigation – A European Alternative to 
Contingency Fees, supra note 74. 
216 See RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 125 ff., in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO 
COMPARATO (R. SACCO ed., 5th ed., 2005). 
217 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
218 See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXTS, MATERIALS 428, 448 
(6th ed., 1998); Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin 
Resistance, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS Art. 1, 9, 36 (2003), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss2/art1. 
219 C. Toggenburger, Financing Private Litigation – A European Alternative to Contingency Fees, 
supra note 74, 620. 
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judges are more predictable than civil law judges, with evident benefit for litigation 
funders.220 
In the third place, from a broader viewpoint, within the civil law-common 
law divide the civil law culture is considered to be less ‘litigious’ compared to the 
common law counterpart,221 which reduces the potential volume of business that 
attracts the TPLF industry. 
In the fourth place, and from an even broader perspective, common law legal 
systems—especially the US—are the ones that have reached the highest level of 
‘commodification’ of justice and legal services among the world’s legal traditions, a 
trend according to which legal services are treated as ‘commodities’ and which has 
found further epiphanies e.g. in contingency fee schemes, advertisement of legal 
services, aggregate litigation and a generally more entrepreneurial class of legal 
                                                      
220 In my direct experience in relation to TPLF, this idea emerged at least twice: once in a private 
conversation with Selvyn Seidel, former Chairman of the Burford group, in Washington, DC, on 21 
May 2010; once during the floor discussion following my intervention at the Global Conference on 
‘Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Civil Justice Friend or Foe?’, organized by the Searle Civil 
Justice Institute at George Mason University’s Law & Economics Center in New York, NY, on 5 
October 2011. On the predictability of civil litigation, see i.a. Evan Osborne, Courts as Casinos? An 
Empirical Investigation of Randomness and Efficiency in Civil Litigation, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 
(1999); Gretchen A. Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe 
for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175 (2001); ROBERT B. 
CALIHAN, JOHN R. DENT & MARC B. VICTOR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF RISK 
ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT (2004); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. 
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN L. REV. 1267 
(2006).  
221 According to the data offered by Marc Galanter in 1983, the only countries out of a group of 15 
that presented more than 40 yearly civil cases per 1000 people were Australia, Canada (Ontario 
only), Denmark, England/Wales, New Zealand and the United States. Among them, Denmark was 
the only civil law country (according to the classification of legal systems provided by the University 
of Ottawa, supra note 181). Among the others, Belgium, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden and W. 
Germany were between 20 and 31 per 1000 people, while Italy, The Netherlands and Spain were 
below 10. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What we Know and Don’t’ Know 
(and Think we Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 
(Table 3) (1983). On the litigiousness of the United States see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION 
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); Macklin Fleming, 
Court Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); B. Manning, Hyperlexis: Our 
National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV 767 (1977). See also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS 
AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002) and, on a more 
recent view on the level of litigation in a comparative perspective, STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
CONTEMPORARY CIVIL LITIGATION 39-64 (2009). 
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professionals.222 The increasing commodification of civil justice in the common law 
probably creates a cultural environment that is fertile ground for the development of 
markets based on the transferability of property rights in litigation like those for 
TPLF and other similar practices. 
In the civil law world, the use of the legal system is traditionally seen more 
as a way for the victim of a wrong to get compensation having his day in court 
rather than a system through which private incentives and commodified legal 
services combine within a market-inspired logic for the pursue of social welfare and 
efficiency.223 I hypothesize that the trend towards this conception of the role of the 
legal system, which I argue to be increasingly dominant in the US, may in part have 
been determined by (or at least gone hand-in-hand with) the success of the economic 
analysis of law in American contemporary legal thinking. The economic analysis of 
law, which has come to dominate American legal thought, has not reached an equal 
degree of success in the civil law world.224 
                                                      
222 See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
(2008). 
223 This approach is also visible in other fields of the law and perhaps it mirrors a general attitude. 
Consider, for example, breach of contract: while in the United States the primary remedy for breach 
of contract is compensatory monetary damages, being specific performance the ‘exception,’ in the 
civil law world it is the other way around. 
224 For an early comprehensive work discussing the success of the Economic Analysis of Law in civil 
law countries, see Vol. 11 (Iss. 3) INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (1991), containing R. Cooter & J.R. 
Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future, 261; U. Mattei & R. 
Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A Comparative Approach, 265; C. Kirchner, 
The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 277; G. Hertig, Switzerland, 293; S. Ota, 
Law and Economics in Japan: Hatching Stage, 301; S. Pastor, Law and Economics in Spain, 309; G. 
Skogh, Law and Economics in Sweden, 319; W. Weigel, Prospects for Law and Economics in Civil 
Law Countries: Austria, 325; G. Hertig, The European Community, 331. For later works see UGO 
MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); BRUNO DEFFAINS & THIERRY KIRAT (eds.), 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES (2001); EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM RATLIFF, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000); Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in 
Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIS 66 (2004); Aristides N. Hatzis, 
Civil Contract Law and Economic Reasoning: An Unlikely Pair?, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
EUROPEAN CODES AND CONTRACT LAW 159 (STEFAN GRUNDMANN AND MARTIN SCHAUER eds., 
2006). 
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Traditionally in civil law legal systems, the claim is considered something 
very ‘personal,’ which cannot be sold or assigned an interest on (as in TPLF) in 
exchange for money. The origin of that can be traced back to ancient Rome and 
Greek jurisprudence, dominated by the view according to which only the litigants 
and judges should participate in the judicial process.225 Under that jurisprudence, if 
an action was pursued on behalf of someone other than the party affected, the 
maintained action was unworthy and seen as a vehicle of oppression.226  
 
3. Possibilities of Expansion of TPLF in the Civil Law World 
The factors and broad trends I proposed above might be some among the reasons 
why TPLF is not developing in civil law countries as it is in the common law world. 
However, it does not seem unlikely that TPLF will soon develop also in continental 
Europe and other parts of the world, especially in countries that are devoting efforts 
to strengthening access to justice, but that are simultaneously experiencing 
difficulties in the publicly-funded systems for financing civil litigation for the poor 
(legal aid).227 These prospects of growth are suggested by the observation that TPLF 
is economically viable in the context of the civil law world, as demonstrated both by 
the economic model studied below228 and by the experience of Germany and other 
                                                      
225 M. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, supra note 91, 51-52. 
226 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 12. 
227 Russia, for example, is showing interest in learning about best practices in (and alternatives to) 
legal aid. See e.g. the project “Strengthening Access to Justice for the Poor in the Russian 
Federation” of the Institute of Law and Public Policy (2008-2012); http://www.ilpp.ru. See also 
Marco de Morpurgo, Финансирование гражданского иска третьими лицами: частная 
альтернатива бесплатной юридической помощи как способ повышения доступности 
правосудия, in LEGAL AID IN CIVIL MATTERS: MODELS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY – INTERNATIONAL AND RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE (INSTITUTE OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY ed.), 
Access to Justice Series (Akvarel, Moscow 2011). 
228 See Chapter IV, Section B. 
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civil law countries where TPLF exists. Moreover, the recognition of the fact that 
“[l]itigation funding by private third parties is practiced successfully in some 
Member States” has also come from the European Commission.229 
TPLF seems to have development potentials in the civil law world. Apart 
from the likelihood that favorable economic conditions exist for the development of 
the industry, which deserves to be carefully studied, what appears to be true is that 
claimholders would largely benefit from TPLF in many civil law countries, and that 
could create a high demand for TPLF. Take the example of Italy, and consider the 
following quotation: 
The Italian John Doe who needs the support of a court in order to 
obtain the fulfillment of a right or of a legally protected interest is in 
a very unfortunate situation. […] In Italy, contingent fees are 
forbidden by the law and lawyers will not bear the costs of a case by 
themselves without being paid for their work throughout the entire 
proceedings. Therefore, our John Doe will be required to pay in 
advance, and in the course of the process, all the money necessary to 
cover the costs of the case and at least a part of the attorney’s fees, 
until the moment when the judgment allocates all these costs 
according to the “loser pays all” rule. This would not be a great 
problem if the time required to achieve the judgment were short. On 
the contrary, however, the length of civil proceedings in Italy is, in 
most cases, excessive. An average case may require three or four 
years to proceed through the court of first instance. […] This means 
                                                      
229 European Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, EU:COM(2008) 794, s.51. 
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that our John Doe must be able to bear all the costs for several years, 
until the case comes to a conclusion in the court of first instance.230 
The length of Italian civil proceedings generates high costs for plaintiffs, which are 
often prohibitive. Although the effects of TPLF on the length of civil proceedings 
are not easy to predict, TPLF might represent a solution to the problems faced by 
claimholders who cannot afford to bring a lawsuit or who, considering its outcome 
uncertain and indeterminable in time, choose not to bring suit because the expected 
value of the claim does not outweigh its expected costs. The possibility for 
claimholders to bargain over property rights in litigation with third parties, in a way 
that allows them to promise a share of the awards in exchange for having all 
litigation costs covered, would allow them to eliminate the risks connected with 
bringing suit, thus increasing the expected value of the claim and making them 
better off.  
If TPLF were to develop in the civil law world, who should be investing in 
litigation? It has been argued that TPLF is a tough business:231 it is a risky business 
that can lead to large losses very quickly.232 The risk of litigation has to be evaluated 
very carefully.233 In the first place, a tendency has been the establishment of 
financing companies by large insurance companies.234 This development is not 
surprising as the business model of TPLF is similar to that of legal expenses 
                                                      
230 M. Taruffo, Civil Procedure and the Path of a Civil Case, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 
159,159-160 (JEFFREY S. LENA & UGO MATTEI eds., 2002). 
231 C. Toggenburger, Financing Private Litigation – A European Alternative to Contingency Fees, 
supra note 74, 627. 
232 M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 
101. 
233 On the role of risk analysis in claim evaluation and litigation management see R.B. CALIHAN, J.R. 
DENT & M.B. VICTOR, ABA, THE ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE AND LITIGATION 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 220. 
234 See e.g. Allianz Prozessfinanzierung’s TPLF business (now terminated). 
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insurance policies and therefore fit into the product lines of many insurance 
companies. In the second place, another trend has been the creation of litigation 
financing companies by large well-capitalized financial companies that raise capital 
on stock markets.235 Finally, in the third place, privately held companies have also 
been created to invest in the TPLF market. 
                                                      
235 See e.g. Juridica and Burford, both listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
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 CHAPTER III 
SHAPING THE LAW OF TPLF (AKA: THE POLITICS OF TPLF) 
 
 
 
A. SOME CONTEXT 
TPLF is based on a contractual agreement freely entered into by two parties, who 
decide to stipulate the agreement acting within their freedom of contract attributed 
to them by the legal system. In this perspective, why would it be necessary or even 
appropriate to ban or regulate this practice? 
Modern legal systems are built around the central role of freedom of 
contract. A person’s freedom to contract with another for the exchange of a good or 
a service, or for the management of his economic interests, is in principle 
unlimited.236 The legal system (expression of the political power within a certain 
society) is only called, and has the power, to restrict such freedom of contract where 
there is a concern that must be dealt with. For example, both under the common law 
and in civil law systems the sale of controlled substances is typically restricted. If 
two or more people contract for the sale of controlled substances in violation of 
those restrictions, courts will refuse to enforce that contract (which in some 
jurisdictions would be considered void). In the common law, another example is the 
doctrine of unconscionability, which allows the court not to enforce a contract when 
                                                      
236 See PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Oxford University Press, 
1985); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harvard University Press, 
1997); MAURO BUSSANI, LIBERTÀ CONTRATTUALE E DIRITTO EUROPEO, supra note 197. 
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its terms are so one-sided at the time of contract formation that they are contrary to 
good conscience.237 In the civil law world, moreover, civil codes typically provide 
for pre-designed contract ‘types’ that the parties may use in order to regulate their 
interests. However, the parties may also decide to distance themselves from those 
‘types’ and create their own ‘atypical’ contract. In this case, however, the parties’ 
freedom of contract is not limitless, but the law leaves to the court the power to 
scrutinize whether the specific agreement concluded by the parties deserves 
protection.238 
Where does TPLF fit in this picture? Is there any reason that justifies 
prohibiting or regulating TPLF? What is the rationale, if any at all, that legitimizes 
the legislator or the courts to limit the individual freedom of the parties to a TPLF 
contract? Originally, the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance 
responded to the needs, discussed above, to discourage feudal lords from unduly 
turning to the judicial system in order to aggrandize their economic and political 
power. However, it has also been stated that this reason no longer exists in modern 
societies.239 
A heated debate (for now very much focused on the common law 
experience) has emerged around TPLF, in response, on the one hand, to a very 
aggressive TPLF industry willing to invest in litigation and, on the other hand, to an 
                                                      
237 In the US context, see Article 2-302 Uniform Commercial Code; for case law see i.a. Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (C.A. D.C. 1965); see also e.g. Clinton A. Stuntebeck, 
The Doctrine of Unconscionability, 19 ME. L. REV. 81 (1967). 
238 In Italy, for example, the civil code legislator construed this limitation by using the concept of 
‘cause’ (causa) of the contract. Simply stated, the court can strike down an ‘atypical’ contract where 
he considers (looking at the contract’s cause) that the contract overall does not deserve protection by 
the legal system (Article 1322 Italian Civil Code).  
239 See above Chapter II, Section A. 
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equally aggressive reaction by some interest groups that are alarmed by the 
expansion of TPLF. 
Importantly, this debate is not really on whether TPLF is legal or not, i.e. 
whether it is permissible on legal grounds. Rather, the debate is concerned with 
whether TPLF should be legal or not, i.e. whether it should be permitted or not on 
policy grounds. 
 
B. SOME EXAMPLES 
In Chapter II I introduced the fictional character of Emily, a single mother who had 
been struck by a truck driver and lost her job as a consequence of the fact that she 
would be unable to work for one year or more. Emily had a valid cause of action 
against the truck driver to recover $1 million in damages. However, Emily was not 
able to bring suit against the truck driver either because her savings were 
insufficient to finance the lawsuit, or simply because taking the case to trial was too 
risky due to her economic situation: if she finally lost her case, she would end up 
penniless.  
In Emily’s case, and that of many other plaintiffs in economic needs, TPLF 
represents an unprecedented opportunity to have their day in court and seek 
enforcement of their rights. TPLF provides plaintiffs with the necessary economic 
resources to start and maintain a lawsuit that they would otherwise not be able to 
afford. In addition, given that a funded plaintiff bears no risk associated with losing 
the case, TPLF encourages access to the courts where the system would otherwise 
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fail to facilitate justice. In this sense, TPLF is capable of increasing access to justice, 
and this has been one of the major arguments in favor of this practice. 
In the former chapter I also introduced another fictional character, X-
Conductors, a start-up company with limited liquidity who obtained a patent on an 
innovative chip for credit card readers, which had been infringed by a large and 
well-funded corporation, Giant Electronics. Also in this case, many real life 
characters find themselves in exactly X-Conductors’s position. For example, in 2010 
Devon IT, a Pennsylvania computer company, sued the International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM), ranked the No. 20 largest company in the US by 
revenue by Fortune in 2013,240 to recover damages for an alleged $12 million 
fraud.241  
It can be argued that there is no difference at all between Emily’s case, i.e. 
that of a poor individual that has been injured in a car accident, and that of a small 
company facing a large and well-financed corporation. In both cases, TPLF is a 
means that allows the small player to sue the big player for the pursuit of justice, 
and therefore support the view that TPLF is a powerful tool to increase access to 
justice. 
A hypothetical application of TPLF to ‘public interest’ litigation would make 
the above argument even stronger. Indeed, TPLF could (and perhaps should) be 
used as a tool to support litigation in areas such as environmental law or human 
rights law. In these areas, plaintiffs often lack the necessary economic resources to 
start a lawsuit, therefore making the justice system incapable to provide a remedy to 
                                                      
240 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2013/snapshots/225.html 
241 Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012). 
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many environmental torts and human rights violations. In particular, an increasing 
liberalization of TPLF on a global scale might produce beneficial effects on access 
to justice in the context of transnational public interest litigation, where alternative 
means to finance poor people’s litigation—such as legal aid or similar state-
sponsored programs—are less likely to be available. 
This could be seen, however, from a different angle. Imagine a small village 
in a country in Africa or Latin America that is populated by a community of 
indigenous people. A large US extracting company is conducting extracting 
operations in the village and, due to their negligence, an oil spill damages the entire 
village, its inhabitants, and their property. The local people of course realize to have 
suffered damages, but are not aware that under US law they could sue the extracting 
company in a US court and seek recovery on a theory of negligence. A US litigation 
funding investor pays a visit to the villagers, explains them that they have the 
chance to obtain monetary compensation for the harm they suffered, and proposes 
them the following: the villagers will not have to advance any money, but only to 
formally present the lawsuit in their own name; the investor will manage the entire 
case and will pay for all costs involved; if they lose the case, the investor will have 
lost the investment; while, if they win the case, the investor will keep 80% of the 
recovery, and 20% will be for the villagers. The villagers agree, and the funder 
invests a total of $20 million in the case. 
The case goes to trial and the villagers obtain a favorable judgment against 
the US extracting company for $200 million. Therefore, as per the TPLF agreement 
between the investor and the villagers, the villagers keep $40 million, and the 
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investor receives $160 million. Discounting the initial investment, the third-party 
funder made a profit of $140 million by only investing a sum of $20 million. 
The examples I brought in the above paragraphs show some of the benefits 
and the concerns associated with TPLF. The last scenario envisaged, for example, 
raises a number of potential concerns, among which are at least the following: (i) the 
investor made an excessive profit at the expense of the (unaware) claimholders; (ii) 
there has been a switch of roles between the claimholders and the investor, both as 
to who had the initiative to bring the case and to who controlled the litigation; (iii) 
the extracting company was sued on a case where it would hardly have been sued 
but for the external capital made available by the funder; and (iv) those who 
invested in funds that in turn own the litigation funding company found themselves 
supporting this case without even knowing it.242 These are only some of the several 
concerns that TPLF raises and that have been subject of debate. 
 
C. THE POLICY DEBATE ON TPLF 
The debate on TPLF has involved many interested stakeholders. Notwithstanding 
the fact that this practice poses some challenging legal issues, lawyers have not been 
the only players in the debate on TPLF. Rather, lawyers have somehow been put on 
a side, while policy makers (including economists, political scientists, government 
and business representatives) have stepped forward.  
At the center of the debate, and thus of the evolution of the law of TPLF, are 
true lobbying battles between the TPLF industry and the resisting business 
                                                      
242 On this issue see Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE, 13 June 2011. 
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community (of potential defendants) that is against TPLF. From there, the 
discussion extends to academics, bar associations, and governmental institutions 
(including courts and legislators). 
The debate on TPLF is very transnationally intertwined, as voices expressed 
in one jurisdiction often migrate and influence policy in other jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, some local specialties exist due to the fact that practices such as TPLF 
do not operate in a vacuum, but are affected by the surrounding context. There is an 
increasing awareness in the debate of the fact that these differences must be taken 
into account when approaching the study of TPLF, which certainly poses a limit to 
the transnationality of the debate on TPLF.243 
In order to present the debate that is shaping the law of TPLF, I will use the 
following format. I start by describing the industry lobbying activity. Then, I 
describe the academic debate and the interventions by some major bar associations 
in the US. For each of these clusters, I first give an overview of the main actors 
involved and the dynamics that govern their relationships, and then I address some 
specific arguments that are brought in favor or against TPLF. Finally, I discuss some 
major governmental reactions to TPLF. 
 
1. Industry Lobbying 
a)  Sides and Strategies 
Companies generally spend lots of resources into effective marketing strategies that 
they expect to be useful not only to directly increase their business, but also to create 
                                                      
243 See e.g. J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 95. 
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a favorable reputation of themselves, with a view to be better positioned on the 
market in the long term. Similarly, companies typically invest resources into 
proactively presenting themselves and their business in a way that is both more in 
line with the regulatory trends of the moment, and also more strategic in terms of 
their ability to influence the regulator and obtain a more favorable environment 
where they will operate in the future. 
Most companies in the TPLF industry have certainly adopted such 
precautions. Many of these companies have websites where they present TPLF as an 
undisputedly good thing, which is beneficial and makes no harm to society. For 
example, the website of Harbour Litigation Funding states that “ litigation 
funding allows good claims to be pursued that would otherwise simply not be 
possible”;244 Alter Litigation’s website even states that “[l]itigation funding is all 
about access to justice” (emphasis in the original), and that the company helps client 
“to litigate on an equal footing”.245 Other companies have published position papers 
where they describe what TPLF is and how it works, and at the same time clearly 
present their business in a favorable light.246 By publishing this type of information, 
TPLF companies expect both to generate more business, and also to create a 
favorable perception of them and this debated practice in both the general and 
specialized public. 
A noteworthy example of this strategy is given by Harbour Litigation 
Funding, who publishes on his website an updated survey of the law of TPLF in all 
                                                      
244 http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com 
245 http://www.alterlitigation.com/#our-value-proposition 
246 See e.g. the White Paper published by Burford and prepared by its CIO Jonathan T. Molot, Theory 
and Practice in Litigation Risk (2012); or more recently, Burford’s paper authored by its CEO 
Christopher Bogart, Litigation Finance: A Smart and Sound Strategy to Reduce Legal Department 
Expenses (2013). Both papers are available on the company’s website. 
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jurisdictions where it is practiced. This way Harbour not only provides evidence of 
the legality of TPLF where available, but it is also able to highlight where a court 
has issued a ‘favorable’ precedent that simply ‘suggests’ the establishment of a 
future favorable legal landscape.247 The information is supposed to be accurate, but 
this strategy leaves Harbour ample room to emphasize the favorable trends, while 
remaining silent on any unfavorable developments that are not settled law yet. 
Another way for companies to advance their interest is through joining 
industry association and pursuing concerted strategies. In the US, around thirty 
consumer litigation finance companies (only funding personal injury litigation) form 
part of the American Legal Finance Association (ALFA).248 Among other things, 
ALFA is the channel through which member companies express uniform views on 
the issues that are debated, and therefore increase the credibility of the industry. In 
particular, as some scholars have argued, ALFA’s primary focus is not regulating its 
members, but lobbying state legislatures to leave the industry alone.249 In addition, 
ALFA aims at improving the reputation and public perception of the consumer 
litigation finance industry. In line with this advocacy objective, one of ALFA’s 
mottos is “Helping people when they need it most”.250 
In the UK, an industry association was also created by the main litigation 
funding companies active in the UK, the Association of Litigation Funders 
                                                      
247 http://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/funding-map 
248 http://www.americanlegalfin.com 
249 Martin J. Estevao, The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect and Inform 
Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2013), 477-478; Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of 
Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 11 
(2014), 15.  
250 See a journal ad available on ALFA’s website at 
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/press/ALFA%20NY%20Law%20Journal%20ad.pdf. 
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(ALF).251 ALF is, however, different from ALFA. First, its members are not limited 
to consumer litigation funding companies, but rather include among the major 
corporate litigation funders investing in the UK. Then, the main reason why ALF 
was created was the adoption of a self-regulatory code for the TPLF industry. I will 
discuss the code more in detail below, after speaking of Lord Justice Jackson’s 
Report.252 For now, it is interesting to note that ALF’s website, in line with the 
general industry’s trend just described, defines TPLF as “an additional resource for 
Access to Justice and rational management of financial risk in making claims”.253 
On the other side of the spectrum stand the ‘enemies’ of TPLF, typically 
represented by the large corporate business community. In the US, the US Chamber 
of Commerce is the main voice of ‘corporate America’ in its fight against TPLF. 
The Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR), in particular, issued two very 
influential reports attacking TPLF. In the 2009 report, the ILR set forth a series of 
arguments against TPLF, calling for a total prohibition of TPLF in the US or, “at the 
very least, [its prohibition] in the context [of class actions and] other aggregate 
litigation”.254 
Three years later, the ILR came out with a new report, this time no longer 
arguing for the prohibition of TPLF (perhaps they realized that they are fighting a 
lost battle), but rather supporting the establishment of “a robust oversight regime to 
                                                      
251 http://associationoflitigationfunders.com 
252 See Section 4 (a) in this Chapter. 
253 http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/banner-3 
254 US CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-
PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES (US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform: 
Washington, DC, 2009), 12. 
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govern this type of TPLF at the federal level” and favoring “legislation that appoints 
a federal agency to regulate third-party investments in litigation”.255 
The US Chamber of Commerce is a channel through which ‘corporate 
America’ expresses itself in a concerted way, through one single channel of 
communication, as well as in a coherent way, expressing all arguments against 
TPLF in one place. However, industry lobbying against TPLF is everywhere in the 
public debate. Often, any fact or event involving TPLF triggers a reaction in the 
press that is always a good opportunity for companies to make their voice heard. For 
example, shortly after the US District Court in Philadelphia issued an order for the 
plaintiff on the issue of privilege in the Devon IT v IBM case,256 IMB general 
counsel Robert C. Weber published a post on Forbes attacking TPLF, calling TPLF 
“a seemingly benign term that camouflages a real risk to clients, our court system 
and to the lawyer professionalism itself”.257 
 
b)  Main Arguments 
On one side of the spectrum of the debate, TPLF supporters argue that the practice is 
beneficial on the grounds that it increases access to justice. This is because, by 
providing resources to who cannot afford to pay for litigation or bear the risks 
                                                      
255 US CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO 
REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION (US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform: 
Washington, DC, 2012), 2. 
256 Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp, supra note 241. 
257 Daniel Fisher, IBM GC Says: Beware Of Lenders Offering To Finance Your Lawsuit, FORBES, 12 
February 2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/02/12/ibm-gc-says-
beware-of-lenders-offering-to-finance-your-lawsuit 
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associated with it, TPLF enables those people to approach a court for the 
enforcement of their rights.258  
Closely connected to the former is another argument in favor of TPLF, and 
namely that TPLF plays a beneficial equalizing function—“levels the playing 
field”259—between plaintiffs and defendants, providing the former, who is typically 
financially weaker, with the necessary resources to face typically wealthy and 
powerful defendants. This ‘David vs. Goliath’ argument is well exemplified in the 
X-Conductors case hypothesized earlier, or in the actual Davon IT v. IBM case.260 A 
balanced distribution of resources between plaintiff and defendant is key to a fair 
trial. Furthermore, a plaintiff who can rely on solid financial resources is assumed to 
be more credible in pre-trial negotiations than a plaintiff who is experiencing 
financial pressures, therefore making the chances of an accurate settlement between 
the parties more likely.261 
On the other side of the spectrum, critics have raised objections on a variety 
of grounds. The first and major ground for criticism has to do with the social costs 
TPLF produces on society. In particular, opponents argued that, because TPLF 
increases the amount of money available to pay attorneys to litigate claims, TPLF 
encourages frivolous and unmeritorious litigation, and, in general, increases the 
overall level of civil litigation and its consequent costs for society.262 
                                                      
258 Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp, supra note 241. 
259 LITIGATION FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 16. 
260 Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp, supra note 241. 
261 J.T. Molot, Theory and Practice in Litigation Risk, supra note 246, 5. 
262 SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 254, 5. This is the argument that the US Chamber of Commerce has made its 
forte. See e.g. the recent ILR’s report THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN AUSTRALIA (US 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, October 2013), at 12 ff, where the ILR uses statistical data from 
the Australian experience to substantiate their claim the TPLF increases the volume of litigation. 
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Another ground for criticism is that ethical violations are associated with 
TPLF, and namely that TPLF can create confusion concerning the party who 
controls the lawsuit and concerning the attorney-client relationship.263  
A third ground for criticism is based on the concern that TPLF allows the 
funder to take undue advantage of the claimholder, e.g. by contracting an 
excessively high percentage of awards in his favor, in particular in the light of the 
fact that the industry does not operate in a competitive environment.264  
Finally, TPLF has been criticized based on the simple idea that it would be 
undesirable that litigation funders make a profit out of someone else’s litigation, i.e., 
ultimately, from someone else’s rights and attempts to obtain justice. As the ILR put 
it, the interest of a litigation funder “lies in maximizing its return on that investment, 
not in vindicating a plaintiff’s rights”.265 This approach supports the folkloristic idea 
that profit-motive and justice are incompatible concepts. 
In addition to the arguments listed above, which concern whether TPLF 
should be permitted or prohibited, the industry debate has also dealt with some other 
issues that are more specific, covering technical aspects of the way in which TPLF 
ought to operate if permitted. Therefore, these arguments are not on the desirability 
of TPLF tout court, but rather deal with operative aspects of the practice. Even if 
this is not the place to analyze the details of these discussions, it is worth mentioning 
them here. The main issues are two: the first one is whether communications 
                                                      
263 SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 254, 7-8; THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN AUSTRALIA , supra note 262, 
15 ff., making the claim that “the nature of TPLF increases the risk that a lawyer’s loyalty will be 
divided between the client and the Funder.” See also on this issue Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc. 915 
So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
264 Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A System Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and 
Its Effects on Settlement, supra note 80. 
265 SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 254, 2. 
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between funders and their clients should be privileged;266 the second is whether the 
existence or even the terms of a TPLF agreement should be disclosed to the court.267 
 
 
                                                      
266 The law on whether communications with the TPLF provider are privileged is not settled in the 
US. US courts generally take a strict approach to privilege waivers, finding that any voluntary 
disclosure of privileged information with a non-privileged party will waive the privilege. Therefore, 
sharing information with a TPLF company may be deemed a voluntary disclosure that waives 
privilege on the information shared. In Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 2010 WL 
2545960 (D. Del. June 24, 2010), Leader had engaged in discussions with multiple TPLF companies 
regarding a potential investment in Leader’s lawsuit against Facebook for patent infringement. 
Leader had entered non-disclosure agreements with the potential investors, and shared documents 
with them. Upon learning that Facebook had shared documents with the TPLF companies, Facebook 
filed a motion to compel the documents’ production, arguing that any privilege had been waived by 
the release to potential investors. The Magistrate Judge concluded, and the District Judge affirmed, 
that privilege did not extend to documents shared between Leader and TPLF companies, and that 
Leader had waived privilege protection with regard to the documents it gave to potential investors. 
The court noted that this is an unsettled area of the law, and ruled that when a party’s interest in 
litigation is commercial, the common interest privilege does not attach. See NYSBA, REPORT ON THE 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING, supra note 82, 8-9. A subsequent 
Delaware case, Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., 801 F.Supp.2d 293, 303-304 (D. Del. 2011), 
distinguished its facts from Leader, and held that common interest privilege was not waived when 
Xerox provided documents to a company hired to assist in monetizing Xerox’s patent portfolio. The 
court indicated that in Leader the funders were negotiating at arm’s length and had not engaged in a 
relationship yet. In Xerox, the third party was already engaged and had been intimately involved in 
the process, having retained its own lawyers and taken an interest in the outcome of the litigation 
proceedings. In Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 
4, 2011), the Eastern District of Texas declined to compel production of documents provided to 
TPLF investors, and held that materials provided to prospective funders in advance of litigation were 
protected under the work product doctrine. More recently, in Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 2012 WL 
4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that common interest 
privilege existed between a plaintiff and its funder to protect documents from production (“[Funder] 
and Devon now have a common interest in the successful outcome of the litigation which otherwise 
Devon may not have been able to pursue without the financial assistant of [funder]”). In a further 
decision, Walker Digital, LLC v. Google Inc., Civ. No. 11-309-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2013) common 
interest privilege was upheld under the same circumstances as Xerox, but without discussion. See 
Bentham IMF, Disclosure of Documents in Litigation Finance (November 2013), available at 
http://www.benthamimf.com/what-we-do/disclosure-of-documents-in-litigation-finance. 
267 On this issue see the December 2013 decision by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 
Waterhouse v. Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89. Further to this judgment, plaintiffs that are 
financed by a third-party litigation funder will be required to disclose to defendants, at the outset of a 
proceeding, the identity of the funder and whether the funder is subject to New Zealand jurisdiction. 
Provision of this information may lead to applications by defendants for security for costs or for a 
stay on the basis of abuse of process. If such applications are made, the terms of the funding 
agreement may have to be disclosed (subject to certain redactions). For further comments on this 
decision see Chris Brown and Felicity Monteiro, Supreme Court Mandates Disclosure of Litigation 
Funding Agreements, Wilson Harle, December 2013, available at 
http://www.wilsonharle.com/supreme-court-mandates-disclosure-of-litigation-funding-agreements. 
See also generally Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (2012). 
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2. Academic Debate 
The controversial practice of TPLF and the advocacy debate that has emerged 
around it have certainly caught the attention of legal academia. While at the 
beginning the scholarly production on TPLF was scarce, especially compared to the 
potential long-term consequences of this practice, in recent years more and more 
scholarly papers have been published, especially in US law journals. At the same 
time, many academic conferences on TPLF have been organized and research 
projects launched, some of which with the ambition of having a transnational or 
global scope.268  
Among the scholarly work that has been published, some approaches TPLF 
from a rather scientific point of view. By this I mean that the purpose of such work 
is to analyze, distill, and deconstruct TPLF in order to obtain a better understanding 
                                                      
268 Among them, the RAND Law, Finance, and Capital Markets Program was launched in 2009 in 
order to “analyze an emerging development in civil dispute resolution in the United States, namely, 
the providing of capital and capital market products for claim holders and those defending against 
claims, and their respective lawyers.” An “International Conference on Litigation Costs and 
Funding” was held in July 2009 in Oxford, UK, organized by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and 
the Institute of European and Comparative Law University of Oxford. A conference titled “Collective 
Redress and Litigation Funding” was held in Sydney and Canberra in December 2009, organized by 
the Centre for Law and Economics at The Australian National University, which aims at 
“coordinating a major research program examining collective redress and litigation funding globally 
with a focus on the US, Europe, Australia and Asia.” The conference “New Trends in Financing Civil 
Litigation in Europe: al Legal, Empirical and Economic Analysis” was held at the Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam on April 24, 2009. The conference “Third Party Litigation Funding and 
Claim Transfer: Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System” was presented by RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice and UCLA School of Law in June 2009. On May 20-21, 2010 in 
Washington, D.C. the Conference “Alternative Litigation Finance in the U.S.: Where Are We and 
Where Are We Headed with Practice and Policy?” organized by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice 
was held, which brought together litigation finance investors, legal practitioners, policymakers, 
academics and researchers to discuss and debate issues and trends related to alternative litigation 
finance in the United States and in other common law jurisdictions. In 2011, the Searle Civil Justice 
Institute at George Mason University’s Law & Economics Center organized a Global Conference on 
TPLF, which comprised two events, one in New York and one in Brussels. It should be noted that, 
when any academic work or conference refers to the comparison between the US, Australia, and 
Europe, often times this comparison is reduced to a US vs. Australia vs. UK one. This is somehow 
ironic, because, even though the UK is certainly in Europe, from a legal point of view UK law is 
much closer to US law and Australian law than to the rest of European law. By contrast, an 
interesting comparison is the one I proposed in Chapter II, i.e. between the law of TPLF in the 
common law and in the civil law. However, little work has been done in this direction.  
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of its functioning and implications.269 The works belonging to this category have 
used both legal analysis, in some cases also making comparative efforts,270 and 
economic analysis, including both an analysis of the incentives of the actors 
involved in TPLF and empirical studies of available data.271 
Another chunk of scholarly work in the area has taken a different approach. 
Rather than a descriptive approach to the study of TPLF, they have taken an 
advocacy approach, arguing either in favor or against TPLF.272 Importantly, in some 
cases academics have genuinely supported or opposed TPLF based on their own 
believes, advancing the public interest as often academics are inclined to do. By 
contrast, however, some scholars have produced biased work products, as a result of 
either the funding they received or their own interests as members of the TPLF 
industry. In fact, some of the academics commenting on TPLF are also involved in 
the industry. The resulting situation might be somewhere between genuine academic 
work and industry lobbying efforts. For example, a 2011 Fortune article criticized 
Georgetown Law professor Jonathan Molot for wearing two hats, both writing on 
                                                      
269 See e.g. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012). 
270 See i.a. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, STEFAN VOGENAUER AND MAGDALENA TULIBACKA (eds.), THE 
COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
271 Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-party Financed Litigation, supra note 96; id., Toward a 
Regulatory Framework for Third-Party Funding of Litigation, Boston University School of Law 
Working Paper No. 13-27 (21 June 2013, Revised 9 July 2013); Cento Veljanovski, Third-Party 
Litigation Funding in Europe, supra note 145; Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum, The 
Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement, Vanderbilt University Department of 
Economics Working Papers, VUECON-14-00002 (2014); Geoffrey J. Lysaught and D. Scott 
Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice 
System, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 645 (2012). 
272 See e.g. Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON 
L. REV. 667 (2010), 669 (arguing that US courts’ concept of champerty has promoted injustice and 
prevented legitimate investment in legal claims); Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party 
Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010) (arguing that the critiques to TPLF 
are flawed and that TPLF should be permitted but regulated to guard against its fairly limited 
dangers); Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice, 36 
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 515 (1998). 
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TPLF as an academic and acting as Burford’s chief investment officer.273 Similarly, 
the RAND Law, Finance, and Capital Markets Program—an influential research 
project in the US—receives generous financial support by Juridica.274  
The arguments that the scholarly work on TPLF has brought forward are 
pretty much the same as the ones we discussed above that have been raised by 
industry.275 Below I re-propose the main arguments in the debate, highlighting any 
peculiar angle these may take in the academic context. 
Access to justice remains the core argument in support of TPLF. Also in the 
academic debate, however, scholars have pretty much limited themselves to argue 
that TPLF is beneficial because it is capable of increasing access to justice. While 
the intuition is simple, scholars have not explored the reasons and the ways in which 
exactly TPLF increases access to justice. In other words, they stick to the rhetoric of 
this argument (just like the industry does).  
Scholars have also brought the argument that TPLF is beneficial in that it 
would level the playing field between plaintiff and defendant. However, a dissenting 
opinion also exists in this respect. In particular, some scholars have argued that 
TPLF may also produce the opposite effect, namely to allow powerful plaintiffs, 
backed by litigation funders, to oppress small and economically weak defendants 
that are unable to resist to litigation due to their financial difficulties.276 Indeed, this 
may become very dangerous. Companies may take advantage of defendants that are 
in situations of economic difficulties to threaten litigation and obtain an easy 
                                                      
273 R. Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, supra note 242. 
274 Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues, Knowns and 
Unknowns, supra note 1, ii. 
275 See for an overview Stuart L. Pardau, Alternative Litigation Financing: Perils and Opportunities, 
12 U. C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 65 (2011). 
276 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, supra note 41. 
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settlement even when they would otherwise not be entitled to any compensation, 
just because the defendant is aware that it may not bear the burdens to defend a 
lawsuit, especially when the plaintiff is backed by a litigation funder. 
An additional argument brought by supporters of TPLF in the academic 
world is that the industry is beneficial because of the positive deterrent effects it 
produces on potential defendants’ behavior, thereby contributing to the social goal 
of minimization of the total costs of accidents in society.277 Under the law and 
economics literature, if victims do not have the resources to sue injurers, or if risk-
averse victims prefer to avoid risking their own resources and thus do not bring suit, 
the resulting scenarios are similar to the reality in which there is no liability for 
wrongdoers.278 As that literature points out, if there is no liability, injurers will not 
exercise any care, for doing so would entail costs but not yield a benefit to them.279 
Potential injurers, who are aware that the victims of their harmful behavior may be 
able to count on solid financial resources through TPLF, will have an incentive to 
take more care in order to avoid liability. 
We mentioned above easy settlements. Some scholars argued that there is a 
risk that TPLF, rather than encouraging accurate and fair settlements,280 facilitates 
abuses. This is because a defendant that has been sued prefers to settle and avoid 
paying for defending himself than going to trial. Plaintiffs backed by litigation 
funders—and therefore with no risk of loss—may take advantage of this set of 
incentives. This in turn may lead to a risk of over-deterrence, where potential 
                                                      
277 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Harvard University Press, 
2004), 178. 
278 Ibid., 179. 
279 Ibid. 
280 J.T. Molot, Theory and Practice in Litigation Risk, supra note 246. 
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defendants carry out their activities to an extent that is below the socially optimal 
one, just in order to minimize the chances to be sued.281 
Also in the academic setting, TPLF has been criticized on the grounds that it 
encourages frivolous and unmeritorious litigation.282 It has been argued that, as a 
matter of simple economics, increasing the amount of money available to plaintiffs 
makes litigation cheaper and thus, as it happens when something becomes cheaper, 
there is more demand of it and that results into an increase of the volume of claims 
litigated.283 Moreover, “third-party financing particularly increases the volume of 
questionable claims”,284 because such financing eliminates the incentives not to 
invest on non-meritorious litigation.285 
Proponents of TPLF have discredited this argument.286 The central 
counterargument underpinning this position is that investors carefully scrutinize the 
cases brought to them by their potential clients.287 Litigation financing firms 
“engage in stringent due diligence when evaluating potential investments,”288 and 
only invest in claims with good prospect of success. The selection of cases by the 
financing company works as a ‘filter’ that leaves out frivolous and unmeritorious 
claims,289 similarly to how attorneys working on contingency do not accept cases 
                                                      
281 Gary Young, Two Setbacks for Lawsuit Financing: But the Practice is Still Alive, NEW JERSEY 
LAW JOURNAL, 18 August 2003, 21. 
282 On the idea of ‘frivolous’ claims see Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 14 U. PA. L. REV. 
519, 529-33 (1997). 
283 Paul H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673 (2011). 
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STATES, supra note 254, 5. 
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286 See generally A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. 
287 In particular on the pre-check by financing companies in Germany: M. Coester & D. Nitzsche, 
Alternative Ways to Finance a Lawsuit in Germany, supra note 65, 89. 
288 Juridica Capital Management, http://www.juridicacapital.com/how.php 
289 At the present status of the industry, the selection is often very stringent. For example, IMF 
(Australia) Ltd (now Bentham IMF Limited), in its 2001-2010 experience, only funded 5% of the 
matters considered. Similarly, Juridica Capital Management only funded 6% of the cases considered. 
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that are not likely to be successful. The result of this is that TPLF could be 
beneficial (both for ‘society’ and for defendants) because it allows ‘good’ claims to 
be litigated, while it does not support unmeritorious claims.290  
But what is a ‘good’ claim? A counterargument against the one according to 
which litigation-funding firms only invest in ‘good’ claims (identified as claims 
with high probability of success) is that funders, being risk neutral and being able to 
spread the risk on large pools of cases, reason in terms of expected values. For a risk 
neutral investor, the expected value of a $500 million claim with only a 5% chance 
of success is equal to that of a $25 million claim with 100% probability to win. 
Since investors make their decision to invest based on the comparison between the 
expected revenue and the expected cost, they might be attracted by highly risky 
(unmeritorious) claims with huge damage awards at stake.291 
Closely connected to the issue of frivolous litigation is the concern for the 
increasing overall (frivolous or not) volume of litigation. This is perhaps the most 
problematic negative externality discussed by the scholarship on TPLF.292 Roughly 
speaking, by increasing the funds available to claimholders to pursue litigation, 
TPLF would cause an increase in the overall number of claims, resulting in a more 
costly civil justice system.293  
                                                      
(Data provided at the RAND ICJ Conference “Alternative Litigation Finance in the U.S.: Where Are 
We and Where Are We Headed with Practice and Policy?,” Washington, D.C., May 20-21 2010). 
290 On this point see RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 52, 117. 
291 SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 254, 6. 
292 P.H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation, supra note 283; David Abrams and Daniel L. 
Chen, A Market for Justice: The Effect of Litigation Funding on Legal Outcomes (2009) (working 
paper on file with author). 
293 For the first attempt of empirical investigation in this direction, considering the experience of 
Australia, D. Abrams & D.L. Chen, A Market for Justice: The Effect of Litigation Funding on Legal 
Outcomes, supra note 292. 
  90 
Some scholars have been able to strengthen this argument by producing 
some evidence that confirms it. In particular, Abram and Chen reviewed the 
experience of Australia, the market where TPLF has been developed for the longest 
time and therefore where most data is available, and came to the conclusion that the 
volume of litigation in Australia in fact increased since the introduction of TPLF.294 
To this argument, it has been countered that “[e]ven if this were true, why 
would this be a bad thing?”295 If the claims that are funded are not fraudulent and 
reflect claims based on valid law, then it would not be a bad thing for these cases to 
increase in number, as that would mean that more legal wrongs are repaired and 
more wrongdoers held to account.296 Perhaps, society should think of devoting more 
resources to the civil justice system. 
 
3. Bar Associations 
TPLF has a significant impact on the legal profession. Lawyers are very likely to 
find themselves involved in issues concerning TPLF, because they represent clients 
whose litigation is being funded by a TPLF supplier, or because clients approach 
them asking for their advice on the matter, or because a client may ask a lawyer for 
a referral to a litigation funding company. Moreover, in the context of negotiations 
between a claimholder and a funding company, the funder may approach the 
potential client’s lawyer asking for (privileged) information on the case, in order to 
                                                      
294 David S. Abrams and Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third 
Party Litigation Funding, University of Pennsylvania Law School Working Paper (January 2012), 
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/dabrams/workingpapers/MarketforJustice.pdf. 
295 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80, 68. 
296 Ibid.; New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. McCann, 707 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Mass. 1999); Kevin Pennell, On 
the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A Contractual Solution to a Contractual Problem, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 481, 494-496 (2003). 
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take a decision on whether to invest or not in the lawsuit. Finally, a funder may seek 
to influence a lawyer’s decisions regarding the strategy to adopt in the litigation, e.g. 
to require additional discovery at the client’s cost, or on whether to accept or reject a 
settlement offer (even if this is typically a decision for the client297).  
Because of the many ethical questions TPLF raises for lawyers, several bar 
associations in the US have issued advisory opinions in order to provide guidance to 
the members of the profession on how to proceed in order to behave ethically.  
The American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Ethics 20/20 formed 
a Working Group on Alternative Litigation Finance to study the impact of TPLF on 
the attorney-client relationship and on the professional responsibilities of lawyers. 
The Working Group was instructed only to consider the duties of lawyers 
representing clients who are considering or have obtained external funding to TPLF 
suppliers. By contrast, the Working Group did not consider any social policy or 
normative issues such as the desirability of TPLF or any related empirical 
controversies. In October 2011, the Working Group published a Draft White Paper 
on Alternative Litigation Finance as an Informational Report to the ABA House of 
Delegates.298 Below I summarize the main conclusions of the Draft White Paper. 
First, attorneys must approach any situation where TPLF is involved with 
care, mindful of their professional obligations as members of the legal profession.  
Second, an attorney must always exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of his client, and not be influenced by financial or other 
considerations. Therefore, a lawyer must not permit a third party (in particular, in 
                                                      
297 For example, Rule 1.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.” 
298 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE 
LITIGATION FINANCE (2011). 
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this case, a third-party funder) to interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of professional 
judgment.  
Third, the lawyer must be vigilant to prevent disclosure of any confidential 
information. He must also use reasonable care to safeguard against a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege or other protection on the communications with his client 
(an issue on which the law in unsettled).299  
Finally, the attorney must advise his client on the terms of the funding 
transaction; if the client is not an expert, the lawyer must become fully informed and 
provide competent advice to the client.300 
Bar associations in the US have expressed advisory opinions also at the state 
and local levels. For example, the New York City Bar Association (NYCBA) issued 
a Formal Opinion on TPLF in 2011.301 In its Opinion, the NYCBA advises lawyers 
on how to behave in order to comply with their professional responsibility 
obligations if they find themselves in a situation that involves TPLF. 
First of all—and importantly for the purpose of the policy debate on TPLF—
, the NYCBA acknowledged that it is not unethical per se for a lawyer to represent a 
client whose case is funded by a TPLF supplier. However, the lawyer must be aware 
of the various ethical issues that may arise from the transaction, and advice the 
client accordingly.302  
                                                      
299 See note 266. 
300 ABA, COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE, 
supra note 298, 4. 
301 NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, FORMAL OPINION 2011-2: THIRD PARTY LITIGATION 
FINANCING (2011). The Opinion is available at http://www.nycbar.org/index.php/ethics/ethics-
opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02 
302 Ibid. 
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According to the NYCBA, the two main issues that arise include: (i) the 
compromise of confidentiality and waiver of attorney-client privilege; (ii) the 
potential impact of the TPLF agreement on a lawyer’s exercise of independent 
judgment. The NYCBA proposes the following solutions, which would allow 
lawyers to behave ethically before these issues: (i) the lawyer may not reveal client 
information to the TPLF supplier without the client’s informed consent; (ii) while 
the client may agree to permit the financing company to direct the strategy or other 
aspects of the lawsuit, the lawyer may not permit the funder to do so unless he has 
obtained the client’s informed consent.303 
 
4. Governmental Reactions 
To complete the picture of the policy debate on TPLF that I have tried to draw in 
this chapter, it is now time to see what have been some major reactions by 
governmental institutions. Among these, I include both courts and legislators. With 
respect to the former, this is not the context to discuss any case law on TPLF. 
Rather, I will briefly survey some other ways in which courts have expressed views 
that are relevant for the policy debate on TPLF. In particular I will address, on the 
one hand, UK Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Jackson’s Report on the costs of civil litigation 
of 2009, and, on the other, examples of courts’ dicta and other policy statements by 
judges that are likely to influence future case law on TPLF. 
 
 
 
                                                      
303 Ibid. 
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a)  Lord Justice Jackson’s Report 
Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Jackson was appointed to carry out an independent review of 
the rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation in the UK, and to make 
recommendations in order to promote access to justice at proportionate cost. The 
review lasted one year, commencing in January 2009 until December 2009, and the 
findings were presented in the form of a published report in January 2010.304  
The Report carries out a thorough review of civil litigation costs in the UK, 
and is by no means limited to the topic of TPLF. It discusses the costs involved in 
virtually all areas of civil litigation—from personal injury to intellectual property—, 
and it discusses alternative ways in which litigation is financed. The Report 
concludes with some recommendations on what are valuable ways to finance civil 
litigation, which should be encouraged, and other proposals to improve the 
efficiency of the legal system and promote access to justice. 
Importantly for the TPLF industry, the Report endorses TPLF as a beneficial 
practice. In particular, the Report states that “[i]n some areas of civil litigation costs 
are disproportionate and impede access to justice”.305 With the scope in mind of 
“propos[ing] a coherent package of interlocking reforms, designed to control costs 
and promote access to justice”,306 Justice Jackson stated that “third-party funding is 
beneficial and should be supported,” in part because it “promotes access to justice,” 
and in particular for the following main reasons.  
                                                      
304 RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 52. 
305 Ibid., i. 
306 Ibid. 
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First, TPLF provides an additional means of funding litigation and, for some 
parties, the only means of funding litigation (hence the argument that TPLF 
promotes access to justice). Second, although a successful claimant with third party 
funding foregoes a percentage of his damages, it is better for him to recover a 
substantial part of his damages than to recover nothing at all. Third, the use of TPLF 
does not impose additional financial burdens upon opposing parties. Finally, TPLF 
tends to filter out unmeritorious cases, because funders will not take on the risk of 
such cases, which also benefits opposing parties. 307 
The section of the Report on TPLF goes on and Jackson LJ discusses 
whether any regulation of the TPLF industry is required in the UK and, in case it 
were, whether full statutory regulation is necessary or whether an industry self-
regulatory code may be sufficient. Jackson LJ acknowledges that some form of 
regulation of the industry is necessary (in line with the advice by the Law Society of 
England and Wales). However, no statutory regulation is required for the time 
being. This is because the TPLF industry is still nascent in the UK, and the typical 
users of TPLF services are sophisticated enterprises with full access to legal advice. 
Therefore, an appropriate self-regulatory code will be sufficient for the time 
being.308 In particular, Jackson LJ noted that the draft voluntary code that had been 
developed by the TPLF industry association (ALF’s predecessor) was not sufficient 
to ensure a proper functioning of TPLF on the market, and required that a stricter 
approach be taken. The Civil Justice Council consulted on a new draft code on 2011, 
                                                      
307 Ibid., 117. The Civil Justice Council (the “CJC”) has expressed a similar view. See the CJC report 
IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE – FUNDING OPTIONS AND PROPORTIONATE COSTS, supra note 163, 
Recommendation 3 and Chapter C. 
308 RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT, supra 
note 52, 118-124. 
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which was voluntarily adopted by the industry’s newly created trade association 
(ALF).309 
Interestingly, Christopher Hodges published an article where he sheds some 
light on the dynamics that led to the adoption of a self-regulatory code for litigation 
funders in the UK. He notes that “[t]he litigation funding industry has lobbied 
Jackson LJ to permit them to operate more freely and extensively. In return, he put 
pressure on the industry to create a self-regulatory regime, since historical examples 
of consumer abuse could clearly be repeated”.310 
 
b)  Court Opinions 
By reviewing the case law on TPLF, one notices that in addition to the relevant 
rulings, which contribute shaping the law of TPLF in many common law countries, 
courts sometimes expressed policy statements on TPLF. These statements are 
sometimes part of the reasoning of the court, other times they are provided as dicta 
or comments within a court decision. While the nature of these comments is 
certainly not that of a binding precedent, these statements are useful in order to 
understand what the position of the court is with respect to TPLF, and possibly to 
predict future decisions. 
For example, in 2007 the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council of Bahamas considered a case that involved the assignment of a claim.311 
The issue was whether the assignment was void as involving maintenance and 
                                                      
309 ALF, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION FUNDERS, supra note 157. 
310 Christopher Hodges, Self-regulation (Jackson Report, Code of Conduct), supra note 164, 155. 
311 Masai Aviation Services & Aerostar Limited vs. Attorney General & Bahamasair Holdings 
Limited [2007] UKPC 12. 
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champerty. While the case did not involve a TPLF transaction, the Lords narrated 
the diminishing relevance of the law of champerty and maintenance in modern 
society. This may suggest that the Courts of the Commonwealth of Bahamas may, in 
the future, look at TPLF with these lenses. 
In 2011, the Royal Court of Jersey heard a case that involved a TPLF 
agreement, and it was required to consider the issue of champerty under the law of 
Jersey. In its judgment, the court held i.a. that the funding agreement facilitated 
access to justice by plaintiffs who would not otherwise be able to afford to bring the 
litigation in question.312 
Moreover, in 2004 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa stated that 
the need for the rules of maintenance and champerty had diminished, if not entirely 
disappeared, in the light of the right of access to justice enshrined in the Constitution 
of South Africa and the coming into force of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997, 
which made speculative litigation possible by permitting ‘no win, no fee’ 
arrangements between lawyers and their clients.313 
By contrast, in some cases courts have expressed themselves in the opposing 
direction. For example, in 2006 the Court of Appeals of Singapore indicated (in 
dicta) that it considers the doctrine of champerty to continue to be useful in 
preventing a perversion of justice.314 
 
 
 
                                                      
312 The Valletta Trust [2011] JRC. 
313 PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc and Others v. National Potato Co-operative Ltd [2004] (6) SA 66 
(SCA). 
314 Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough Engineering Ltd [2007] 1 SLR (R) 989. 
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c)  Legislators 
While in the UK the regulation of TPLF has been left to an industry voluntary code, 
in the US some states have adopted statutory regulation on the matter. In most cases 
these statutes, where adopted, abolish the traditional prohibitions on champerty and 
maintenance and, in some cases, establish a regulatory regime to which TPLF 
suppliers are subject.  
For example, Maine requires that TPLF companies register with the state and 
include specific funding provisions in their agreements with clients. Similarly, Ohio 
recently enacted a law that expressly requires all TPLF contracts to include language 
stating that the investor “shall have no right and will not make any decision with 
respect to the conduct of the underlying civil action or claim or any settlement or 
resolution thereof”.315 Moreover, Texas state Representative Senfronia Thomson (D-
Huston) recently proposed setting up a regulatory scheme in Texas to allow 
companies or individuals with no stake in litigation to take a share of potential 
proceeds in exchange for an upfront payment.316 
However, not all state assemblies are moving in the direction of a more 
liberal approach to TPLF. Instead, some states are attempting to address some of the 
concerns arising from TPLF with statutory regulation. For example, a bill that would 
place limits on the interest charged by litigation funders passed a Senate vote in 
Louisiana in April 2013. The bill, which is still waiting for a House vote, would set 
a cap at 35% to the size of the share that the funder would be entitled to if the 
                                                      
315 NYSBA, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING, supra 
note 82, 3-4. 
316 Jess Davis, 3rd-Party Litigation Funding Regs Proposed In Texas, LAW360.COM (14 February 
2013); NYSBA, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING, 
supra note 82, 3-4. 
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litigation is successful. Reportedly, eleven other US states are considering similar 
legislation.317 
                                                      
317 Kyle Barnett, Lawsuit Lending Bill Aimed at Putting Caps on Predatory Lenders Passes State 
Senate, THE LOUISIANA RECORD, 30 April 2013. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LIFTING THE VEIL ON THE POLITICAL DEBATE 
 
 
 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
In chapter III we saw the main policy arguments raised by the debate on TPLF 
regarding whether this practice should be liberalized, regulated or prohibited. In 
particular, we identified the key players taking part to the political debate, and 
analyzed their arguments as they present them. 
As often in the realm of law and politics, some arguments proposed by 
stakeholders reflect legitimate business, economic or political interest. These 
arguments come in confrontation with those brought by opposing interest holders 
through a process of (more or less transparent) lobbying before the institutions that 
are entitled to take decisions for the community. Lobbying works as a sieve of 
stakeholders’ interests in a process that leads to the formation of a legal rule that is 
supposed to mirror the outcome of that process. Seen in this way, lobbying is an 
essential part of the functioning of modern democracies.  
In other cases, however, interested stakeholders advocate for their interests 
by creating ‘fake’ arguments, constructed in such a way to have political grasp, with 
a view to prevail in the aforementioned process vis-à-vis other stakeholders, and 
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eventually obtain a more favorable regulatory environment where to conduct their 
business more profitably.  
In this respect, it is the job of academics—and the purpose of this work—to 
lift the veil of appearance of policy arguments that are structured in a way that they 
make sense on their face, and deconstruct those arguments in order to uncover 
whether they are genuine arguments (which should be acknowledged), or not (in 
which case they should be disregarded). 
In order to do so, in Section B of this chapter I test the main arguments 
described in Chapter III by using economic analysis, a methodological approach that 
can be traced under the umbrella of comparative law—meant as an anti-formalistic 
and critical approach to the study of law and policy.318  
Moreover, in Section C, I use sociological analysis in order to explain some 
other grounds (i.e., in addition to those provided by economic analysis) that may 
explain or justify the regulation of TPLF. In particular, first, and from a descriptive 
perspective, I discuss what may explain an interest in the regulation of TPLF that 
the economic analysis cannot explain. Secondly, and from a normative perspective, I 
discuss other grounds that should inform a regulator’s decision as to whether to 
regulate TPLF, and thus eventually justify the regulation of TPLF, in addition to the 
grounds provided by economic analysis—which conclusions may not be sufficient 
per se to lead to optimal regulation—or even in contradiction with them. 
 
 
                                                      
318 On the benefits deriving from the interaction between the two “strongest nonpositivistic 
approaches to legal analysis,” namely comparative law and law and economics, see UGO MATTEI, 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 224. 
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B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TPLF 
1. Property Rights in Litigation 
In the law and economics literature on property law,319 consideration is given to how 
alternative ‘bundles of rights’ create incentives to use resources efficiently.320 
Property is not understood as a monolithic institution, but rather as a multifaceted 
right that describes what people can and cannot do with the resources they own. 
Modern law permits forms of property that were unthought-of in the past, being the 
history of property a story of increasing complexity that mirrors increasing 
opportunities of wealth creation.321 Often a new form of property is created in order 
to take advantage of a previously unseen market opportunity.322 The law sometimes 
reacts to such innovations by imposing limitations to what can be transferred as 
property. That usually happens when, for a variety of reasons, such innovations are 
considered undesirable. In particular, on the one hand, private law imposes 
limitations on the right to transfer that is inherent to property by denying contract 
enforcement and/or the protection that in principle it affords to “entitlements” 
through injunction or money judgments.323 On the other hand, the legal system uses 
regulation as a means to correct market failures.324 
                                                      
319 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 7-176; 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (5th Int’l ed. 2008), 74-118.  
320 R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 319, 78. 
321 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
324 See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 
22 ECONOMETRICA 265 (1954); Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 351 (1958); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 
1 (1960); Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect 
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 229 (1986); ALFRED 
E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 1, 1-19 (1988); 
  103 
In the language of legal economists, a plaintiff (or potential plaintiff) holding 
a claim can be said to have ‘property rights’ in it, including possessory rights and 
rights to transfer, being the lawsuit qualifiable as object of property.325 By selling 
his claim to an assignor, or by selling an interest in the outcome of the litigation to 
an investor, a plaintiff transfers all or part of his property rights in litigation.326  
Under the economic approach, a rational claimholder—by definition—will 
be willing to maximize the value of his property right in the lawsuit. In order to do 
so, among the rights included in the ‘bundle,’ he will only decide to keep those 
specific rights that he evaluates more than others, while he will prefer to bargain 
over the other rights he holds with another person who evaluates them more. In this 
way the claimholder will maximize the expected value of his claim. Furthermore, 
given that litigants are usually risk averse,327 the elimination by a claimholder of the 
risk connected to the litigation is something a claimholder may be willing to pay a 
price for, resulting in a factor capable of increasing the expected value of his claim. 
TPLF is a practice through which claimholders can eliminate the risk 
connected to the possible unfavorable outcome of the litigation. A plaintiff may be 
willing to transfer part of his property rights in the lawsuit to a third party in 
exchange of having that risk eliminated, thus increasing the expected value of his 
claim.  
                                                      
SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS: BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION 205-232 (2004); 
John O. Ledyard, Market Failure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (S.N. 
DURLAUF & L.E. BLUME eds., 2nd ed., 2008). 
325 On the use of the term ‘property rights’ in the Law & Economics literature see S. SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 9-11. 
326 On this view see also Michael I. Krauss, Alternative Dispute Financing and Legal Ethics: Free the 
Lawyers!, 33 MISS. C. L. REV. (2014) (forthcoming). 
327 See S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 258-259, 406-
407, 430; W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 
(1988); A. Heyes, N. Rickman & D. Tzavara, Legal Expenses Insurance, Risk Aversion and 
Litigation, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107 (2004). 
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On these premises, the next sections of this chapter aim to explain the 
functioning of TPLF by using economic analysis. Understanding the economic 
logics of TPLF will be essential as background information in order to fully 
understand the legal issues posed by TPLF and the policy arguments in favor and 
against TPLF. Section 2 provides an economic model of TPLF, showing the array of 
incentives of the parties of a TPLF contract. Section 3 explains why and under what 
conditions the parties form a TPLF contract, and shows that TPLF is Pareto 
efficient. Section 4 critically looks at the main arguments advanced by supporters 
and critics of TPLF, unveiling the myths and realities of this practice, and 
reconciling the debate by re-assessing the costs and benefits of TPLF. 
 
2. Economic Model of TPLF 
In this section I provide a basic economic model of TPLF. I adopt as my starting 
point Shavell’s basic theory of litigation,328 and I analyze the incentives of the 
funder and the plaintiff with respect to TPLF, respectively under the ‘American’ 
rule and the ‘English’ rule for the allocation of legal costs. 
The economic model is based on the following assumptions: a) all parties are 
rational and risk neutral, b) if a plaintiff brings suit, there will definitively be a trial 
(i.e., I abstract from the possibility of settlement before trial); c) we are in a 
simplified world model, with only two time dimensions: T0 and T1 (the time of the 
TPLF agreement and the time of the judgment), d) at T1 there are only two possible 
                                                      
328 See S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 387-443; 
Kathryn E. Spier, Litigation, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 262 (A.M. POLINSKY & S. 
SHAVELL eds., North Holland, 2007). 
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scenarios: plaintiff wins or plaintiff loses, e) the lawyer is paid on a hourly basis, 
and that is included in the costs of litigation, and f) there are no transaction costs. 
 
a)  American Rule329 
The Third-party Funder 
The funder, a profit maximizer, will be willing to fund a plaintiff’s suit when his 
expected revenue E(R) from his investment is higher than his expected costs E(C), 
i.e. when his expected profit E(π) is positive, being E(π) = E(R) – E(C). The funder 
will evaluate—with careful scrutiny—the merit of the plaintiff’s claim, and estimate 
the size of the claim (R), i.e. the dollar amount likely to be won, and the probability 
of success of the claim (λ).330 Furthermore, the funder and the plaintiff will 
determine, contractually, the share of awards that the funder will be entitled to get 
after a judgment is reached (σ). The funder’s expected revenue is the share of the 
amount likely to be won times the probability to win.  
E(R) = σ(λR) 
The funder’s expected costs are the plaintiff’s legal expenses associated with the 
suit, which he is obliging himself to cover by signing the contract. The funder will 
invest if and only if E(R) > E(C).  
Suppose the plaintiff holds a claim worth $100,000, the funder believes that 
the plaintiff will win at trial with probability 70 percent, the contractually 
                                                      
329 Under the ‘American rule’ each party pays for its own costs of litigation. David A. Root, Attorney 
Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and 
“English Rule,” 15 IND. INT. & COMP. L. REV. 583 (2005), 585. 
330 On the use of risk analysis applied to litigation see R.B. CALIHAN, J.R. DENT & M.B. VICTOR, 
ABA, THE ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT, supra note 220, 5-
33. 
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determined share of the proceeds for the funder is 30 percent, and the expected 
litigation costs are $20,000. Here, we will have 
R = 100,000 σ = 30% λ = 70% E(C) = 20,000 
Thus, applying E(R) = σ(λR) we will have 
E(R) = .3(.7(100,000)) = 21,000 
Under the given conditions, the funder will invest, because E(R) > E(C). 
 
The Plaintiff 
Assuming that the plaintiff is also a profit maximizer, being his reason for bringing 
suit that of receiving the highest possible amount of money (and not, for example, 
personal vindication which he may even be willing to pay for), we know from the 
basic economics of litigation that, in absence of third-party funding, the plaintiff will 
bring suit if his expected return from suit is higher than his expected costs.331 In 
other words, the plaintiff tries to maximize his E(π), being E(π) = E(R) – E(C).  
If TPLF is available, we have two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, 
one with no TPLF, plaintiff’s E(π) = E(R) – E(C) = λR – E(C). In the second 
scenario, in which the plaintiff receives TPLF, we indicate the respective variables 
as E(π)’ = E(R)’ – E(C)’. Because the funder is entitled to a share σ of the awards, 
for the plaintiff E(R)’ = E(R) (1–σ) = λR (1-σ). Because by turning to TPLF the 
plaintiff eliminates his expected costs (because he does not advance any money and 
bears no risk), his E(C)’ = 0, and therefore E(π)’ = λR (1-σ).  
 
                                                      
331 S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 390. 
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The plaintiff will be seeking third-party funding if and only if  
E(π) < E(π)’ 
or, 
λR – E(C) < λR (1–σ) 
In other words, the plaintiff will be willing to contract with a litigation financing 
company only in the case he expects to lose less by giving away a share of the 
proceeds than by risking his own money funding his own litigation. 
Before continuing with the explanation, it is necessary to notice that we can 
distinguish between two types of plaintiffs: a) the plaintiff under a budget constraint 
(the ‘poor’ plaintiff), who cannot afford to bring suit without TPLF,332 and b) the 
plaintiff who does have the resources, but decides to receive external funding 
because he prefers it as a strategy, as a way to manage his risk associated with the 
litigation, because he does not want to risk his own money and is willing to pay for 
purchasing that protection against risk. 
The ‘poor’ plaintiff’s expected profit under a litigation funding agreement 
will always be equal or higher than without external funding. The intuition is 
simple, and the reason is that without any external funding he would not be able to 
bring suit and thus his E(R) would be zero. Instead, if he receives third-party 
funding, his E(C)’ will be zero and his E(R)’ will always be ≥ 0. Thus, the ‘poor’ 
plaintiff is always better off (or rectius: is not worse off) by getting third-party 
funding than by getting nothing.333 
 
                                                      
332 Apart from poor people, this category includes creditors in the insolvency context, for which it 
would be impossible to pursue wrongdoers due to lack of funds. 
333 Here the comparison is only between with or without TPLF: I am not discussing other alternatives 
for financing poor people’s litigation. 
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Coming back to the plaintiff who is not under a budget constraint, consider 
the following numerical example: 
R = 100,000 σ = 30% λ = 70% E(C) = 25,000 
The plaintiff will be willing to receive external financing when  
E(π) < E(π)’ 
Thus,   
λR – E(C) < λR (1–σ) 
[(.7) 100,000 – (25,000)] < [(.7)(.7) 100,000] 
45,000 < 49,000 
In the example, we can conclude that the ‘non-poor’ plaintiff would get 
third-party financing for covering all the costs of his litigation (so to eliminate any 
risk) and give up 30 percent of the award, rather than risking his own money hoping 
to get the keep the entire award. After all, the plaintiff’s expected profit with TPLF 
is higher than his expected profit without TPLF. Under all assumptions of the model 
he will get TPLF. 
 
b)  English Rule334 
The Third-party Funder 
Under the English rule—just like under the American rule—the funder will be 
willing to invest as long as his E(π) from the investment is positive, i.e. when his 
E(R) > E(C). Because under the English rule all costs are paid by the losing party, 
                                                      
334 Under the ‘English rule’ the losing party pays for all litigation costs. D.A. Root, Attorney Fee-
Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English 
Rule,” supra note 329, 584. See also Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the 
English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987). 
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the expectancies are not as linear as under the American rule. The funder will have 
no costs in the case the plaintiff wins, but his costs will include the defendant’s 
litigation costs if the plaintiff loses (Cp + Cd). Thus, for the funder, the E(R) from the 
investment will be λ(σR), and his E(C) will be (1-λ)(Cp + Cd). Consequently, the 
E(π) for the funder looks as follows: 
E(π) = λ(σR) – (1-λ)(Cp + Cd) 
Consider the following numerical example 
R = 100,000  λ = 60% σ = 30% Cp = Cd = 20,000  
Applying E(π) = λ(σR) – (1-λ)(Cp + Cd), we will have: 
E(π) = (.6)(.3)(100,000) – (.4)(40,000) 
E(π) = 18,000 – 16,000 
E(π) = 2000 
In this numerical example, because a positive expected profit of 2000 exists, the 
funder will decide to fund the lawsuit. 
 
The Plaintiff 
From the viewpoint of the plaintiff, the decision to turn to TPLF depends on 
whether the E(π) with TPLF is higher than the E(π) without TPLF. That is to say, 
recalling that the apostrophe (’) is used to make reference to the scenario with 
TPLF, the plaintiff will turn to TPLF when 
E(π) < E(π)’ 
If the plaintiff sues the defendant with no external funding, then his E(π) = λR – (1-
λ)(Cp + Cd). If the plaintiff decides to turn to TPLF, then his E(π)’ = λR (1-σ). 
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Consequently, because the plaintiff will turn to TPLF as long as E(π) < 
E(π)’, he will do so when 
λR – (1-λ)(Cp + Cd) < λR (1-σ) 
Consider the following numerical example: 
R = 100,000  λ = 60% σ = 30% Cp = 20,000 Cd = 30,000 
Here, the plaintiff will turn to TPLF because 
(.6) 100,000 – (.4) 50,000 < (.6)(.7) 100,000 
40,000 < 42,000 
In other words, in this example, the plaintiff will be better off by turning to TPLF 
than by financing his lawsuit with his own resources. 
A few words are worth mention here with respect to what I earlier referred to 
as the ‘poor’ plaintiff, i.e. the claimholder under a budget constraint that prevents 
him from the possibility to sue the defendant. Also under the English rule the ‘poor’ 
plaintiff will be better off by turning to TPLF, because, with no external funding, he 
will not bring suit and thus his E(π) will be zero. With TPLF, instead, his E(π)’ = 
λR (1-σ) ≥ E(π). 
Under the English rule, one further possible scenario exists: that of a 
claimholder who does have the resources to start a lawsuit (i.e. to pay for his own 
legal expenses), but who would not be able to bear the costs of an adverse cost order 
in case of loss. A claimholder in such situation would find TPLF beneficial because 
it eliminates the risk of an adverse cost order that would oblige him to pay for the 
winning defendant’s litigation costs. 
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3. Lessons from the Economic Model 
a)  Why the Parties Enter into a TPLF Agreement 
The economic model has served the function of explaining when the funder and the 
plaintiff are individually willing to enter into a TPLF agreement. As a common 
intuition suggests, they will actually form a contract when the expected utilities of 
both are increased by the contract,335 i.e. when there is room for a Pareto superior 
allocation of property rights in litigation.336 However, it is worth considering under 
what conditions both parties’ expected utilities may in fact be increased by TPLF, in 
order to see when and why the parties will actually form a contract.  
If we assume that the two parties of a financing contract have symmetric 
information,337 have equal predictions about the outcome of the case and are equally 
risk neutral, there is no room for gains from the financing contract, because there is 
no possible σ that can be agreed upon that makes both parties better off. This is true 
under both the American rule and the English rule for the allocation of legal 
expenses, as it is demonstrated in the following subsections. 
 
American Rule 
Assume both the funder and the plaintiff believe that the outcome of the case will be 
favorable by a certain percentage λ, the value of the claim is of a certain amount R 
                                                      
335 See S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 293. 
336 A change from one allocation to another is Pareto superior when at least one party is better off 
and no one else is worse off. See ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 590 ff. 
(7th ed. int’l 2009). 
337 For a model of parties’ litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information see Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 404 (1984). See also, specifically on the effects of legal-expenses insurance (including 
after-the-event legal-expenses insurance) on settlement under asymmetric information, Y. Qiao, 
Legal-Expenses Insurance and Settlement, supra note 187. 
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and so are each party’s litigation costs (say $20,000). Under these conditions of 
perfectly symmetric information there will be no possible σ the parties will be 
agreeing upon, because there will always be a σ by which one party gains and the 
other loses unless their respective expected profit under the financing contract is 
equal to that without the contract. 
Consider the following table, using apostrophe (’) to indicate the situation 
with a TPLF agreement: 
 
 Funder Plaintiff 
No TPLF E(R) = 0 E(C) = 0 E(R) = λR E(C) = 20,000 
Yes TPLF E(R)’ = σ(λR) E(C)’ = 20,000 E(R)’ = (1-σ)λR E(C)’ = 0 
 
 
Put in terms of E(π), the following can be stated: 
 Funder Plaintiff 
No TPLF E(π) = 0 E(π) = λR – 20,000 
Yes TPLF E(π)’ = σ(λR) – 20,000 E(π)’ = (1-σ)λR 
 
Since both the funder and the plaintiff will be willing to enter into a contract as long 
as their respective E(π)’ > E(π), then the following can be said about the two parties 
as to whether they will be willing to form a TPLF contract: 
Funder if 
σ(λR) – 20,000 > 0 
Plaintiff if 
(1-σ)λR > λR – 20,000
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Or, 
σ(λR) > 20,000 
σ(λR) > 20,000 
 
λR – σ(λR) > λR – 20,000 
σ(λR) < 20,000
As a result, under the American rule, if both the funder and the plaintiff have 
perfectly symmetric information and are risk neutral, they will never enter into a 
TPLF agreement. 
 
English Rule 
In this subsection I do the same test under the English rule. An equivalent 
conclusion is reached. 
Assume that both the funder and the plaintiff believe that the claim is of a 
certain value R, the probability to win λ is 60%, and the total litigation costs C = (Cp 
+ Cd) are 40,000. Now consider the following table, which shows the expected 
payoffs of alternative scenarios (with and without TPLF) for the funder and the 
plaintiff respectively: 
 Funder Plaintiff 
No TPLF E(π) = 0 E(π) = λR – (1-λ) C 
Yes TPLF E(π)’ = λσR – (1-λ) C E(π)’ = λR (1-σ) 
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Because both the funder and the plaintiff will be willing to come into contract if and 
only if their respective E(π)’ > E(π), then the following can be said with respect to 
their willingness to enter into a contract: 
Funder iff 
λσR – (1-λ) C > 0 
Plaintiff iff 
λR (1-σ) > λR – (1-λ) C
Or, 
λσR – C + λC > 0 
(.6) σR – 40,000 + 24,000 > 0 
(.6) σR – 16,000 > 0 
(.6) σR > 16,000 
 
λR – λσR > λR – C + λC 
– λσR > – C + λC 
– (.6) σR > – 16,000 
(.6) σR < 16,000
As a result, under the described conditions, the funder and the plaintiff will never 
form a TPLF contract. 
 
Different Perceptions and Attitudes Towards Risk 
If under symmetric information the parties cannot agree on any σ and thus do not 
enter into contract, what is it that makes them do so? The reasons why the parties 
come into contract seem to be of two orders. On the one hand, the parties are likely 
to have different perceptions of R and, even more likely, of λ.338 On the other hand, 
they have different attitudes towards risk (and different marginal disutility of 
loss).339 While for an individual plaintiff a dispute is a single episode, a litigation 
                                                      
338 Compared to the individual plaintiff, litigation financing firms are likely to have greater expertise 
and thus higher ability to evaluate the probability of success of a claim. 
339 In fact, a $20,000 loss is likely to negatively affect an individual plaintiff more than a well-
financed litigation funding company, for which such a loss might not be as significant. 
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financing company is repeated player that is able to spread the risk across a large 
pool of cases it decides to finance. Consequently, a financing firm is more risk 
neutral, while the individual claimholder is likely risk averse. 
 
b)  Efficiency of TPLF 
We have learnt from the economic model discussed above that TPLF is in principle 
efficient. At this point the following question comes up: if TPLF is efficient, why 
has it received judicial and institutional resistance? And why is the question of its 
desirability receiving scholarly attention? The former chapter shed light on the 
hidden ‘driving forces’ of the law of TPLF, showing the opposite interest groups 
that have influenced the evolution of the case law and policy initiatives concerning 
TPLF through (sometimes aggressive) lobbying efforts. Speaking in economic 
terms, TPLF has been attacked on the grounds that it creates negative 
externalities.340 To be accurate, the debate on TPLF has highlighted both positive 
and negative externalities, which are in fact what the most recent scholarship has 
pivoted on. The next section of this chapter critically discusses these externalities, in 
order to lift the veil on the current debate and re-assess the costs and benefits of 
TPLF. 
 
4. The Costs and Benefits of TPLF: Myths and Realities 
This section addresses some of the main issues raised by the debate on TPLF and it 
reconsiders them in light of the lessons we have learnt from the economic analysis 
                                                      
340 See P.H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation, supra note 283. 
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of TPLF. In particular, it deals with the major issues that represent grounds for the 
potential ban or restriction of TPLF. By contrast, it does not discuss minor issues 
that may require regulation had the admissibility of TPLF been taken for granted, 
and merely dealing with the way in which TPLF should be conducted in order for 
the TPLF market to function properly, such as the protection of confidential and 
privileged information, solvency requirements for TPLF suppliers, and similar 
issues. 
 
a)  ‘Negative’ Externalities 
Increasing Overall Volume of Litigation 
It has been argued that, as a matter of simple economics, increasing the amount of 
money available to plaintiffs makes litigation cheaper and thus, as it happens when 
something becomes cheaper, there is more demand of it and that results into an 
increase of the volume of claims litigated.341 This is perhaps the most problematic 
negative externality discussed by the debate on TPLF. 
Roughly speaking, by increasing the funds available to claimholders to 
pursue litigation, TPLF would cause an increase in the overall number of claims, 
resulting in a more costly civil justice system.342 It has been countered that if the 
claims that are funded are not fraudulent and reflect claims based on valid law, then 
it would not be a bad thing for these cases to increase in number, since that would 
                                                      
341 SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 254, 5; See P.H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation, supra note 283. 
342 For the first attempt of empirical investigation in this direction, considering the experience of 
Australia, D. Abrams & D.L. Chen, A Market for Justice: The Effect of Litigation Funding on Legal 
Outcomes, supra note 292. 
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mean that more legal wrongs are repaired and more wrongdoers held to account,343 
and therefore, society should devote more resources to the civil justice system. 
The question regarding the volume of litigation can also be addressed from a 
different perspective, namely that of the social versus the private incentive to bring 
suit in a costly legal system.344 This perspective does not focus on the costs of the 
courts system that are born by taxpayers, but rather it focuses on the relationships 
between, on the one hand, the private and social costs of litigation, respectively (Cp) 
and (Cp + Cd), and, on the other, the private and social benefits of litigation, 
respectively λR and the external effect on the behavior of potential defendants 
generally.345 Assuming that the overall level of litigation increases due to TPLF, the 
question to address is whether the absolute value of the increasing social costs (Cp + 
Cd) determined by the amount of litigation that depends on the private incentive to 
litigate under TPLF (which in turn depends on the private costs and benefits) 
outweighs the absolute value of the social benefits of litigation, identifiable as the 
decrease of social costs due to the precaution activity of defendants that makes the 
probability of loss to victims decrease from p to q, where p > q. If the absolute value 
of litigation costs outweighs the absolute value of the deterrence benefits, then 
TPLF is socially undesirable; in the opposite case, TPLF is desirable. This is true 
under a perspective which criterion of desirability is assumed to be the minimization 
of total social costs, which equals the sum of expected losses, prevention costs and 
expected legal expenses.346 
                                                      
343 A.J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, supra note 80, 68. 
344 Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Inventive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 
J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). 
345 Ibid., 334. 
346 Ibid., 335. 
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I now draw a model of the social desirability of TPLF from the perspective 
of the social versus private incentive to bring suit, adopting as my starting point 
Shavell’s model347 and assuming the American rule for allocations of legal costs 
applies. 
Define l = loss suffered by plaintiff, where l > 0; p = probability of loss if 
defendants do not engage in preventing activity, p > 0; q = probability of loss if 
defendants do engage in preventing activity, p > q > 0; x = cost to a defendant of 
prevention activity; a = plaintiff’s legal expenses, a > 0; b = defendant’s legal 
expenses, b > 0. 
Under Shavell’s model, legal expenses apart, a social interest in affecting 
defendants’ behavior exists when 
x + all < pl 
Now two scenarios will be modeled. 
The first is one in which plaintiffs are expected to bring suit (because of their 
private incentives), and thus defendants will engage in prevention activities. The 
social costs are 
x + q(l + a + b) 
In the second scenario plaintiffs are not expected to bring suit, thus defendants will 
not engage in precaution activities. The social costs are 
pl 
Consequently, considering legal expenses, a social interest in that plaintiffs bring 
suit exists when 
x + q(l + a + b) < pl 
                                                      
347 Ibid., 334-336. 
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TPLF is capable of affecting plaintiffs’ private incentives to bring suit. I have shown 
in the basic model of TPLF348 that, with no TPLF available, the plaintiff will bring 
suit when λR – Cp > 0 and, if TPLF is available, he will turn to TPLF when λR (1-σ) 
> λR – Cp. As a consequence of what has been said, TPLF might become 
problematic when it creates higher incentives for the plaintiff to bring suit. When λR 
(1-σ) > λR – Cp, the plaintiff will have higher an incentive to bring suit if TPLF is 
available than if it is not available. This point is crucial when it comes about 
questioning the social desirability of TPLF. Allowing a claimholder to bargain over 
his property rights in litigation with a third party increases his incentives to bring 
suit when there are gains from trade. Thus, allowing TPLF permits the possibility of 
higher incentives to bring suit; prohibiting TPLF does not permit it.  
In the light of the theory of the social versus private incentive to bring suit, 
the question of the social desirability of TPLF looks as follow: does TPLF increase 
plaintiffs’ incentives to bring suit to such an extent that the total increasing social 
costs, which amount depends on the ‘new’ incentive, outweigh the social benefits, 
which derive from the deterrence effect determined by TPLF on the behavior of 
potential defendants? If the answer is no, then TPLF is to be considered desirable. If 
the answer is yes, then TPLF results socially undesirable under this theory. The 
question, however, cannot be answered univocally in general terms. Instead, it is an 
empirical question: the social desirability of TPLF depends on many factors to be 
taken into consideration on a case-by-case basis. The answer will depend, apart from 
the costs of litigation, on the nature of defendants’ activities, which could be 
activities which harmfulness can be reduced substantially with little marginal efforts 
                                                      
348 I consider the model under the American rule. See note 329. 
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or vice versa. 
 
Ethical Issues 
TPLF agreements give rise to a number of ethical issues from a variety of 
perspectives. First of all, at first glance it might seem that the funder unduly profits 
at the expenses of the plaintiff, who would be worse off because he has to give up a 
share of the awards upon winning the case. Instead, both parties are made better off 
by the contract. In fact, in terms of expectations—at the time of the agreement—also 
the plaintiff is better off. Of course, he will eventually find himself with less money 
after the judgment, but that is the price he has decided to pay in exchange for the 
elimination of risk. The plaintiff prefers to eliminate the risk of an unfavorable 
outcome of the litigation and is willing to pay for that. By bargaining over property 
rights in litigation, the expected value of his claim increases. TPLF creates gains 
from trade in property rights in litigation and is thus efficient. 
Another problem might exist from the perspective of the plaintiff, 
concerning the issue of whether he comes into contract voluntarily. A first example 
is that of the ‘poor’ plaintiff who finds himself in the necessity to receive TPLF in 
order to bring suit. I have earlier demonstrated that in these cases the plaintiff is by 
definition better off with TPLF rather than without it. However, the plaintiff might 
have agreed on contractual conditions that he would not have agreed upon had he 
not found himself in a state of necessity.  
A second example is that of a plaintiff holding a claim with high probability 
of success, who though might be unaware of the high value of his claim and 
 121 
bargains with a funder for a disproportionately high σ in case of success. In such 
case the funder might be taking advantage of the plaintiff’s unawareness. This issue 
becomes problematic especially in the case of individual plaintiffs outside the 
commercial context (not corporate actors or professionals), who may not have 
access to full legal advice.  
Both situations in the two examples are problematic. However, they are not 
distinct from other problems that commonly emerge in social and economic life and 
which are addressed by the legal system in a variety of ways. A number of 
alternative solutions can be thought of. In the first place, standard remedies available 
under contract law can be applied to TPLF contracts: for example, the common law 
doctrine of unconscionability could apply to vitiate particular instances of unfair 
TPLF dealings.349 In the second place, regulatory strategies like mandatory 
provisions of information, licensing, default rules, codes of conduct350 and others 
might be implemented.351 In the third place, the benefits from a competitive market 
for litigation financing could be substantial, as competition among litigation 
financing companies would induce them to offer financing for percentages of 
awards closer to the real expected costs of financing. Moreover, as far the benefits 
from competition are concerned, the availability of TPLF to plaintiffs would force 
attorneys working under contingency fee agreements—where available—to compete 
with litigation funders, thus taking out the monopoly enjoyed by lawyers on the 
determination of the percentage of their retainer, which could thus be lowered under 
                                                      
349 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 153. 
350 See e.g. the consultation paper produced by the Civil Justice Council in the UK: CJC, A SELF-
REGULATORY CODE FOR THIRD PARTY FUNDING, supra note 157. 
351 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 161-188. 
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the pressure of competition.352 The same is true the other way around too. For 
example, in a jurisdiction like the UK, which has recently opened to contingency 
fees,353 TPLF providers will suffer the pressures of competition, and thus are likely 
to lower the shares of awards they contractually demand, in order to stay 
competitive. 
Another ethical issue concerns who controls the litigation when a litigation 
funder is involved, and whose interests the lawyer will represent in a funded 
litigation—whether the client’s or the funder’s. The review of the policy debate and 
economic analysis has shown that TPLF per se is not capable of affecting either of 
the ethical concerns under analysis. With respect to the attorney’s obligation, she 
remains bound to serve the client’s interest even in the presence of a TPLF 
agreement. Specific professional responsibility rules are in place to ensure that the 
lawyer is loyal to her client. In this respect, TPLF is no different from other 
situations that may impair the lawyer’s loyalty to her client in favor of a third party. 
Therefore, TPLF may and should be addressed with the same tools. 
With respect to who controls the litigation, once again this is a false 
problem. This is for the following reasons. First, where transfer of control is 
perceived as a problematic issue, legal systems do not permit such transfer of 
control, and therefore, a TPLF agreement that contemplates such transfer is void.354 
Second, if we abandon the prohibition to transfer control rights to the funder, control 
becomes a valuable good subject to negotiation between the claimholder and the 
funder. According to the economic model of TPLF designed here, control will 
                                                      
352 Ibid., 134-5. 
353 LEGAL AID, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS ACT (2012), Sec. 45. 
354 See Chapter II. 
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normally be allocated efficiently between the parties, generating gains from trade. In 
fact, the funder certainly benefits from acquiring control. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that the transfer of control harms the claimholder: the more control 
the funder acquires over the litigation, the lower will be the price (i.e., share of 
awards) that he will require from the claimholder in exchange. This is not to say that 
the conflict of interest problems that can derive from the transfer of control should 
be overlooked. Rather, I suggest that they be looked at under a different light, 
attributing an economic value to the rights to control the lawsuit, which should be 
given a price.355 If the parties to a TPLF agreement were allowed to bargain over the 
transfer of control, this would likely lead to Pareto improvements and eventually to 
efficient allocations of resources. 
Finally, from the point of view of the funder, a TPLF contract is essentially 
an investment. Some concerns have been raised with respect to the fact that third 
parties can profit from other people’s litigation in which they have no interest other 
than financial.356 However, investing in litigation is something that already 
happens—more or less directly—in other markets that have developed around 
property rights in litigation.357 Furthermore, in the business world, virtually any risk 
other than litigation risk can be spread or eliminated via the market.358 There is no 
actual difference between other markets and TPLF that would justify its prohibition 
                                                      
355 See also on this point M. Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 269, 501-502. 
Generally on pricing legal claims see Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? 
Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. R. 1889 (2013). 
356 In fact, this possibility is restricted in some jurisdictions, such as Ireland or Singapore. See above 
notes 176 and 177.  
357 E.g. contingency fees and litigation expenses insurance, among others. See Preface and note 12 
above. 
358 As J.T. Molot puts it, “companies not only spread business risk through the capital markets, but 
also dispose of some risk that they simply do not want to bear.” J.T. Molot, A Market in Litigation 
Risk, supra note 12, 367. 
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on purely ethical grounds. Instead, TPLF is a system that allows claimholders and 
investors to efficiently manage litigation risk, because it allows the risk to be 
transferred from the risk-averse individual claimholder to an investor who is able to 
spread the risk over a large pool of cases.  
 
b)  ‘Positive’ Externalities 
Access to Justice 
Access to justice is a vague concept. Both terms ‘access’ and ‘justice’ can be 
interpreted in various ways, which can then combine into a variety of meanings of 
the concept.359 In broad terms, access to justice is defined as the set of conditions 
that allows those who whish to enforce or defend their legal rights to reasonable 
opportunity to do so.360 In particular, access to justice has been framed in terms of 
access to the legal process and access to the courts.361 Furthermore, access to justice 
has been defined as access to due redress.362 This work does not enter the question 
of what should be meant by access to justice, and it will limit itself to consider 
access to justice in the general sense referring to one’s opportunities to defend his 
legal rights and to obtain due redress for the wrongs received. 
I mentioned earlier that TPLF increases the chances that a claimholder will 
act for the protection of his rights. In fact, both the ‘poor’ plaintiff and the ‘non-
                                                      
359 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI (gen. ed.) ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 4 v. (Milan, 1978-1979); CHRISTINE 
PARKER, JUST LAWYERS AND REGULATION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Oxford University Press, 2004); Ugo Mattei, Access to Justice. A Renewed 
Global Issue? 11.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., 2-4 (2007), available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/113/article113-14.pdf. 
360 D.L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 359, 5. 
361 See RT. HON. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT, HMSO, London 1996. 
362 V. WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS, supra note 16, 16. 
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poor’ plaintiff benefit from TPLF.363 On the one hand, a claimholder who cannot 
afford to bring suit will do so if he has external funding available. On the other 
hand, the chances that a risk-averse ‘non-poor’ plaintiff brings suit against a 
wrongdoer may also increase if he does not bear the risk of litigation. This 
beneficial effect (from the viewpoint of the claimholder) is though not to be 
considered an externality, because it is ‘included’ in the Pareto improvement 
obtained through TPLF in relation to the parties involved. 
Conversely, it can be inferred that the existence of a system that provides 
broader access to justice, which as such increases the level of equality within a 
given society, produces the external effect of increasing all individuals’ utilities, 
because individuals possess, in connection with a notion of morality that includes 
equality, a set of tastes that affect their utility.364 Under the classical utilitarian 
measure of social welfare, the overall level of social welfare raises when any 
individual’s utility increases. Furthermore, under other measures, not just the sum, 
but also the distribution of utilities generally matters, and more equal distributions 
of utility may be superior to less equal distributions.365 In the light of those 
arguments, TPLF produces a positive external effect that increases social welfare. 
 
Social Benefits of Deterrence 
The possibility for a claimholder and an investor to bargain over property rights in 
litigation and to come to a TPLF agreement, apart from making both parties better 
off, produces an external effect on potential defendants that the law and economics 
                                                      
363 See Section B. 2 (a) in this Chapter. 
364 S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 601. 
365 See ibid., 597. 
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literature refers to as the ‘deterrence’ effect.366  
If potential defendants know in advance or reasonably expect that 
individuals, who might potentially sue them, will not do so because of lack of funds 
or risk aversion, then the former will have no or lesser incentive to avoid the 
happening of those events that would entitle the latter with a legal claim against the 
former. Optimal deterrence requires potential injurers to be aware of the fact that 
they will bear full costs of the harm they produce.367 If potential injurers are aware 
of that, they will optimally internalize the costs of their actions so to engage in their 
harmful activities to the extent that the private benefits are not outweighed by the 
costs, which, if they are held fully liable, become private costs. The rationale that 
applies here is similar to that which explains why strict liability induces injurers to 
choose socially optimal levels of care in the economic analysis of tort law.368 If a 
potential injurer expects that potential victims will not sue them because of lack of 
funds or risk aversion, then they will be led to take a sub-optimal level of care that 
will result in too many wrongs.  
TPLF provides funds to claimholders under a budget constraint and increases 
the expected value of a claim held by risk-averse plaintiffs. Consequently, the 
availability on the market of TPLF functions as a signal for potential defendants of 
the fact that their counterparts will count on solid financial resources to sue them. 
Thus, behaviors likely to create more losses than benefits, which their actors would 
be held responsible for, are discouraged by the availability of TPLF. 
                                                      
366 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). 
367 Robert Cooter, Commodifying Liability, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 139, 
141-142 (F.H. Buckley ed.,1999). 
368 See S. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 277, 179-180; S. 
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, supra note 366. 
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c)  Re-assessing the Costs and Benefits of TPLF 
The economic analysis developed in this section has allowed us to test some of the 
core arguments brought by supporters and opponents of TPLF, who use them to 
advocate for either an increasing liberalization or a restriction of this practice, 
respectively. Testing those arguments through the lenses of the economic analysis of 
law is useful in order to understand whether they are genuine arguments, to be taken 
into account when taking policy decisions on TPLF, or whether they are false 
arguments constructed by stakeholders in order to lobby for a more favorable 
regulatory environment. 
The first conclusion that the economic analysis led to is that TPLF is Pareto 
efficient. In other words, TPLF allows for mutually beneficial trades in property 
rights in litigation between the parties to a TPLF agreement, in a way that allows 
both parties to be better off, and no one worse off. By definition, if either one of the 
party would be made worse off by the agreement, there would be no agreement. 
From this point if view, therefore, TPLF deserves approval. 
The economic analysis also proved some of the beneficial effects that TPLF 
supporters attribute to this practice, namely access to justice and deterrence. 
In contrast, the economic analysis was capable to dismantle the main 
arguments concerning potential negative externalities associated with TPLF. In 
particular, the economic analysis has shown that the alleged ethical issues are pure 
rhetoric and not real issues to be concerned about. With particular respect to the 
issue of control, our analysis has shown that it is not a sufficient concern to ban 
TPLF. In particular, either the parties are allowed to bargain over control rights, thus 
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likely reaching efficient allocations of those rights, or—if we prefer not to allow 
parties to do so—the law (and professional responsibility rules) may play a role and 
restrict the transferability of control rights to litigation funders. 
Importantly, also, our analysis dismantled the argument that TPLF 
determines an increase in the volume of litigation that would be detrimental for 
society. Specifically, from an economic point of view, whether TPLF increases the 
volume of litigation to socially undesirable levels is an empirical question. TPLF 
may well generate positive deterrence in a way that more litigation corresponds to 
fewer accidents, determining a total saved cost that exceeds the cost of litigation, in 
which case social welfare would be increased. However, this is an empirical 
question; it is not a matter of principle on which a regulator can blindly base any 
policy intervention. 
 
C. TPLF THROUGH THE LENSES OF SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
While economic analysis is a very useful tool in addressing policy issues, it may 
alone not be sufficient. When economic analysis reveals that a certain practice is 
efficient, then according to its own ‘internal rules’ it creates no problem and there is 
no need for regulation.369 However, other reasons external to economic ones may 
exist justifying regulation. In order to find if there are any such reasons, sociological 
analysis is a useful tool, both in a descriptive perspective (i.e., to understand the 
existence of other interest in regulation than economic), and in a normative 
perspective (i.e., because regulators should take into account the products of 
                                                      
369 See e.g. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 324. 
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sociological analysis when taking policy decisions). This is because regulators 
should act by balancing out different values of political life, of which economic 
values are just one set out of many others. 
A scholastic example concerns the sale of children. In a transaction for the 
sale of a child, both parties are made better off from the deal. In particular, one party 
wants to get rid of his child in exchange for cash, while the other party is willing to 
pay in order to have a child. Therefore, there are gains from trade in this situation 
and a transaction for the sale of a child would be efficient. However, ethical limits 
justify the prohibition of this practice in most existing societies and legal systems. 
This can be explained by the fact that we do not only look at economics when taking 
policy decisions.370 
Another example of something that ‘works’ from an economic perspective, 
but may not be desirable on other grounds, concerns the reduction of government 
expenditure on the national health system for reimbursed drugs. Imagine a poor sick 
man, who must take an expensive treatment in order to recover and cannot afford it. 
The drug is currently reimbursed by the national health system, but the government 
is considering deleting this drug from the list of reimbursed drugs in order to reduce 
public expenditure. The government argues that private investors will make up for 
the government’s de-listing of the drug. In particular, a private investor may decide 
to finance the patient’s cure in exchange for a 30% of any remuneration the man 
will earn during his working lifetime. If the patient survives the treatment and is 
                                                      
370 We may in fact construe the prohibition to trade in children in economic terms. A child market 
would likely create widespread mental suffering by people for simply knowing that such as market is 
in place. It is likely that the costs produced by this mental suffering would decrease social welfare 
(measured as the sum of individual levels of welfare) to an extent larger than the benefit to the parties 
to a transaction for the sale of a child. Therefore, a child market would be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. 
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successful on his job, the investor will have made a good deal and a high profit. By 
contrast, if the patient dies or will make little money during his life, the investor will 
have made a bad deal. In any case, in this example the incentives of the parties to 
the agreement are aligned. Should the government go ahead with this policy? Is this 
something we would want to take place in our society?  
It should be noted that TPLF may be similar to the example just described. 
In particular, it is easy to compare the above example with the government reduction 
of legal aid expenditure and the concomitant opening to TPLF as a private means to 
finance litigation. However, the comparison with TPLF may stand even without the 
reference to the reimbursement and de-listing issue (compared to a reduction in legal 
aid).  
The concluding question we ask ourselves therefore is: is TPLF something 
we like, comparable to ‘normal’ financial investments, or does it involve a dynamic 
that is similar to the example of the pharmaceutical product, which most people are 
likely neither to like nor want in our society? 
Most policy arguments in the debate on TPLF are of a legal or economic 
nature. However, some scholars have brought forward a sociological argument 
raising the concern that TPLF risks to generate excessive commodification of the 
legal system and commercialization of the practice of law.371 In particular, this 
process would lead to a replacement of the idea of the legal claim as a means 
towards the fulfillment of a right with that of the legal claim as a commodity, as a 
business opportunity, or even a pretext, for an investor (and in turn its shareholders, 
                                                      
371 E.g. J. Kalajdzic, P. Cashman & A. Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of 
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, supra note 9, 104. 
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i.e. ultimately taxpayers) to seek a profit. Similarly, the practice of law would no 
longer be a profession serving the needs of clients and the interest of justice, but it 
would become a business purely devoted to the service of capital.  
Roughly speaking, this problem is likely to be felt more in the civil law 
world than in common law systems (especially the US), as the latter are typically 
more accustomed to the vicinity of the legal profession to the business world, and 
are perhaps more commodified than the civil law counterparts (think of the 
widespread acceptance of contingency fees in the US, the more liberal regime for 
lawyer advertising, the existence of class actions led by entrepreneurial plaintiff 
lawyers, among other things). 
Within this perspective, a lot depends on the type of claim that is financed by 
the investor: a personal injury claim is certainly different from a corporate claim for 
the infringement of a patent. Businesses have fewer feelings than physical persons, 
and all corporate activity is perceived as an emotionally neutral activity that is 
conducted for profit, including litigation. People hardly think of corporate litigation 
as a way to fulfill ‘rights,’ but rather as a way to recover cash as part of the overall 
business’s goal to maximize profits. In this light, TPLF is morally less shocking 
when applied to corporate litigation. Think, by contrast, of someone investing in a 
rich man’s wife’s divorce, or in a succession case. This immediately shows that 
there are some types of claims where TPLF may result morally odd.  
However, morals evolve with time, and activities that today are commonly 
accepted might have seemed unethical in the past. If TPLF becomes part of our 
daily routine, perhaps one day people will walk into claim stores and sell them in 
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exchange for cash just like we do today when we walk into a bank to take out a loan 
to buy a new house, and the bank makes a profit from the transaction. 
Different from the concern for the economic costs resulting from an 
increased volume of litigation, discussed above, is a concern for the increased role 
of litigation in social dynamics. This may be relevant from a sociological 
perspective in the context of TPLF.  
This concern deals with the idea that TPLF would make all social 
relationships more commodified, in a way that litigation arises more easily if TPLF 
is available. That would be because, due to the third-party funder’s initiative, 
litigation arises even where it would otherwise not have arisen absent TPLF. Some 
people are concerned with this trend, and prefer that society use other ways to deter 
and solve controversies, in accordance with culture, which would be politically 
preferable although economically inefficient.  
This evolution would walk hand-in-hand with a society that is more and 
more individualistic. In the absence of TPLF, a plaintiff has to risk his own money 
in order to sue somebody, and he also has to publicly stand up for his own cause 
against the defendant. By contrast, with TPLF, everything becomes de-personalized, 
because the plaintiff hides behind an operation in which the funder has a legitimate 
economic interest. Therefore, while with no TPLF the litigation is rooted in the 
plaintiff’s initiative alone (who is seen as interested and greedy), if the litigation is 
financed by a third party the attention shifts onto the TPLF provider: the litigation 
becomes justified by the funder’s legitimate business (it is the funder’s job), and 
therefore the plaintiff is somehow protected from a social point of view. It is 
possible that society does not like this trend, at least in certain cultures, because this 
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is capable to tamper with social equilibriums, creating a more individualistic 
society, where conflicts are solved in new ways (and with new justifications) that 
are efficient (though with the caveat of the social v. private incentives to bring suit), 
but are politically not desirable. 
Nevertheless, even in light of the present sociological argument, TPLF finds 
a moment of redemption when it concerns either pure business litigation, which is a 
less sensible type of litigation for the collective conscience, or poor people’s 
litigation, where litigation that otherwise would not be possible may be seen as 
being for a ‘noble cause.’ In fact, on the one hand, society is more likely to tolerate 
the idea that investors finance business litigation, because this remains within the 
realm of business. On the other hand, society may even like the idea that external 
funding makes possible poor people’s litigation, where otherwise weak and harmed 
parties would not be able to use the channel of private enforcement in order to 
obtain redress for the harms suffered. In those cases, society might like externally 
funded litigation as a means to solve controversies. 
As a concluding comment, generally speaking, many people look at TPLF 
with suspicion because they do not know where to locate it conceptually within the 
relationship between profit motive and justice. Behind this mental attitude stands the 
cultural tendency of many people to reject the idea that profit motive and justice are 
two compatible concepts. Some people tend to believe that everything that deals 
with profit be somehow incompatible with a higher degree of justice and welfare 
(think, for example, of the perception of oil extracting companies or pharmaceutical 
companies as evil players!).  
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Instead, at the basis of this view of TPLF is a fundamental trick. In my view, 
TPLF provides the funder with an economic incentive to make profit from a higher 
level of justice. Profit and justice are not incompatible: TPLF does not put the two 
concepts in a relationship of the type ‘profit vs. justice,’ but rather it makes it 
possible to ‘profit from justice.’ 
 
D. “ADELANTE, CON JUICIO”372 
We have come to a point where we can look back at TPLF and try to address our 
two key questions (should TPLF be permitted? / if so, should it be regulated?), after 
having uncovered the debate on TPLF and tested the main arguments used by 
stakeholders to lobby in their respective favor. 
Overall, the reassessment leads to the conclusion that TPLF is desirable and 
it should be permitted. This is because (i) TPLF is Pareto efficient, and (ii) any 
concerns regarding the relationship between the parties to a TPLF agreement (e.g., 
abuse by the funder, excessive profits) may and should be addressed using normal 
contract law remedies made available by the legal system. 
With respect to other concerns raised by the debate, namely the externalities 
allegedly produced by TPLF on the collectivity (e.g., increased volume of 
litigation), economic analysis has shown that most of such concerns are not real 
issue and therefore do not require regulation. 
                                                      
372 This Spanish expression (English: “Go ahead, with caution”) appears in Alessandro Manzoni’s 
1827 novel The Betrothed (I Promessi Sposi) (Chapter XII). In particular, the Grand Chancellor 
Ferrer pronounces this phrase to his coachman while his carriage passes through a crowd of 
protesters while entering Milan.  
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By contrast, regulation may be justified in order to ensure a proper 
functioning of the TPLF market. For example, regulation may be desirable in order 
to: (i) protect the interests of claimholders and funders, e.g. by granting privileged 
status to their communications; and (ii) protect the interest of consumers and users 
of TPLF services, by requiring clear and transparent contractual terms from funders 
(this favoring competition in the market), as well as solvency or similar 
requirements. Further analysis will be required to review how in detail TPLF should 
be regulated.  
In addition, appropriate professional responsibility rules should be in place 
to ensure that lawyers are loyal to their client even in the presence of a third-party 
funder. And finally, with respect to the issue of control, transfer rights may be 
restricted in order to protect claimholders, although a liberalization in this respect 
would allow efficient allocations of control rights, and thus may be beneficial. 
With respect to the sociological concerns outlines above, policymakers shall 
take them into account when thinking of how to regulate TPLF. However, in this 
work I limited myself to what I believe should be the role of academics, i.e. 
identifying and explaining the nature of problems. The sociological issues I 
discussed help explain some stakeholders’ interest in regulation, and may as well 
justify regulatory intervention. However, these are matters for politics to decide, not 
a matter for scholarship.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
TPLF is a rapidly expanding phenomenon and it is here to stay. Its importance 
should not be underestimated. On the one hand, TPLF breaks with the traditional 
view of litigation, by adding a third party alongside the claimholder and her lawyer 
on the plaintiff side. On the other hand, TPLF is likely to have a long-term impact 
on the civil justice system as a whole, by increasing the interrelations between the 
latter and the world of finance, adding an entrepreneurial flavor to the business that 
orbits around the pursuit of civil justice, and ultimately changing the way in which 
litigation is perceived in both business and social dynamics. 
Faced with the arrival on the scene of TPLF, the law was unprepared to 
welcome it. In the common law world, courts reacted by pulling out ancient 
doctrines such as maintenance and champerty, which were originally designed to 
prevent practices that on their face resembled TPLF. However, the rationale 
justifying the prohibitions on maintenance and champerty had faded away in 
modern societies. This has determined fluctuating court decisions across the 
common law world in this rapidly evolving area of the law. Recently, this 
uncertainty has come closer to an end. In some of the main common law 
jurisdictions, the traditional legal obstacles to TPLF are gradually being abandoned, 
and the current trend points in the direction of permitting TPLF and favoring its 
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establishment. Some minor jurisdictions are following shortly behind, while others 
are showing a higher degree of hostility with respect to this practice.  
Throughout the common law world, public policy considerations have 
played a major role in directing the courts in dealing with TPLF. In this context, 
access to justice has been the core argument opening the field to TPLF. By contrast, 
courts’ fears for abuses of process have put a break to the accelerating TPLF 
industry. 
In the civil law world, the picture is quite different. On the one hand, no 
prohibitions to TPLF seem to exist on the face of the law. On the other hand, the 
TPLF industry has thus far been much less interested in investing in litigation in 
civil law countries, and only timidly entered selected markets therein. 
The analysis of the law of TPLF in Chapter II revealed that the legal and 
regulatory divergence between the common law and civil law experiences is striking 
on its face. However, looking beyond the surface of declamatory provisions, the 
comparative analysis of the operative rules governing TPLF (carried out through an 
observation of the interplay of different legal formants) led to the conclusion that 
both traditions share common problems and similar solutions to the challenges 
posed by TPLF, thus ‘narrowing the distance’ between the two legal traditions. In 
particular, the analysis of the problem concerning the transfer of control rights from 
the claimholder to the funder, and the observation that passive funding is admissible 
in all jurisdictions under analysis, led to this conclusion. 
The counterintuitive fact that TPLF is much more developed in the common 
law than in the civil law world also found an explanation through comparative 
analysis. In particular, the reasons for this state of facts should not be looked for in 
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any positive rule of law, but rather they may be found in the context in which TPLF 
operates. On the one hand, structural features—such as the costs of litigation and the 
predictability of courts—help explain why the common law markets might have 
attracted the TPLF industry more than their civil law counterparts. On the other 
hand, cultural attitudes and cryptotypes—such as the entrepreneurial temperament 
of the legal profession and the extent of ‘commodification’ of the legal system—
play a fundamental role in determining this divergence in the development of the 
TPLF market. However, the theoretical and practical conditions for a successful 
expansion of TPLF in the civil law world are present, and the fact that more and 
more companies are being incorporated to invest in litigation in the Old Continent 
suggests that we will soon see evidence of such an expansion. 
After reviewing the status of the law of TPLF, I started a journey into the 
politics of TPLF. I analyzed the political debate that stands behind the evolution of 
the law of TPLF, identifying the key actors involved and the real driving forces that 
steer the law in the area. On the one hand, the TPLF industry is pushing towards a 
favorable legal and regulatory environment, running away from government 
regulation. On the other hand, the community of potential large corporate 
defendants (represented in the US by the Chamber of Commerce) has launched 
sharp attacks against the TPLF industry by engaging in intense lobbying activities.  
A heated academic debate over the desirability of TPLF has arisen around 
these lobbying battles. While some scholars limit their efforts to analyzing the legal 
or economic essence of TPLF, others openly advocate for either a liberalization or a 
restriction of this practice. Moreover, bar associations and governmental institutions 
also expressed their views on TPLF, contributing to shaping the law in this area. 
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In the last chapter, I attempted to lift the veil on the political debate on 
TPLF, by decomposing the main policy arguments raised in favor and against this 
practice, and revealing which are genuine policy arguments and which are false 
rhetoric narratives. First, I did so by testing these arguments using economic 
analysis. The results revealed that TPLF is Pareto efficient, and no economic 
reasons are per se sufficient to justify a ban or restriction of this practice. Moreover, 
the economic analysis revealed that no further regulation is required in addition to 
the ordinary legal remedies and regulatory schemes normally provided by the legal 
system.  
Secondly, I proposed some sociological arguments that might help explain 
and find a justification for the regulation of TPLF notwithstanding the results of the 
economic analysis (which might per se not be sufficient to determine public policy 
decisions). However, these justifications are the mirror of political preferences. The 
role of scholarship in this respect should be limited to identifying and explaining 
such sociological arguments. From there, whether those sociological concerns 
should serve as foundations for public policy is a question that should be left to 
politics to decide. 
We have come to the conclusion of this journey. At this point, we are ready 
to answer the two key questions that this work is intended to address, and namely: 
(i) whether TPLF should be permitted; and, if so, (ii) whether it should be regulated. 
With respect to the former question, I came to the conclusion that TPLF should be 
permitted, as a further liberalization of TPLF would ultimately be socially 
beneficial. With respect to the second question, regulation should be not be adopted 
to restrict the practice of TPLF. However, some form of regulation may be 
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appropriate in order to ensure the proper functioning of the industry in a fair, 
transparent, and competitive environment. 
I hope that the reader will have enjoyed reading this dissertation, and I hope 
that she or he will have understood most of what I had so say on TPLF. However, 
there is one message that I really hope went through, as I believe that it will 
distinguish the people who read this thesis from those that did not. While many 
people out there perceive litigation funders as greedy players, who take advantage of 
the justice system in order to aggrandize their pockets, thus placing themselves in a 
competitive relationship with the idea of justice, I challenge this view. TPLF 
provides litigation funders with an economic incentive to profit from a higher level 
of justice. Therefore, in my opinion, profit-motive and justice are not incompatible 
concepts. Rather, when it comes to TPLF, this practice makes it possible to ‘profit 
from justice.’ 
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